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FEDERAL DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE
INTERFERENCE WITH STATE COURT
PROCEEDINGS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE LIMITS OF
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
RALPH U. WHITTENt

I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most unusual characteristics of our judicial system in
the United States is its side-by-side arrangement of two sets of courts
with concurrent jurisdiction over certain categories of cases, one set obtaining its powers from the national government, the other operating
within and deriving its authority from each of -the several states. In
theory the constitutional authority of Congress to establish inferior federal courts' might have provided the opportunity to allocate business
between the state and federal court systems without creating a scheme
of concurrent jurisdiction. For example, one such allocation of business might have been delegation to the federal courts of exclusive authority to resolve all disputes of "national" concern, while the state systems retained the authority to resolve all "local" disputes." In practice,
however, either because Congress has deemed federal interests adequately protected by a grant of less than exclusive jurisdiction to the
federal courts over certain "national" matters, or because "national"
and "local" issues cannot be neatly compartmentalized within exclusive
jurisdictional grants, state and federal courts under the existing jurisdictional pattern share the responsibility for resolving many categories of
disputes involving some "federal" element. ' This system of shared reI

t Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina, B.B.A., 1966, J.D.,
1969, University of Texas, L.L.M., 1972, Harvard University. The author thanks Mr.
Robert Rosenfeld, a third year student at the University of South Carolina Law School,
for his invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, art. III, § 1.
2. Another scheme, of course, would be to leave both "national" and "local" matters to the state systems. In other words, Congress would create no system of inferior
federal courts. Under the existing federal jurisdictional scheme, Congress has made a
determination that some "national" matters are of such importance as to warrant a grant
of exclusive jurisdiction over them to the federal courts. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(1970) (admiralty, maritime, and prize cases); id. § 1338(a) (patent, plant variety protection, and copyright cases).
3. Typical of provisions granting jurisdiction to the federal courts concurrent with
that exercised by the state courts are id. § 1331 (general federal question jurisdiction);
id. § 1343 (civil rights and elective franchise"
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sponsibility usually means that at least one of the parties to a lawsuit
has the option of resorting to a federal or state court for the resolution
of a dispute containing some federal issue. When there is an appropriate grant of original jurisdiction over the dispute to the federal courts,
the choice in the first instance belongs to the plaintiff. But even if
the plaintiff elects a state court in such a case, the defendant often has
the option of "removing" the case from the state court to a federal

court.

Thus the system generally operates in a way that insures that,

once both parties have exercised their options, only one system of

courts will remain with the authority to resolve the controversy between
them.'
Because litigation may arise in a variety of forms, however, it is
sometimes possible for a single dispute to be presented for resolution
to both federal and state courts simultaneously. 6 Congress could, of

course, enact detailed rules to govern when federal and state courts
4. Removal jurisdiction, although existing at the option of the defendant, is generally keyed to original jurisdiction. See id. § 1441. The statutory grant of original federal question jurisdiction does not, however, extend to cases in which the federal issue
enters by way of defense; see, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
Congress, however, clearly has the constitutional power to provide for federal defense
removal. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879). Cf. Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). See also ALI STUDY OF THE DiviSiON OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1312 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
ALI STUDY]. It should be noted that this constitutional authority would enable Congress, if it so chose, to make serious inroads upon the states' ability to confine criminal
cases to their own courts, see Tennessee v. Davis, supra, a problem with which this article is intimately concerned. Thus far, however, Congress has not chosen to extend the
removal jurisdiction so far. See 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1970) (once removal is effectuated, "the State court
shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded"); id. § 1447(c), which
provides: "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed
improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case ....
A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by its clerk to the clerk of the
State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case." The authority
of the state courts finally to resolve the dispute is, of course, subject to the power of
review on appeal or by way of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court in cases
involving a federal question. See id. § 1257.
6. For example, A, a citizen of state X, brings suit for $50,000 against B, a citizen of state Y, in a Y state court for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident, the suit being nonremovable because of the restriction upon a resident defendant's
ability to remove in a diversity case. Id. § 1441. For tactical reasons, the defendant
wishes to file suit in federal court upon a claim against the plaintiff arising out of the
same automobile accident rather than file his claim as a counterclaim in the pending
state action. Despite the statutory restriction on removal, he is permitted this as a plaintiff by the general diversity statute, see id. § 1332(a)(1), although he may be prohibited
from maintaining the federal action on other grounds. For a survey of the variety of
cases in which such duplication of proceedings can result see Annot., 5 A.L.R. Fed. 10
(1970).
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must defer to each other's proceedings, but, with minor exceptions, it
has chosen not to do so.7 Thus, the task has been left largely to the
courts to articulate principles that will insure the smooth working of
both systems. This task was long complicated by a feeling on the part
of the federal courts that they should not decline to exercise jurisdiction
legitimately conferred upon them by Congress;' but the power, under
appropriate circumstances, to stay federal actions in deference to state
court proceedings has now generally been recognized by those courts.'
A more restrictive approach has, however, been evident when federal

courts are requested to interfere with state court proceedings by issuing
declaratory or injunctive relief to terminate or moot those proceedings.
In private civil litigation, for example, the federal courts will not
issue injunctions to stop parallel in personam state court actions simply
in order to prevent duplication of effort, 10 although they will issue such
7. The primary exception, for purposes of this article, is the Anti-Injunction Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). For discussion of the history and construction of this provision see Part III(B) infra. For a more elaborate scheme regulating state and federal
deference to proceedings in the courts of other systems see ALI STUDY, supra note 4,
§§ 1371-73.
8. See Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently Pending
State Court Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 684, 687 (1960); Note, Power to Stay Federal
Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE L.J. 978, 980
(1950). The statements of this doctrine have often been cast in absolute form. An
example is Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264 (1821):
It is most true, that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not:
but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction, if it should. The judiciary
cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure, because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful. With
whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must
decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.
Id. at 404. See also McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910). That the Court does
not consider the doctrine absolute, however, is demonstrated by the authorities dealing
with the doctrine of abstention, see note 9 infra.
9. The Supreme Court has recognized the duty of federal courts to defer to state
courts when the narrow, special factors that bring into play the doctrine of abstention
are present. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); C. WRIr, HANDBOOK OF THE Lw OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 52 (2d ed. 1970); Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of
the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974). In addition, despite
the authorities cited in note 8 supra, the lower federal courts have recognized that they
possess the discretion to defer to prior pending state court proceedings under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949); Note, 60
COLUM. L. REv., supra note 8; Note, 59 YALE L.J., supra note 8; Annot., 5 A.L.R. Fed.
10 (1970). It should be noted, however, that the latter courts have recognized no absolute obligation to defer even to prior pending state actions. See P. BATOR, D. SHAPmo, P. MISHKIN, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEER.AL SYSTEM 1234, 1254-61 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
10. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 1235.
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injunctions to protect their jurisdiction over property within their control.11 These principles have been derived from present and past versions of the Federal Anti-Injunction Act1 2 and the judicial construction
of that Act.' Similar judicial construction of the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act 4 has also resulted in federal court deference to pending
state actions when federal declaratory relief is requested. 5
The most intense problems in federal-state relationships do not,
however, occur in the area of private civil litigation. Rather, those
problems occur when federal courts are asked to halt or prevent state
court proceedings on federal constitutional grounds. The problems are
more intense in such cases both because state feelings are often likely
to run high against federal interference, and because of the tension that
exists between state interests and the obligations conferred on the federal courts by Congress. On the one hand, the congressional grant of
federal question jurisdiction to the federal courts, while not absolute,
does carry with it at some point the obligation to adjudicate those cases
in which litigants properly invoke the jurisdiction, including cases involving constitutional challenges to state authority."0 On the other
hand, state courts and state judges are equally bound to enforce the
Constitution of the United States in preference to state law when the
two are inconsistent.17 Moreover, the states, not the national govern11. Id. See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 '(1922). Much can
be said against these rules when they result in wasteful duplication of proc.eedings in
both federal and state courts. For example, there seems to be no valid distinction between in personam and in rem proceedings. In an in rem proceeding the property or
thing that is the subject of the litigation is very often not in the physical custody of
the court at all, despite the judicial fiction that it is. Any interference that another court
might cause would thus be with the disposition of the property. But this is precisely
the kind of interference caused in in personam proceedings--i.e. interference with another court's disposition of the litigation. Ordinary principles of res judicata might as
easily control both kinds of cases, or perhaps injunctions could be permitted against the
second proceeding.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). For a discussion of the history and construction
of this provision see Part III(B) infra.
13. See HART & WEcHSLER, supra note 9, at 1235-39.
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
15. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
16. Most of the challenges to state authority dealt with in this article are brought
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). In cases brought under
that provision, Congress has conferred jurisdiction upon the federal courts without regard to the jurisdictional amount in controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970); cf.
id. § 1331. It has been persuasively argued that the grant of jurisdiction in these cases
is especially compelling. See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 230 (1948).
17. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. Procedurally, in the category of cases being discussed
in the text, the constitutional question would most often be raised by way of defense
in a state civil or criminal proceeding, although state anticipatory remedies for constitutional violations are also available.
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ment, are the source of those laws, rules, and regulations that most directly and most frequently bear on the primary conduct and the dayto-day activities of every citizen. Structurally speaking, this places the
bulk of the responsibility for the wise protection of individual rights
upon the state judiciaries. Necessarily included within that responsibility is the duty of enforcing federal constitutional guarantees, and a corollary of this duty is the function of construing state laws consistently
with those guarantees whenever possible-a function that the federal
courts, in the final analysis, cannot authoritatively perform.' 8 Thus the
states have a vital interest in insuring that their courts, rather than federal courts, will usually decide constitutional questions involving local
laws.
It should be apparent that this function of state courts to initially
decide federal constitutional issues is seriously impaired when the responsibility for constitutional decision-making is taken wholesale from
state tribunals and exercised by federal judges. Yet such impairment
can be the only result if the federal courts, by issuing anticipatory relief
against state proceedings, frequently interpose themselves between the
state courts and the process of constitutional adjudication. As a result,
both Congress and the Supreme Court have attempted to construct
principles that would resolve the dilemma posed by the competing obligations imposed on the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon them to protect constitutional rights from state infringement and simultaneously to avoid unnecessary interference with state
court proceedings. The most important legislative attempt to resolve
the dilemma is the Federal Anti-Injunction Act, previously mentioned.'" However, because of the various legislative and judicial exceptions to this statute which have been created over the years, it has
not constituted an effective mechanism for resolving the conflicts described.20 As a result, the bulk of the responsibility for achieving a
balance between the jurisdictional grant and countervailing state interests has again fallen to the judiciary, primarily to the Supreme Court
of the United States. The Court has undertaken this task by developing principles of restraint for the federal courts to utilize in administering the discretionary remedies of injunction and declaratory judgment.
18. Compare Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), with Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941); Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957) and England v. Louisiana State Bd.
of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 419-20 (1964).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). See text accompanying note 12 supra.
20. See the discussion of the history of this statute in Part III(B) infra.
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Given the sensitivity and complexity of this job, it is not surprising to
learn that the Court has vacillated somewhat in the development of
these principles. In fact, an examination of the Court's decisions will
reveal that the rigor with which it has been willing to apply principles
of restraint has varied with its perception of the need for federal relief
against state authority in any given period of history.2"
In 1971 the Court entered a new period in its evolution of rules
to guide the lower federal courts in determining requests for injunctions
and declaratory judgments against state court proceedings. In six cases
decided in February of that year, the Court made it plain that it was
considerably tightening the availability of declaratory and injunctive relief against state criminal actions, 22 although the full scope of the contraction is not yet clear. The purpose of this article is to examine the
legitimacy of the Court's regulation of the discretionary remedies of injunction and declaratory judgment in these and subsequent cases. The
thesis of the article is that, given the legitimacy of the Court's role in
settling the conflict between the federal courts' obligation to adjudicate
controversies within their jurisdiction and their obligation to avoid
emasculating interference with the state court systems, its response has
been deficient in several important respects. First, the Court has failed
to articulate a workable, principled formula for allocating responsibility
for constitutional adjudication between the two systems of courts. Secondly, the Court has, while adhering in form to the traditional rules governing the administration of declaratory and injunctive relief, in fact
perverted the principles which ought to govern the administration of
those remedies in our system. Finally, as a result of the above two
failures, the Court has, perhaps intentionally, aggrandized to the federal
courts a degree of discretion to decline to adjudicate that they are not
entitled to exercise, even in administering basically discretionary remedies. To understand fully the deficiencies in the Court's response, it
is important to understand the rules that traditionally determine when
declaratory and injunctive relief will issue and the history of those
remedies in the federal courts.
In any systemic analysis of the federal courts, certain goals should
be used as indicia of a functional system. Most important, the rules
21. The Court's application of restraint in issuing declaratory and injunctive relief
is discussed in Part III(A) infra.
22. See Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200
(1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971);
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). These
cases are discussed in Part IV infra.
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by which any remedy is administered should reflect the real reasons
and policies behind judicial decisions. These rules should reflect the
current needs of the judicial system and not be mere rubrics of another
era. If the federal courts instead adhere to the terminology of traditional
rules while announcing decisions based on policies irrelevant to those
rules, the rules lose their capacity to perform a limiting function. They
then only obscure the decision-making process, creating at least the
appearance of arbitrariness, if not the actual opportunity for arbitrary
decision-making. In a modem procedural system, therefore, courts
should establish and be limited by intelligible, functional procedural
rules. These rules should form the basis for decision-making, and not
be used as justifications for decisions made on other grounds.
II.

T-m TRADITIONAL RULES GOVERNING THE AwARD OF
INJUNCTIONS AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

A.

Injunctions

There were three traditional doctrines of equity jurisprudence that
governed when a court would issue injunctive relief that are relevant
to this article. First, there was the often-stated rule that equity would
not enjoin a criminal proceeding. Secondly, was the principle that, before equity would grant an injunction in any case, the plaintiff had to
demonstrate a threat of "irreparable injury." Thirdly, was the requirement that the injury threatened must be "imminent" and "substantial"
before an injunction would issue. The characteristics and purposes of
these doctrines are discussed below. Then the effects of the merger
of law and equity in modem procedural systems are examined in order
to determine the standards that should be employed by a court operating within such a modern system in determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate.
(1) The Principle That Equity Will Not Enjoin A Criminal
Proceeding
In examining the traditional rules governing injunctions against
criminal prosecutions, one often encounters the principle, stated in various ways, that equity will not interfere with criminal proceedings."
23. See, e.g., Kerr v. Corporation of Preston, 6 Ch. D. 463, 467 (1876); Saull v.
Browne, L.R. 10 Ch. 64 (1872); 1 J. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS
§§ 68, 272 (3d ed. 1890); 1 H. JOYCE, A TREATISE ON THE LAw RELATING TO INJUNCTIONS §§ 58-60 (1909); 4 J. POMERY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRuDENcE § 1361b
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The fundamental basis of the principle seems to have been a lack of
criminal jurisdiction in the English Court of Chancery. 24 More precisely, the rule seems to be the result of Chancery's renunciation of its
criminal jurisdiction when the common law began to afford adequate
remedies for criminal violations:
When, however, an improved state of society diminished the
frequency of crime, and the state of the country permitted that the
powers of the magistracy and of the ordinary tribunals should be
efficiently exerted for the repression of outrage and violence, and
an effectual supervision was exercised over the magistrates themselves; and when the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts to afford
Compensation for injuries, as well as to inflict punishment, was
completely established, the necessity for the interference of the
Court of Chancery in such matters ceased, and the Court of
Chancery renounced its jurisdiction. In modern times the Court
of Chancery has refused to exercise any jurisdiction for the repression of crimes, or even to afford its aid to the criminal jurisdiction
of the courts of common law .... 25
The basic limitation on interference with criminal proceedings was often
stated in conjunction with the rule that equity protects property rights
rather than personal rights.2 6
Although the rule against noninterference with criminal proceedings seems to be absolute, the authorities reveal some important exceptions. One long-standing qualification of the rule permitted an injunction against a party in an equity suit, to prevent him from using a subsequently commenced criminal proceeding to litigate the same matter at
issue in the equitable action. 2 7 Some English decisions attempted to narrow this exception to the general rule by restricting it to cases in which
the object of the subsequent criminal proceeding was identical to that
of the equity suit.28 However, other authorities seem to indicate that the
(5th ed. 1941); 1 T. SPELLING, A TREATISE ON INJUNCTIONS AND OTHER EXTRAORDINARY
REMEDIES §§ 24, 71 (2d ed. 1901); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JUISPRUIDENCE § 893 (12th ed. 1877).

T.

24. See 1 J. HIGH, supra note 23, § 68; 1 H. JOYCE, supra note 23, §§ 58, 59; 1
SPELLING, supra note 23, § 24; 2 J. STORY, supra note 23, § 893.
25. 1 G. SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 688

(1846).
26. See Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818). See also 1 J. HIGH, supra
note 23, § 68; 1 H. JOYCE, supra note 23, § 59. For a discussion of this case, and of
the property-personal right distinction see Developments in the Law-Inunctions, 78
HAv. L. REv. 994, 998-1001 (1965).
27. See Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 26 Eng. Rep. 584 (Ch. 1742).
28. See Thames Launches, Ltd. v. Trinity House, [19611 Ch. 197 (1960); Saull
v. Browne, L.R. 10 Ch. 64 (1874); cf. Attorney-General v. Cleaver, 34 Eng. Rep. 297,
300 (Ch. 1811).
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exception was part of a broader power to protect equity's jurisdiction

2
over matters and parties within its control .
A second exception to the general rule which is more important

for our purposes is derived from equity's jurisdiction over matters in-

volving property interests. It seems self-evident that even if equity
exists only to protect "civil and property rights," there will be occasions
in which the maintenance of criminal proceedings can damage such
rights.3 0 Nevertheless, the rule against interference remained relatively stringent both in this country and in England until the latter part
of the last century."' At that time the rule began to be relaxed rather
drastically in this country, although apparently not in England.3 2 The
29. See Turner v. Turner, 15 Jurist. 218 (Ch. 1850), reproduced in 2 A. CHAFEE,
227 (1938). In Turner a receiver was appointed in the
course of the administration of an estate and the defendants were enjoined by the court
from carrying on actions of ejectment for any part of the lands of the deceased. Subsequently, the receiver was ordered to pull down a house situated on certain of the property under administration. To do so, however, the receiver's agents were forced to expell
one of the defendant's agents from the premises forcibly. For so doing, the defendant
procured indictments against the agents. The court enjoined the defendant from prosecuting the indictment, holding that despite equity's absence of jurisdiction over an indictment, the court might enjoin a party from obstructing an order against him. Story cites
Turner, among other cases, for the following proposition: "Courts of Equity will not
only grant an injunction, restraining suits at law, between parties upon equitable circumstances; but they will exercise the same jurisdiction to protect their officers, who execute
their processes, against any suits brought against them for acts done under or in virtue
of such processes." 2 1. STORY, supra note 23, § 891, at 176.
But [the restriction against enjoining criminal proceedings] applies only to
cases, where the parties, seeking redress by such proceedings, are not the plaintiffs in Equity; for if they are, the Court possesses power to restrain them personally from proceeding at the same time at law, upon the same matter of civil
right, for redress in the form of a criminal proceeding. In such cases [the injunction] is merely incidental to the ordinary power of the court to impose
terms upon parties who seek its aid in furtherance of their rights.
Id. § 893, at 178 (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Kerr v. Corporation of Preston, 6 Ch. D. 463 (1876), in which plaintiffs had made certain alterations in a building owned by them, allegedly with the knowledge of the local authorities. After the alterations were completed the authorities threatened criminal proceedings against the plaintiffs if they did not undo them. One of the
arguments made by plaintiffs was that the local authority could not prohibit the alterations without paying compensation. See id. at 465. The injunction was refused.
31. See J. STORY, supra note 23, § 893; Developments in the Law, 78 HARv. L.
REV., supra note 26, at 1025.
32. There are a number of English cases articulating the rule that while equity has
no criminal jurisdiction, if a criminal act causes injury to property, equity will intervene.
See, e.g., Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L.R. 6 Eq. 551 (1868); Emperor of Austria
v. Day & Kassut, 45 Eng. Rep. 861 (Ch. 1861). But the view of these cases appears
to have been repudiated in later decisions. See Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, L.R.
10 Ch. App. 142 (1875). See also White v. Mellin, [1895] A.C. 154. Halsbury states
the rule as still being in effect, while citing the repudiating authorities as ones which
strongly suggest a contrary proposition. 21 HALSBJRY'S Lkws OF ENGLAND 347 & nn.
(i)-(1) (3d ed. 1957). The same source does not, however, refer to the exception (or
authorities cited to support or repudiate it) when discussing injunctions against criminal
CASES ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES
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reasons for the intensity of the change in this country have been explained as follows:
Two developments around the turn of the century undercut
the basis for the doctrine of noninterference. An increasing judicial concern with substantive due process was reflected in greater
willingness to provide relief against official action interfering with
the right to own and use property. At the same time, the increasing number of regulatory statutes, such as rate-fixing laws, and municipal police ordinances, such as zoning laws, presented a variety
of conflicts with these property rights. The new laws, often enforced by criminal sanctions, produced numerous challenges to
their validity and applicability in which only legal questions were
raised. Many of these laws affected continuing commercial activities, and those who might be within the scope of the laws were
faced with an unpleasant dilemma: either forego their arguably
legitimate and perhaps constitutionally protected activity, or continue it and risk heavy penalties if enforcement procedures should
subsequently be instituted. 3
Thus, because of the fundamental structural differences between
our system and -the English system, there was an expansion of equity's
authority to interfere in criminal matters involving constitutional issues. 34 Coupled with the subsequent demise of the distinction between the protection of property rights and the protection of personal
rights by equity, 35 this expansion of authority held serious implications
for the ability of government officials to enforce public policy through
the medium of the criminal law. However, the blanket restriction upon
equity's jurisdiction to interfere with criminal matters was not the only
potential limitation upon the issuance of injunctions against criminal
prosecutions. The requirements, previously mentioned, that before an
injunction might issue there had to be a threat of "irreparable injury,"
which was "imminent" and "substantial," still held the potential for limiting drastically equity's ability to intervene in criminal actions.
(2) The Principle that an Injunction Will Issue only to
Prevent "Irreparable Injury"
Even after the expansion in this country of equity's authority to
enjoin criminal prosecutions, the courts were not willing to grant injuncproceedings. See id. at 406. See also Note, Injunctions Against Criminal Proceedings,
14 HARV. L. REv. 293, 294 (1900).
33. Developments in the Law, 78 H-Iv. L. Rav., supra note 26, at 1024.
34. Note, 14 HAlv. L. REv., supra note 32, at 294.
35. The evolution and erosion of the personal-property rights distinction is discussed fully in Developments in the Law, 78 HARV. L. REv., supra note 26, at 998-1001.
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tions merely upon a complaint that a prosecution was being brought or
threatened under an invalid law. 36 Rather, plaintiffs in equity have always had to demonstrate in addition to the law's invalidity that they
were threatened with- some "irreparable injury" before an injunction
would issue.17 Typical of statements expressing this general rule is the
following: "An injunction, being the 'strong arm of equity,' should
never be granted except in a clear case of irreparable injury, and with
a full conviction on the part of the court of its urgent necessity." 8
So stated, however, the rule is somewhat misleading. The expression "irreparable injury," or "irreparable harm" implies that an injury
which is absolutely destructive in some sense is required, but this has
clearly never been the case. On the contrary, the term "irreparable
injury" means no more or no less than that the plaintiff's legal remedy
must be inadequate-a traditional restriction on equity's authority to restrain actions at law. 39 The following is a good explanation of the doctrine's true meaning:
In its general sense an irreparable injury is one which cannot
be repaired by any means accessible to individual parties or by invoking the aid of others. In its technical sense, as used in connection with the question of granting or withholding preventive
equitable aid, we mean by saying that an injury is irreparable
either that no legal remedy furnishes full compensation or adequate
redress, owing to the inherent ineffectiveness of such legal remedy,
or that, owing to the delay incident to the prosecution of an action
at law to final judgment and obtaining service thereon, such judgment and process would prove fruitless of beneficial results. However it may have been at a former period, it is not entirely correct
to say at present, that an injunction will never be granted except
in cases of irreparable threatened injury as a consequence of with36. See, e.g., Kent Prods., Inc. v. Hoegh, 245 Iowa 205, 61 N.W.2d 711 (1953);
Williams v. Board of Barber Examiners, 75 N.D. 33, 25 N.W.2d 282 (1946); Olds v.
Klotz, 131 Ohio St. 447, 3 N.E.2d 371 (1936); Sherod v. Aitchison, 71 Ore. 446, 142
P. 351 (1914).
37. See cases cited note 36 supra.
38. 1 J.HiOH, supra note 23, § 22, at 22. See also 1 H. JoYCE, Supra note 23,
§ 35, at 70 ("It is a general rule that, where a complaint shows that the injury threatened will be an irreparable one, a court of equity will grant relief by an injunction.").
39. This traditional limitation on relief against actions at law is expressed by 4
J. PoMERoY, supra note 23, § 1363, at 982, as follows:
It is .. .a well-settled doctrine that in cases of this kind, where the primary
rights of both parties are legal, and the courts of law will grant their remedies,
and courts of equity may also grant their peculiar remedies, equity will not interfere to restrain the action or judgment at law, provided the legal remedy will
be adequate; that is, provided the judgment at law will do full justice between
the parties, and will afford a complete relief; the adequacy or inadequacy of
the legal remedy is the sole and universal test.
See also id. §§ 1362, 1364.
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holding it. By the -term 'irreparable injury' it is not meant that
there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury; all that
is meant is that the injury be a serious one, or at least a material
one, and not adequately reparable by damages at law; and by the
term 'the inadequacy of the remedy by damages,' is meant that the
damages obtainable at law are not such a compensation as will, in
effect, though not in specie,
place the parties in the position in
40
which they formerly stood.
The irreparable injury standard thus translates into a determination of the circumstances under which the plaintiffs remedy at law will
be deemed adequate for purposes of an injunction against a criminal
prosecution. Ordinarily, the remedy at law by way of defense of a
criminal proceeding, with appeal of any errors of law, has been considered adequate by the courts. 4 1 The "injury" sustained by having to
defend a criminal action brought under an unconstitutional law has not
been considered the kind of burden or defect that renders the legal
remedy inadequate, because "[t]he ordinary interruption caused by
good-faith prosecution [is] considered one of the burdens of citizenship." 42 As a result, some injury or loss that will not be compensated
by acquittal in the criminal proceeding must be demonstrated. In general, this means that the mere enforcement of the criminal law must
involve some cost or damage that will not be eliminated or redressed
by a successful defense.43 For example, when the allegedly invalid law
or official action is directed at persons other than the plaintiff, such as
his customers or employees, the damage inflicted has generally been
considered irremediable by the successful defense of a criminal action. 44 The reasons seem obvious. It is one thing to declare that the
40.

1 T. SPELLING, supra note 23, § 13, at 19-20.

See also I H. JoycE, supra note

23, § 60a. The same meaning prevails in England. See 21 HALSBURY'S LAWS or ENGLAND 352 (3d ed. 1957).
41. See, e.g., Thompson v. Van Lear, 77 Ark. 506, 92 S.W. 773 (1906); Kent
Prods., Inc. v. Hoegh, 245 Iowa 205, 61 N.W.2d 711 (1953); Williams v. Board of Barber Examiners, 75 N.D. 33, 25 N.W.2d 282 (1946); Olds v. Klotz, 131 Ohio St. 447,
3 N.E.2d 371 (1936); Sherod v. Aitchison, 71 Ore. 446, 142 P. 351 (1914); Kelly &
Co. v. Conner, 122 Tenn. 339, 123 S.W. 622 (1909); State v. Logue, 376 S.W.2d 567
(Tex. 1964); Littleton v. Burgess, 14 Wyo. 173, 82 P. 864 (1905); 1 T. SPELLING, supra
note 23, § 24, at 37; Developments in the Law, 78 HARV. L. REV., supra note 26, at
1024.
42. Developments in the Law, 78 HARV. L. REv., supra note 26, at 1024.
43. See State v. Logue, 376 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1964).
44. See, e.g., Benton Bros. Drayage & Storage Co. v. City of Savannah, 219 On.
172, 132 S.E.2d 196 (1963); Brown v. Nichols, 93 Kan. 737, 145 P. 561 (1915); Mil'on Dairy Co. v. Great N. Ry., 124 Minn. 239, 144 N.W. 764 (1914); Biddies v. Enright, 239 N.Y. 354, 146 N.E. 625 (1925); Ideal Tea Co. v. City of Salem, 77 Ore.
182, 150 P. 852 (1915); City of Austin v. Austin Cemetery Ass'n, 87 Tex. 330, 28 S.W.
528 (1894); Fellows v. City of Charleston, 62 W. Va. 665, 59 S.E. 623 (1907).
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ordinary burdens of citizenship require the plaintiff to choose between
adherence to the law and violation of it in order to determine his legal
rights. But it is quite another to require him to violate a law in order
to obtain a determination of his rights under circumstances where his
rights will be effectively destroyed anyway because someone he depends on will refuse to violate the questionable provision. Moreover,
there may be instances in which the law is wholly directed at someone
other than the plaintiff, but who is essential to the plaintiff's livelihood.45 Under such circumstances there may obviously be no legal
remedy at all, since the plaintiff cannot violate the criminal provision
and the person to whom the law is directed probably will not do so.
Another example of a situation in which the remedy of defending
a criminal prosecution has been considered inadequate is when the
plaintiff is threatened with multiple prosecutions under an invalid law.
Very often such a threat is posed when plaintiff has committed significant resources to a course of conduct which is subsequently outlawed. 46
Under these circumstances the choice posed for him is not an "ordinary" burden of citizenship since here he must choose between giving
up his established pursuit, probably at great expense, or defending
numerous prosecutions, which may ultimately result in conviction and
the imposition of substantial penalties if his legal theories are wrong.
This, the courts have determined implicitly, is a greater burden than
citizenship ordinarily requires. Moreover, there are other situations in
which a threat of multiple prosecutions has resulted in a conclusion that
defense of a criminal action is inadequate, apparently for the same reason. For example, where the plaintiff has not already entered into an
established course of conduct, but an allegedly invalid law is framed
in such a way that it is virtually impossible to violate it only once, the
danger of multiple prosecutions has resulted in the award of appropriate equitable relief.47 And where multiple prosecutions are brought
for purposes of harassment under laws already declared invalid by a
state's highest court, the attendant burden of defending against clearly
invalid charges has been held appropriate for equitable relief.48
45. See, e.g., Milton Dairy Co. v. Great N. Ry., 124 Minn. 239, 144 N.W. 764
(1914).
46. See, e.g., Ellison v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 175 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1965); Stoner
MeCray Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956). See also
New Orleans Baseball & Amusement Co. v. City of New Orleans, 118 La. 228, 42 So.
784 (1907).
47. See cases cited note 46 supra.
48. See Alexander v. Elkins, 132 Tenn. 663, 179 S.W. 310 (1915).

604

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

The open-ended nature of the irreparable injury test, of course,
precludes one from cataloguing all the situations in which it will be
deemed satisfied by the courts. Hopefully enough has been said thus
far to demonstrate that the essential characteristics of the test involve
some deficiency in the legal remedy. That deficiency may result in
the ultimate destruction or deterioration of the interest the plaintiff
seeks to protect, place some extraordinary burden upon the plaintiff
that may deter him from resorting to his legal remedies, or, as in the
case of harassing prosecutions, transform the plaintiff's legal remedy
into a sword that may be used to coerce him into obedience of an invalid law. However, the irreparable injury standard is not the only obstacle that a plaintiff seeking an injunction against criminal proceedings
must overcome. Equity also contains rules governing the timing and
magnitude of the injury necessary before injunctive relief will issue.
These are expressed most often as the requirements that the injury to
the plaintiff must be "imminent," and "substantial," as well as irreparable, before an injunction will issue.
(3) The Requirement of "Imminent" and "Substantial"
Injury
The primary utility of the injunctive remedy to a plaintiff lies in
its preventive nature, aided by the ability to coerce the defendant's obedience to it through the sanction of contempt. This very utility, however, has the potential of imposing enormous burdens upon the defendant. For example, suppose there arises a situation in which one group
of officials is charged with the responsibility of maintaining the banks
of a river in good condition, while another group of officials is responsible for draining land along the sides of the river. The latter group is
about to adopt a new method of drainage that will result in an increased
flow of water into the river. The officials responsible for maintaining
the banks seek an injunction against the new method (i) to preclude
its use altogether or (ii) in the alternative to preclude the draining officials from using the new method in such a manner as to injure the
banks.4" If the court grants either form of the injunction, the defendants' legitimate activities are seriously impeded. If the new method
is altogether precluded, the defendants are prevented from adopting
a more efficient means of fulfilling their responsibility to drain the abut49. The hypothetical is derived from Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 40 Eng. Rep. 65
(Ch. 1834).
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ting land. If the second alternative is chosen instead, they may be just
as effectively prevented from adopting the new method, since they may
not be certain whether or to what extent it will actually affect the river
banks harmfully, and will therefore refrain from using it for fear of incurring the contempt sanction. In the end, if the harmful effects of
the new method have been miscalculated by the plaintiffs and the court,
either alternative will have unnecessarily interfered with the defendants' legitimate activities.
In order to assure that such impositions would be held to a minimum, equity developed the requirement that the harm to the plaintiff
had to be "imminent" before an injunction would issue against the defendant:
To justify the court in granting the relief it must be reasonably satisfied that there is an actual intention on the part of defendant to
do the act which it is sought to enjoin or that there is probably
ground for believing that, unless the relief is granted, the act will
be done. And it is not a sufficient ground for interfering that, if
there be no such intention on the part of defendant, the injunction
can do no harm."°
The application of the requirement does not, as the term "imminent injury" might suggest, entail simply a measurement of the closeness in time of the injury sought to be avoided by the plaintiff. Rather,
the process is one of balancing the magnitude of the harm against the
probability of its occurrence. 51 The operation of the doctrine was well
2
explained by Lord Chancellor Brougham in Earl of Ripon v. Hobart:
[T]he law cannot make over-nice distinctions, and refuse the relief
merely because there is a bare possibility that the evil may be
avoided. Proceeding upon practical views of human affairs, the
law will guard against risks which are so imminent that no prudent
person would incur them, although they do not amount to absolute certainty of damage. Nay, it will go further, according to the
same practical and rational view, and, balancing the magnitude of
the evil against the chances of its occurrence, it will even provide
the
against a somewhat less imminent probability in cases where
53
overwhelming.
and
vast
be
would
done,
be
it
mischief, should
50. 1 J. IGHR, supra note 23, § 22, at 22. See also 1 H. JoYcE, supra note 23,

§§ 17-19.

51. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Bealey, 28 Ch. D. 688 (1885); Pattisson v. Gilford, L.R.
18 Eq. 259 (1874); Hepburn v. Lordan, 71 Eng. Rep. 497 (V.C. 1865); Haines v. Taylor, 50 Eng. Rep. 511 (Rolls 1846); Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 40 Eng. Rep. 65 (Ch.
1834); Crowder v. Tinkler, 34 Eng. Rep. 645 (Ch. 1816).
52. 40 Eng. Rep. 65 (Ch. 1834).
53. Id. at 67-68.
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Thus, when the probability of the harm occurring was uncertain and
the injury itself not substantial, the English decisions refused injunctive
relief."' Likewise, when the probability of serious harm was greater,
but -the defendant might take steps to prevent it, no relief was forthcoming. 5 Conversely, relief was sometimes granted when the injury was
substantial, although the probability of its occurrence doubtful.10 And
to constitute a "substantial" injury, it was not necessary that the harm
be catastrophic; a certain interference with a legal right possessed by
the plaintiff was sufficient.51 ' The decisions thus make it apparent that
the "imminence" and "substantiality" requirements were merely differ54. See id., where the potential harm was damage to a river's banks that would
be caused by a steam pump increasing the flow of water into the river. The injunction
was refused, in part because the harm was not likely to be done all at once. Thus there
would be time enough to reapply to the court for relief when it was certain harm would
result from the pumping, and thus unnecessary interference with what might be wholly
legitimate activities by the defendants was avoided.
55. See Fletcher v. Bealey, 28 Ch. D. 688 (1885), in which the defendant had
leased land a mile and one-half above a river from plaintiff's paper manufacturing works,
for the purposes of dumping "vat waste" upon the land. The vat would eventually,
though not immediately, ooze a noxious green liquid, which if it were allowed to pollute
the river, would prevent plaintiff from using its water in paper manufacturing. The
court refused injunctive relief, partly upon the grounds that the defendant might be able
to prevent the harm:
[I] think that in ten years time it is highly probable that science (which is
now at work on the subject) may' have discovered some means for rendering
this green liquid innocuous. But even if no such discovery should be made in
that time, I cannot help seeing that there are contrivances, such as tanks and
pumps, and other things of that kind, by which the liquid may, as the Defendants say, be kept out of the river altogether. Therefore, upon that ground
alone I do not think that the action can be supported.
Id. at 699-700. See Pattison v. Gilford, L.R. 18 Eq. 259 (1874) (Injunction against
defendant selling for building purposes lots on an estate over which plaintiff had a right
of shooting refused, on grounds that defendant was selling the lots subject to the plain.
tiffs right); Haines v. Taylor, 50 Eng. Rep. 511 (Rolls 1846) (Injunction to prevent
erection of a gas manufacturing works near plaintiff's residence refused, on the grounds
that defendant might be able to manufacture the gas without proving a nuisance). See
also Crowder v. Tinkler, 34 Eng. Rep. 645 (Ch. 1816) (Injunction to prevent maintenance of powder magazine near plaintiff's paper mill refused. Parties sent to court of
law to try issue of nuisance, conditioned on defendant's storing minimum amount of
powder on site, so as to avoid imminent danger).
56. See Hepburn v. Lordan, 71 Eng. Rep. 497 (V.C. 1865), where an injunction
was granted to prevent the defendant from storing jute on land adjacent to the plaintiffs'
tanning premises.
57. See Goodhart v. Hyett, 25 Ch. D. 182 (1883), in which an injunction was
granted to prevent defendant from erecting a house over a line of water pipes owned
by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had acquired an easement for the pipes across the land,
and although the house could be built without eliminating the pipes, its construction
would have made repair of the pipes difficult, though not impossible. The court states:
"It appears to me that this is a case in which I am bound to interfere by granting an
injunction, because there is not only a mere possibility that harm may come, but the
necessary effect of what is being now done is that when the pipes have to be repaired
there will be a greater difficulty and greater expense in doing it than at the present
time." Id. at 190.
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ent ingredients in -thesame balancing process,5 8 the substantiality factor
operating primarily to mitigate the effect of a remote or doubtful probability of occurrence, but otherwise being relatively unimportant in the
presence of a clear infringement of a legal right. 59
The remaining question is how these two factors operate in the
context of injunctive challenges to criminal prosecutions in this country.
In most situations it seems clear that there will exist no question of prematurity at all. For example, when public officials threaten to enforce
the penal provisions of a confiscatory rate statute against a railroad,
there is no question that6 0the harm threatened to the railroad is both
imminent and substantial.
The confiscatory nature of the statute will
produce immediate lost profits if the statute is obeyed and the constitutional nature of the objection to the statute would seem to foreclose
any argument that the plaintiff should delay his request for injunctive
relief until the certainty of the injury is increased. 6 '
The most likely situation in which a prematurity objection will
exist is when a statute or ordinance is challenged before the officials
charged with the responsibility of enforcing it against the plaintiff have
taken steps to do so. Two cases from Texas provide a good illustration.
In Page v. Tucker6 the plaintiffs, cattle owners, filed suit to enjoin certain public officials from enforcing the state tick eradication law. Although the law was alleged to be unconstitutional on several grounds,
the trial court refused the injunction and the court of civil appeals affirmed. The appellate court held the law to be constitutional, but went
on to state that even if the law be considered void for any of the reasons assigned by the plaintiffs, an injunction was properly refused.63
All that had been done toward enforcement of the law was the entry
58. See 21 HALsBuRY's LAws OF ENGLAND 355-56 (3d ed. 1957).
59. Small injury or damage was, as indicated, not generally grounds for refusing
the injunction. See id. at 354-55. There existed a rule that an equity court would not
interfere by injunction when the violation was so "small, slight and formal that the
plaintiff [had] no ground in conscience to complain of it." Id. at 355. However, it
seems to have been difficult successfully to defend with an objection of this sort. See
id. Compare Harrison v. Good, LR. 11 Eq. 338, 352 (1871), with Lloyd v. London,
C. & D. Ry., 46 Eng. Rep. 496, 500 (Ch. 1865) and Kemp v. Sober, 61 Eng. Rep. 200,
201 (V.C. 1851).
60. See, e.g., Coal & C. Ry. v. Conley, 67 W. Va. 129, 67 S.E. 613 (1910).
61. Of course, the irreparable injury standard would have to be satisfied also. This
would doubtless be accomplished by demonstrating that multiple prosecutions would result if the statute's enforcement is not enjoined. See id. at 149-50, 67 S.E. at 622.
62. 218 S.W. 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919), affd, 288 S.W. 809 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1926, judgmt adopted).
63. Id. at 586.
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of an order by the county commissioner's court that provided the necessary funds for enforcement and the appointment of inspectors prescribed by the law. 64 As the court of appeals stated:
[A]ppellants are not entitled to injunctive relief against [the law's]
enforcement till it is shown that there is some impending or threatened injury to them or to their property. The law requires stock
owners to have their animals dipped, and provides a penalty for
a failure to do so. It also authorizes the forcible seizure, for the
purpose of dipping, of stock which are not dipped by their owners
or custodians. There is no evidence in this record that the appellees, or any of them, were threatening or intending to prosecute
the appellants criminally for a failure to dip their stock, or that the
proper officers were intending or threatening to seize their stock
for the purpose of dipping them.6 5
In Neal v. Boog-Scott66 another group of plaintiffs challenged the
same tick eradication law, again on constitutional grounds. Again the
trial court denied an injunction, and the plaintiffs appealed. This time,
however, the appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred
in sustaining the defendants' demurrer to one of the plaintiffs' allegations. The allegation was that the dipping solution in which plaintiffs'
stock was ordered to be dipped was very harmful and would kill or
damage many of the stock. 7 Since any such damage would, under the
law, go uncompensated, the court held that the plaintiffs would be entitled to an injunction if the allegations were true.6 8
The relevant distinction between the two decisions seems clear,
at least as far as the question of "imminent substantial injury" is concerned. In Neal, unlike Page, -the plaintiffs had actually been ordered
to dip their stock by the officials charged with enforcing the tick eradication law. Failure to comply would result in either prosecution, or
seizure of the stock, or both. Thus it was clear that there was a high
probability of injury if the plaintiffs' allegations were true.69
64. Id. at 584.
65. Id. at 586.
66. 247 S.W. 689 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923, no writ).
67. This same allegation had been made in Page. However, in that case the trial
court did not sustain a demurrer to the allegation, as in Neal. Rather, evidence was
presented by both plaintiffs and defendants as to the deleterious nature of the dip, and
the conflict was resolved in favor of defendants. 218 S.W. at 586.
68. The court rejected other contentions made by plaintiffs as grounds for injunctive relief, because the contentions would provide a complete defense to any criminal
prosecution instituted against them. 247 S.W. at 693-94. Still others were rejected as
being without merit. Id. at 690-93.
69. See also Davis v. City of Houston, 264 S.W. 625 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924, no
writ), in which suit was brought by operators and passengers of "jitneys" to enjoin the
enforcement of an ordinance prohibiting the use of the streets for "jitney service." The
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One may properly wonder, however, whether the distinction is not
one without a difference. The purpose of -theimminent substantial injury requirement, as reflected in the English decisions, is protection of
the defendant's legitimate activities from interference by an unnecessary or overbroad injunction. When -the defendant is a public official
and -the plaintiff's ground for injunctive relief is the unconstitutionality
of a law the defendant is charged with enforcing, why should the plaintiff have to do more than establish the law's invalidity-i.e. demonstrate
that the defendant's activity, if undertaken, will be illegitimate? One
might justify retention of the "irreparable injury" requirement as a device with which to prevent encroachment of the equity courts upon the
law courts, 70 but if anticipatory relief is otherwise proper because the
defense of a criminal prosecution does not afford an adequate remedy,
what function will making the plaintiffs burden heavier possibly serve?
In our system there appear to be at least two possible functions
which the "imminent substantial injury" requirement may continue to
serve. First, there is the tradition, inherent in our process of constitutional adjudication, of avoiding premature decisions of constitutional issues whenever possible. The reason for this tradition is not merely reluctance on the part of the courts to override -thejudgment of legislative
bodies, though doubtless there is some feeling by the judges that their
determinations of constitutional issues are not necessarily more accurate
than those of legislators. Rather, the most important reason is that in
our system the courts generally do not adjudge legislation to be constitutional or unconstitutional on its face. Instead, laws are ordinarily
judged valid or invalid as applied to particular fact situations, and this
means that courts usually require a concrete factual context before they
will agree to make constitutional determinations 71 The traditional requirement of an imminent injury thus contributes to the decision-making
trial court refused relief and the court of civil appeals affirmed, in part because the
plaintiffs had failed to allege that prosecution under the ordinance was imminent.
70. But see Part HI(A) (4) infra.
71. At the extreme, this so-called ripeness requirement is derived from the rule
against advisory opinions, which governs most United States courts and which is itself
a function of the case or controversy requirement. The purposes underlying the rule
against advisory opinions are themselves closely related to the inherent nature of the
judicial function and the correlative limitations upon that function. See generally G.
GUNmHE & N. DowLING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 72-76 (1970); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 64-70. To the extent that the ripeness requirement embodies policies that
are discretionary with the courts, as opposed to constitutionally compelled, it seems directed in part to insuring that the courts will avoid the same kind of pitfalls inherent
in rendering advisory opinions. See G. GUNrHER & N. DOWLING, supra at 76-85; HART
& WECHSLER, supra at 140-49. See also Part 11(B) (2) inIra.

610

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

process by insuring that the courts will subject laws to constitutional
scrutiny only when, at a minimum, their operation is visible within the
context of incipient enforcement activities.
Second, and closely related to this first function, is the function
of allowing ample play to the discretion traditionally afforded law enforcement officials within our system.7 2 This discretion has often operated in a manner that mitigates some of the rigors of the criminal law
by permitting police and prosecutors the latitude not to arrest or prosecute for activities that violate that law. 73 Clearly, such discretion not
to enforce penal provisions can operate also to nullify the effect of unconstitutional laws as well as it can to reduce the hardship imposed by
unfair ones. Moreover, the discretion of police and prosecuting officials in deciding how to enforce questionable laws can be an important
factor in determining whether they are ultimately applied constitutionally or unconstitutionally. Thus, the imminent harm requirement, by
permitting -the discretion of public officials to mature fully, can avoid
constitutional confrontations altogether in certain categories of cases
and insure in others that laws possessing the potential for both constitutional and unconstitutional applications are saved whenever possible
through wise administration.
It should be noted, however, that the operation of the imminent
harm requirement may make it quite impossible for a plaintiff to obtain
a determination of his legal rights without first becoming a lawbreaker.
If a court refuses injunctive relief because the officials charged with
the enforcement of criminal laws have not yet taken or threatened action against -the plaintiff, the only viable option left open to him may
be violation of the challenged provision. The officials in question may
refuse to indicate whether enforcement will follow a violation, thus
forcing the plaintiff to choose whether to obey a law he considers invalid or to risk incurring penalties if his legal theories are incorrect.
Before concluding that law-abiding citizens should be forced into such
a dilemma, one should be certain that the imminent harm requirement
actually serves functions which cannot be better served in some alternative way. Indeed, all of the traditional limitations upon injunctive relief
72. For a general discussion and description of this discretion see, e.g., K. DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JusICE (1969); W. LAFAvE, ARRS: Tm DECISION TO TAKE A SUsPECr INTO CUSTODY (1965); F. MMLER, PROSECUTION: ThE DECIsION TO CHAROE A
SUSPECT wrrH A CRIME (1969); J. SxOLmC, JUsncE WITHoUT TRIAL 71-90 (1966);
J. WILSON, VARiEIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR:

EIrGHT CoMMUNrrms 83-139 (1968).
73. See authorities cited note 72 supra.
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deserve such scrutiny, to determine whether their retention in the context of a modern procedural system is desirable.
(4) Injunctive Relief in a Merged System of Law and Equity
The various restrictions upon injunctive relief had their origin in
the early English chancery practice, when equity and law were considered to be wholly separate systems. In England, this formal distribution of power between separate courts of law and equity ended with
-the Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873, 74 which consolidated the
High Court of Chancery with various other tribunals and permitted
legal and equitable remedies to be administered by a single court. in
the United States, most states have also abolished ,the distinction between courts of law and courts of equity and operate in merged systems. 75 This widespread consolidation of law and equity courts raises
the question whether the functions once served by the ancient chancery
principles controlling the issuance of injunctions are still served by the
retention of such principles in a merged system. If they are not, and
if the old principles serve no valid modern function, it seems -they
should be discarded in favor of rational, modem rules.
First, it may confidently be said that no valid, modern function is
served -by-the principle that equity possesses jurisdiction only over civil
and property rights and has no jurisdiction over criminal matters.
Enough has been said above to demonstrate that courts in this country
are more than willing to enjoin criminal prosecutions in appropriate
cases. Unfortunately, however, there is a tendency even 'by modem
courts to honor the ancient jurisdictional shibboleth, even if only in the
breach. 76 Yet it is demonstrable that a court requested to enjoin an
actual or threatened criminal prosecution in no sense lacks "jurisdiction" to do so in 'the same way that the courts of chancery lacked "jurisdiction!' over criminal matters. A court in the United States has "jurisdiction" to act over a case if by the law of its creation it has been given
competence over the subject matter of the lawsuit and if it has, consistent with statutory and constitutional restrictions, obtained personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.7 7 Since virtually all state courts of gen74.
75.
note 23,
76.

36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, §§ 3, 24, 25.
For a discussion of the reforms in the United States see 1 J. POMERoY, supra
§ 40.
The problems involved when a court determines it lacks "equity jurisdiction"
are admirably discussed in Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF Equrnr 296-363 (1950).
77. See id. at 301-21.
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eral jurisdiction usually have subject matter and may obtain personal
jurisdiction when they are requested to enjoin criminal proceedings,
there is no true jurisdictional problem at all in the vast majority of such
cases. Any restrictions upon the court's ability to afford the remedy
of injunction against criminal actions should therefore be based upon
articulated policies disfavoring the use of the remedy, rather than
wrongheaded notions that the courts have no power to act in the situations described. The argument is not simply an academic one. A
court that views restrictions upon its authority to give a particular
remedy as "jurisdictional" is not likely to advert to the important interests on both sides of the lawsuit that would allow it to formulate principled guidelines to govern the administration of the remedy in all
cases.7 8 As a result, litigants are likely to be left with clear statements
that the courts lack power to give an injunction and even clearer impressions that those statements are untrue, but only vague notions of
when the remedy will be available to them in particular cases. If policy
reasons exist in favor of or against injunctions to restrain criminal prosecutions, they are likely to be ignored altogether.
Similarly, the rule that a criminal prosecution will not be enjoined
in the absence of a showing of "irreparable injury" is demonstrably unsound in a merged system, at least in so far as it represents an absolute
principle restricting the availability of injunctive relief. The term "irreparable injury," it will be recalled, is properly used only as another
means of expressing the rule that the plaintiff's remedies at law must
be inadequate. 79 And the inadequate remedy at law requirement was
evolved as one means of dividing the authority of law and equity courts
before the merger of the two systems.80 However, in a merged system
it is apparent that the inadequacy of the plaintiff's remedy at law should
no longer control whether a court will interfere to grant an equitable
remedy. For when a single court is competent to administer both legal
and equitable remedies, it makes little sense to retain a remedial stand78. It may also, as Professor Chafee has demonstrated, warp the court's ability to
determine when sanctions should be imposed for the violation of equitable decrees and
to determine when such violations should be excused. See id. at 296-363.
79. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
80. Where the jurisdiction of equity was concurrent with that of law-i.e. when
the underlying substantive rights were legal and the remedies awarded by chancery were
of the same kind as the remedies obtainable in a law court-the requirement was truly
jurisdictional in nature. See 1 J. PomERoY, supra note 23, § 217. However, when the
jurisdiction was exclusive because of the remedy equity afforded, such as an injunction,
the requirement was only a ,ale regulating the proper exercise of the jurisdiction. Id.
§§ 216, 220.
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ard that was originally designed to confine a separate court of equity
within its proper sphere.
[If the true spirit and intent of the reformed procedure were
fully carried out by the courts. . . the question whether or not an
adequate remedy can be obtained at law would cease to have the
slightest importance in the actual decision of causes ...
In those states which have carried out "the true spirit and intent of the reformed procedure," all branches of the law are of
equal dignity--the common law, statutory law, and principles of
equity. The court does not so much inquire into the question as
to the adequacy of a legal remedy as compared with an equitable
remedy, as it inquires into the appropriateness of the relief
sought.81
Of course, there may be other reasons why an equitable remedy is inappropriate in a particular case, especially with regard to injunctions
against criminal prosecutions. The public interest in the unencumbered
enforcement of penal laws may be deemed so strong that few circumstances will justify burdening a law enforcement official with an injunction and its attendant contempt sanction. If so, it seems appropriate
to state the controlling policies clearly, so that the situations in which
they apply may be distinguished by litigants and courts alike from those
in which they do not. By retaining the "irreparable injury" standard
the courts often obscure the most important inquiry beneath dysfunctional labels of ancient chancery lore, a process which assists neither
the litigant who seeks an injunction, the official who opposes it, or the
courts which must initially decide between them. All concerned are
distracted from a functional inquiry into the policy choices that ought
to govern the administration of the remedy by the metaphoric quality
of the traditional standard.
For example, in Combined American Insurance Co. v. City of
Hillsboro,s2 the plaintiff insurance company sued for an injunction
against the city of Hillsboro, Texas to prevent the city from enforcing
the provisions of its vendors' and peddlers' ordinance against the company, and to obtain a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was invalid. The trial court denied the plaintiff both forms of relief. The
court of civil appeals affirmed the denial of injunctive relief on grounds
of prematurity. However, the court then went on to reverse the trial
court's denial of declaratory relief and awarded a declaratory judgment
81. Id. § 358, at 804-05, 807.
82. 421 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967, writ refd n.r.e.).
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that the ordinance was invalid as applied to plaintiff. Such a result
could perhaps have been justified on the ground, among others, that
coercive relief was unnecessary on the facts of the case. However, the
court did not choose to justify the result at all, except to say that under
the circumstances there was "no ground" for injunctive relief in the absence of threatened enforcement. It did not explain why, if the constitutional question was ripe for adjudication in a declaratory judgment
action, anything inherent in the process of sound constitutional adjudication required refusal of an injunction. Nor did it suggest that a declaratory judgment would interfere less with the exercise of enforcement discretion than an injunction, since it expressly stated that it assumed "that under the judgment -here rendered the city of Hillsboro
will make no further attempt to enforce the ordinance ... .8 As
indicated, one justifiable ground for such a procedure seems to be a
preference for noncoercive relief over coercive relief, where both will
apparently achieve the same result. Yet the court's opinion did not
attempt to express such a preference, much less to explain why there
should be a preference given to noncoercive relief. It merely adhered
to the traditional requirement of an imminent injury for an injunction.
As a result, the case illustrates dramatically how the retention of anachronistic equity standards can impede the process of evolving rational
criteria.
Adherence to the traditional standards governing injunctive relief
also impairs the true usefulness of the injunction by ignoring one of
its most important characteristics: the flexibility of the injunctive decree. Cases in which laws are challenged on constitutional grounds do
not readily fit into fixed categories. Their number and variety preclude the formulation of fixed, narrow rules to govern when injunctive
interference with law enforcement should be permitted. A functional
approach would establish an analytical framework for courts and litigants, within which the relevant interests at stake in each case can be
taken into account. The ability to mold the injunctive decree to fit the
particular facts of each case significantly enhances this analytical process. Once the relevant interests have been identified and weighed, the
decree can be framed so as to produce only the amount of restraint
required and no more. Adherence to the traditional standards governing injunctive relief impairs these flexible qualities by causing relief to
be denied and sometimes granted by reference to an absolute standard,
83. Id. at 491.
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without reaching a point where the court may consider tailoring a decree to fit the situation. In short, because the ancient equity labels are
substituted for an analytical process, the true scope of the relief needed
is often obscured.
The modem approach to injunctive relief favors a test which focuses the courts' attention upon all the interests which bear on the appropriateness of the injunction in a particular case. One such approach
is that set out in the Restatement of Torts. 4 The process there described is one of measuring the appropriateness of the injunctive remedy by making a comparative appraisal of all of the factors in the case."5
The method employed is to estimate "the probable consequences of -the
remedy if it is granted and of the alternative remedies if they are employed.""" The primary factors to be appraised in each case are (i)
"the character of the interest to be protected," (ii) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of an injunction as opposed to other available remedies, (iii) any delay on plaintiff's part in bringing suit, (iv) any misconduct on plaintiff's part, (v) the relative hardship that will result to
the defendant if the injunction is granted and to plaintiff if it is denied,
(vi) "the interests of third persons and the public," and (vii) "the prac'87
ticability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment.
The Restatement's approach retains the traditional factors that
governed injunctive relief against tort, albeit it places them within a superior analytical framework. The important point to note about the
scheme outlined is that it is far superior to the approach often taken
by the courts in evaluating the appropriateness of injunctions against
criminal prosecutions. It is superior because it illuminates, rather than
obfuscates, the analytical process that must be employed in a wise evaluation of the injunction's appropriateness. It thus enables courts and
litigants to bring to bear the important arguments, interests, and policies
that should govern the decision-making process in each case.
In a larger sense, this modem decision-making process is one of
evaluating not simply the appropriateness of injunctions against criminal
proceedings, but rather of assessing the need for anticipatory relief
against the enforcement of criminal laws. The injunction is only one
84. RmSTAEM NT OFTOTS§§ 933-51 (1939).
85. See id. §§ 934, 936.
86. Id. § 934.
87. Id. §§ 936(1) (a)-(g). Although the Restatements approach is devoted to the
technique of evaluating the appropriateness of injunction against tort, the same principles
are stated to be applicable to injunctions against the enforcement by public officers of

an unconstitutional statute. See id. §§ 933-51, at 678-79 (Scope Note).
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of two important anticipatory remedies that might be given against such
laws. The other is the remedy of declaratory -judgment. An analysis
of the need and desirability of anticipatory relief should take into account the relevant features and functions of both remedies, in order
to enhance the range of flexible remedies available to courts and litigants in the analytical process. To that end, the origins and characteristics of the declaratory remedy must now be examined.
B. DeclaratoryJudgments
In contrast with the early origins of injunctive relief, the declaratory judgment is a fairly recent development in American law. No
state enacted an effective declaratory judgment statute until 1915, and
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act was not approved until 1922.88
Since that time, however, the remedy has gained overwhelming acceptance in this country, and can now be said to represent an important
part of the remedial scheme of most states.80 For the purposes of this
article, it will be important to examine those topics which bear most
directly upon the usefulness of the declaratory judgment as an anticipatory remedy for constitutional violations. These are four: (i) the
underlying philosophy and general purposes of declaratory relief; (ii)
the extent to which traditional notions of justiciability affect the availability of declaratory relief; (ii)
the characteristic of the declaratory
judgment as a "discretionary" remedy and the standards which guide
the courts' discretion in administering the remedy; and (iv) the availability of -theremedy to challenge the validity of penal statutes.
J1) The Premises of Declaratory Relief
A declaratory judgment is simply a final judicial determination,
embodied in a formal declaration, of the rights and liabilities of the
parties to a controversy.90 The characteristic which differentiates it
from more -traditional remedies, such as damages and injunction, is that
it has no coercive effect. 9 ' That is, of itself it cannot be executed
against a defendant as can the coercive remedies. 2
88. See E. BoRcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 244-45 (1st ed. 1934); Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgments 1941-1949, 62 HAv. L. REV. 787, 790-91
(1949).
89. See Developments in the Law, 62 HIv. L. Rnv., supranote 88, at 791.
90. See id. at 787.
91. Id.
92. E. BoRcHApm, supra note 88, at 23.
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The premises of the declaratory remedy are grounded in the
needs and characteristics of modern society. In a civilized society, typified by the formation of complex legal relationships and competition
between divergent legal interests, there is a need for some mechanism
with which officially and authoritatively to stabilize legal relationships
before they ripen into violence or disruption
by adjudicating disputes
93
of the status quo.
Of course, the utility of noncoercive anticipatory adjudication
would be sharply diminished if litigants were generally unwilling to accept declaratory judgments as final, authoritative pronouncements of
their rights. Thus, a second premise of declaratory relief is that in a
civilized society, the necessity of displaying force in order to secure
obedience to court decrees is sharply reduced.94 "The adjudication,
not the command, is the essence of judicial power; and in our civilized
communities, it is the adjudication, and not the command, which evokes
respect and official sanction, because it is a determination by the societal agent appointed to perform that function, and thus irrevocably fix
legal relations." 9
From these premises one can readily observe that the uniqueness
of the declaratory remedy in the context of criminal proceedings stems
from two of its characteristics. First, when the remedy is authorized,
it permits litigation to be instituted much earlier than when traditional
coercive remedies are sought. That is, damages need not accrue nor
harm be imminent before a declaration of rights is requested. Quite
the contrary, since the purpose of the declaratory judgment is to avoid
the accrual of damages and the peril and insecurity that attends imminent injury, its usefulness would be nullified if it were not available
much earlier than traditional remedies. Second, the remedy is availa coercive
able to one who would be in the position of a defendant in.
action. It therefore permits the potential defendant to take the initiative in the litigation process. To require otherwise would, again, be
to nullify much of the remedy's usefulness, since it is often the potential
defendant who is most threatened with peril and insecurity in a legal
controversy.
The very usefulness of these characteristics of the declaratory
judgment creates difficulties, however. The primary difficulty stems
93. Id. at 2, 94-98.

94. See id. at 10.
95. Id.
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from traditional notions in this country of the elements necessary to
comprise a justiciable controversy.
(2) The Problem of Justiciability
The necessity of proving the elements of damage and the imminent harm that is traditionally prerequisite to injunctive relief generally insure that the facts of a controversy will be well developed before a court is asked to give those forms of coercive relief. However,
because the potential defendant in a coercive action is able to take the
initiative in seeking declaratory relief, and because that relief may be
requested prior to the time a cause of action for coercive relief has matured, the factual development in a declaratory action will often be significantly less than in an action for damages or an injunction. Consequently, litigants seeking declaratory relief frequently must confront
one of the traditional requirements of a justiciable controversy in our
system: the requirement that an action be "ripe" for decision. 8 The
requisite degree of factual development necessary to meet the ripeness
standard in a declaratory action has been described in terms of the degree of probability -that the harm or coercive litigation feared by the
plaintiff will actually occur. A difficulty has sometimes arisen, however, when a plaintiff has attempted to challenge the constitutional validity of a statute by means of a declaratory action. Sometimes the
courts have required a threat of enforcement against the plaintiff before
considering such a case justiciable.97 One explanation that has been
offered for this requirement is the view in our constitutional law that
an official enforcing an invalid statute is not acting out of official duty,
but rather lawlessly, as an individual tortfeasor. 98 Under this view, it
is not possible to create a justiciable controversy by the mere enactment
of an unconstitutional statute, since the plaintiff's quarrel is with the
lawless official, not the statute.
Although the requirement of an official threat as an essential element of justiciability has the virtue of being consistent with the discre96. See generally id. 40-50; Developments in the Law, 62 HM.v. L. REv., supra
note 88, at 795.
97. See Borchard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52 YALE
L.J 445, 459 (1943); Developments in the Law, 62 HARv. L. REV., supra note 88, at
870-71; Note, Official Threat of Enforcement as a Requisite of Justiciabilityin Declara.
tory Judgment Actions, 50 YALE L.J. 1278 (1941).
98. See Borchard, supra note 97, at 459, 467-75; Developments in the Law, 62
HAIv. L. REv., supra note 88, at 870 n.657; Note, 50 YALE LJ., supra note 97, at 1280.
81.
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tion conferred upon law enforcement officials in our system, 99 the requirement has correctly been criticized as inappropriate as a measure
of the courts' fundamental authority to entertain an action. 100 Realistically, the mere enactment of an invalid statute, coupled with an official's duty to enforce it, can create the very kind of peril and. insecurity
that the declaratory judgment is designed to remedy, even though the
law fictionally treats the enforcing official as an individual tortfeasor. 101
In any practical sense, therefore, there exists a case or controversy appropriate for judicial action in such instances. There may, of course,
be cases in which declaratory relief should be refused in the court's discretion in order to obtain more concrete facts, or to avoid unwarranted
interference with the discretion of enforcement officials. 02 But, as in
the case of the dysfunctional requirement of imminent injury which is
prerequisite to injunctive relief, it seems more appropriate for the
courts to say so and articulate the reasons why declaratory interference
is unjustified, rather than to deny the existence of authority to deal with
the controversy. To do otherwise is to confuse power with discretion.
Happily, however, the requirement of an official threat has not
been a major obstacle to declaratory relief in most jurisdictions. 0 3 The
next question is therefore under what circumstances the courts should
generally grant declaratory relief when a justiciable controversy is present.
(3) The Declaratory Judgment As a Discretionary Remedy
The declaratory judgment is generally conceded to be a discretionary remedy.10 4 However, the injunction is often described as a remedy
whose issuance is within the sound discretion of the chancellor, 0 5 but
from the above discussion of the standards by which injunctions were
administered it should be apparent that this does not mean the availability of the remedy is subject to the unfettered discretion of the court.
Injunctions are administered by settled principles, 1 6 and so it is with
99. For a discussion of this discretion see authorities cited note 72 and accompanying text supra.
100. See authorities cited note 98 supra.
101. See E. BORCHAIM, supra note 88, at 45-47; Developments in the Law, 62 HARV.
L. REv., supra note 88, at 870-71.
102. See Parts 11(B)(3) &M(C) infra.
103. Developments in the Law, 62 HARv. L. REv., supranote 88, at 870-71.
104. Id. at 805-17; see E. BORCHARn, supra note 88, at 109-13.
105. See, e.g., 0. Fiss,INJtNcInONs 74 (1972).
106. See id. 74-93.
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declaratory relief, although it is very clear that the same principles governing the availability of injunctions are not to limit the court's ability
to grant declaratory judgments.'
For example, it is clear that the irreparable injury standard is inapplicable as such in determining
whether a declaratory judgment should be granted, 10 8 and enough has
already been said to demonstrate that the requirement of imminent injury should be irrelevant in declaratory actions. Rather, the basic
standard by which declaratory relief is to be administered is stated in
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, as follows: "Discretionary.The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceed00
ing."'
In operation, this principle is often said to involve the determination whether a declaratory judgment will serve a "useful purpose" in
resolving the controversy between the parties." 0 This determination
is obviously open ended, requiring an evaluation of all the factors which
bear on the question of the declaratory judgment's usefulness in the
particular case."' For example, such factors as whether all interested
parties may be joined in the declaratory action, whether all issues involved in the controversy have been raised, the relative balance of convenience between the plaintiff and defendant in resolving the controversy in a declaratory action, and the public importance of the issue
all bear on the question of the declaratory judgment's usefulness in resolving a particular controversy. ' One factor of particular importance to the subject of this article
that is sometimes considered under the useful purpose test is the effect
of a prior pending action on the availability of declaratory relief. It
107. See Developments in the Law, 62 HAv. L. R-v., supra note 88, at 789, 808.
UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AcT § 1 provides: "Courts
of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status,
and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." (emphasis added).
109. UN oRM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AcT § 6.
110. See Borchard, Discretion to Refuse Jurisdiction of Actions for Declaratory
Judgments, 26 MINN. L. REv. 677, 678 (1942); cf. E. BORCHARD, supra note 88, at 103;
Developments in the Law, 62 HARv.L. REv., supra note 88, at 807.
111. See Developments in the Law, 62 HARV. L. REV., supra note 88, at 807-17. The
similarity of this analysis to that described above as the modem approach to determining
the appropriateness of injunction against tort is obvious. See notes 84-87 and accom-

108. Id. at 808.

panying text supra.

112. See generally E. BORCHARD, supra note 88, at 102-13; Developments in the
Law, 62 HAv. L.REv., supra note 88, at 805-08.
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has already been stated that the propriety of a declaratory judgment
is not properly measured by reference to the equity standard of whether
an adequate remedy at law exists.1 13 However, it is equally clear that
the existence of a prior pending action can have a direct bearing upon
the usefulness of the declaratory proceeding.
As a general rule it may be stated that a declaratory action
will not be entertained, where another remedy is available and applicable, provided an action seeking to invoke the same is already
pending when the action for a declaration of rights is filed, and in
such case it is the duty of the court in the subsequently filed declartory judgment action to proceed no further than may be necessary
therefor
to protect the rights of the parties, and if no necessity
4
exists, then the declaratory action should be dismissed."
Therefore, when the courts speak in terms of the adequacy of another
remedy in such cases, their statements should be evaluated in terms
of the useful purpose test, rather than the equity standard of an irrepar5
able injury. 1
The remaining question is whether, against the background of the
above discussion of the declaratory judgment's general purposes, the
requirements of justiciability in declaratory actions, and the standards
that should guide the courts' discretion in administering declaratory relief, declaratory judgments should be available to challenge the validity
of criminal laws.
(4) The Availability of Declaratory Judgments Against
Criminal Laws
It is clear that there is no across-the-board restriction upon declaratory judgments against invalid criminal laws. From the premises underlying the remedy, it is apparent that there can be a need for a declaratory judgment to prevent violence and disruption of the status quo
in disputes involving criminal laws as well as in other situations. 1 '
113. See notes 108-09 and accompanying text supra.
114. 1 W. ANDmisON, ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 443 (2d ed. 1951).

115. The adequacy standard in declaratory actions is applicable where another action is imminent, as well as where it is pending. This seems clearly conect, since the
usefulness of the declaratory remedy is affected quite as much where substantial preparation toward another proceeding has taken place, as well as where the proceeding has
been formally instituted. In either case the standard applied is whether the other action
will resolve the controversy as well as the declaratory proceeding. If not, as all the
same issues are not involved in the other action, the declaratory judgment will serve
a useful purpose and should be granted. See Developments in the Law, 62 HARv. L.
REV., supra note 88, at 808-10.
116. See Borchard, supra note 97, at 445; Note, Declaratory Relief in the Criminal
Law, 80 HAnv. L REv. 1490 (1967).
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Thus the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act broadly provides for
challenges to the validity of statutes and ordinances without regard to
11 7
whether they are penal.
In challenges to penal statutes, however, there are several problems relating to justiciability and the discretion afforded to the courts
in administering declaratory relief that deserve mention. First, there
is the difficulty, adverted to above, of determining whether a threat of
enforcement is a prerequisite to the justiciability of a declaratory action. 118 The proponents of declaratory relief against criminal laws take
the view that justiciability requires no threat of enforcement in order
to render an action appropriate for judicial determination:
[P]etitioners are placed in jeopardy by a statute or ordinance
requiring them under penalty to change their mode of life or business, to which a threat by -the Attorney-General only adds weight
but of which it is not the source. The jeopardy lies in the statute,
not in the Attorney-General, and it is the statute that they challenge and not the Attorney-General's threat. A threat in any event
is only one type of jeopardy, which may be created-and therefore
initiates justiciability-by an event, like war; by a document, like
a statute or a deed; by a personal act, like an unjust charge or
claim; or, among other challenges, by a threat of an enforcing officer, alone or, as usual, in combination with other operative
facts.119
However, others have found merit in the requirement of a threat of
prosecution as a prerequisite to a "ripe" controversy:
Threatened prosecution as the criterion for ripeness in the typical case strikes a practical balance between adjudication too soon
and too late. The prosecutor's threat assures the court that the citizen's interest is not mere meddling, while the court's intervention
will still be timely enough to allow the citizen to alter his conduct
on the basis of the decision.120
However, the latter view. seems erroneous for several reasons.
First, it is unrealistic, in that it views the justiciability requirement more
stringently than is warranted by daily experience. Criminal laws are
designed to deter behavior without the necessity of a threat by the offi117. "Any person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by
a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question

of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder."
UNIFoRM DECLARAToRy JuDGMENTs Acr § 2.
118. See notes 97-103 and accompanying text supra.
119. Borchard, supra note 97, at 464.
120. Note, 80 HLv. L. REv., supra note 116, at 1508.
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cials charged with their enforcement. Consequently, when the laws
perform their assigned task, it seems unrealistic to argue that something
more is required in order to invoke the authority of a court to adjudge
their validity. Second, the "ripeness" requirement is often associated
with the courts' power to act-i.e. with the requirement that there be
an actual "case or controversy" before the court in order for it to entertain an action. 121 Yet it again seems unrealistic to suppose that there
is no actual controversy when the plaintiff is faced with an allegedly
invalid criminal law which jeopardizes his activities. There may be
solid reasons why there should be no adjudication of the law's validity
in a particular case, but it seems that these reasons are more appropriately addressed to the court's discretion than to its power to act.122 Finally, to impose a threat of enforcement as a prerequisite to the justiciability of declaratory actions against criminal laws is to place the imperiled citizen at the mercy of the official charged with enforcing the
statute.
The [official] becomes the only one who as of right can challenge
the statute. By the mere process of refraining from a "threat" to
enforce or prosecute he can frustrate all opportunity of the victim
or taxpayer or affected citizen to raise the issue. Thus he alone
can control the possibility of litigation and the public must assume
all risks of observing an unconstitutional
statute or exposing its
123
members to a criminal prosecution.
To prevent the official from thus insulating an invalid statute from judicial review while effectively enforcing its provisions, it seems far better to consider a declaratory action justiciable whenever it can be objectively demonstrated that the existence of a statute imperils a citizen's
activities, leaving abuses of the remedy to be dealt with by discretionary
dismissal.
What standards should be used to determine whether a declaratory
action challenging a criminal statute serves a useful purpose? The
proper exercise of the court's discretion in some common categories of
situations involving declaratory challenges to penal statutes has been
analyzed, as follows:
When plaintiff admits that he is within the statute and contests
only its validity, there would seem to be no public benefit in refus121. See, e.g., E. BoncHmAR, supra note 88, at 29, 40. The ripeness requirement
in the federal courts is clearly composed of some discretionary elements, over and above
the constitutionally compelled "case or controversy" requirement. See Part M(C) infra.
122. See text following note 102 supra.
123. Borchard, supra note 97, at 467. See also Note, 80 HARv. L. REv., supra note
116, at 1509.
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ing to declare a statute unconstitutional even though the effect of
such a declaration would undoubtedly be to restrain enforcement.
Where the application of the legislation to the plaintiff is at issue,
however, the public interest in having the penal laws enforced without undue restriction upon the enforcing officials may be stronger
cause for denying declaratory relief. A court may be reluctant to
render a declaration for fear that it will deter future prosecutions
which may be justified by reason of a change in the circumstances
surrounding plaintiff's activity. However, where the plaintiff's conduct is admitted there would usually be no reason to deny a declaration concerning the applicability of the statute to the activity in
question.124
By refusing a declaration in a case where the facts are disputed, and
restricting any judgment to the facts before the court, maximum freedom is retained by prosecutors to enforce the law in any situation not
before the court. This illustrates the manner in which the courts should
generally evaluate requests for declaratory judgments against criminal
statutes. It should particularly be noted that the analytical method used
seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with legitimate law enforcement discretion, while employing the declaratory judgment where it
will otherwise serve a useful function. 2 5
One factor not dealt with above, but which deserves special attention, is the effect on the discretionary determination of a prior pending
criminal proceeding. In measuring the usefulness of declaratory relief
in such a situation, it is important to recall that the basic purpose of
the declaratory judgment is to provide a means of avoiding violence and
disruption of the status quo: 126
The modem declaratory action to construe or invalidate a
penal statute bears the important distinction that it does not disrupt
a pending prosecution, but seeks to resolve legal issues to prevent
prosecution. Whereas prosecution can only follow conduct, the
modem declaratory action precedes it, and in that difference lies
its cardinal function. .. . Once the disputed conduct has taken
place, the equities of the statute itself can be at least as well litigated in defense to the prosecution thus ripened. 3ut criminal trial
124. Developments in the Law, 62 HAv. L. REv., supra note 88, at 871-72 (footnotes omitted). See also Note, 80 H~Av. L. REv., supranote 116, at 1511-13.
125. The flexibility of the declaratory decree should also be noted. By placing the
burden on the plaintiff in the declaratory action to establish his conduct with particularity or be denied relief under the useful purpose standard, the analysis insures that futile
judgments-i.e. ones which do not resolve the uncertainty created by the statute-will
not be rendered. The flexibility afforded by the declaratory decree thus parallels that
of the injunction, without the coercive sanction of contempt attached to violation.
126. See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
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is not an adequate remedy where the legal dispute precedes the
conduct; anticipatory relief intends that no criminal liability be created. "The right to test a statute by submitting to arrest is not a
remedy."n
This does not, of course, mean that declaratory relief may never be
granted in the presence of a pending criminal prosecution. All it
means is that the action is less likely to serve a useful purpose in such
cases. Where circumstances are found to exist that would point to a
useful purpose, the declaratory judgment should issue in spite of any
28
pending criminal action.
C. Summary and Conclusions
The foregoing discussion of injunctive and declaratory relief
should illustrate several important things. First, the administration of
both the injunctive and declaratory remedies has sometimes been saddled with dysfunctional and unanalytical standards. The traditional
roots of the injunction in English Chancery practice continue to influence the availability of the remedy today, leaving it encumbered with
standards no longer relevant in a modern merged system of law and
equity. Similarly, the availability of declaratory judgments has sometimes been fettered by unrealistic principles governing the justiciability
of declaratory actions. Second, the modem, functional approach to
both remedies requires an evaluation of all the factors in a case which
bear upon the appropriateness and utility of the two remedies in the
particular situation before the court. Although this analytical process
requires more effort on the part of judges and lawyers than would a
more mechanical process of deciding cases in accord with labels, such
as "irreparable injury," and dysfunctional factors of justiciability, such
as whether there has been a threat of prosecution, it more nearly accords with the true function of the remedies as anticipatory devices with
which to prevent future harm. Moreover, it has the virtue of taking
into account all the various interests and policies which relate to the
benefits and burdens of an anticipatory remedy in a given case. Finally, when unanalytical, restrictive standards are employed to govern
the availability of the two remedies, the ultimate result is not only to
cloud the proper criteria by which each remedy will be administered,
but also to make impossible an intelligent choice between the two remedies when some form of anticipatory relief is clearly appropriate.
127. Note, 80 HAv. L. REv., supra note 116, at 1503-04 (footnotes omitted).
128. See Developments in the Law, 62 HARv. L. REv., supra note 88, at 872.
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In this last regard, it seems apparent that if both remedies continue to serve valid purposes in a modem procedural system, it is because each has distinctive features which allows it to perform unique
functions. It is clear that insofar as both remedies involve adjudication
of the respective rights and liabilities of parties to a dispute, both can
serve the primary function of declaratory relief to avoid violence and
disruption of the status quo prior to the time action of some sort is required of the plaintiff or defendant. However, there is one prominent
difference between the two remedies which makes a functional, intelligent choice between. them possible. That difference is the availability of the contempt sanction as a means of enforcing an injunctive order,
but not as a means of executing a declaratory judgment.
It will be recalled that the absence of contempt as a sanction for
violation of a declaratory judgment is grounded in the assumption that
in a civilized society it is ordinarily not necessary to display force in
order to secure obedience to court decrees. 129 Consequently, the declaratory remedy may be viewed as a uniquely civilized remedy, to be
preferred over an injunction as long as there is no affirmative evidence
pointing to the need for a coercive sanction to secure obedience to the
court's determination in a given case. This preference for the declaratory remedy is not simply an abstract desire to adhere to more civilized
procedures over less civilized ones. Rather, the preference serves a
valuable function in guarding against the harshness with which judicial
mistakes can fall upon litigants. Despite the care with which a court
may frame its decrees, there is always a danger that it will go farther
than is justifiable in restricting the defendant's activities in order to secure the plaintiff's rights. For example, in cases where a decree is
sought against enforcement of an allegedly invalid statute, the court
may find it has restricted legitimate law enforcement activity to an unwarranted extent by a decree so broad or ambiguous that it potentially
encompasses activities by the plaintiff which are constitutionally punishable, but which did not occur to the court or to the defendant when
the decree was originally framed. If the decree is in the form of an
injunction, the enforcement officials have basically two alternatives:
(i) to move for a modification of the decree to reflect the constitutional scope of the statute or law in question; or (ii) to attempt what
they believe to be legitimate enforcement anyway and risk imposition
of the contempt sanction. The first alternative will probably be suffi129. See text accompanying notes 94-95 supra.
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cient in most cases. But there may be instances in which the activities
of the plaintiff are so injurious that they call for immediate enforcement
of the law without the delay of a court proceeding to determine whether
the activities are covered by the decree. It may well be that if such
enforcement ultimately proves to have been justified in constitutional
terms, the enforcing official may rely upon the reason and good faith
of the court not to impose contempt penalties. But there is no reason,
in the first place, why an official should have to face a risk of incurring
fine and imprisonment or, alternatively, to give up legitimate enforcement of a statute. In the absence of any affirmative evidence presented by the plaintiff that the official will not obey the decree, the
court should issue only a declaratory judgment, thus leaving law enforcement officers free, in extraordinary cases of need, to act in accord
with their good-faith view of the decree's legitimate scope without fear
of subsequently being punished for contempt. The plaintiff is not left
without remedy in cases where the officials are not justified in undertaking activities in apparent violation of the decree, for the court is free
to enjoin the officials from violating a declaratory judgment if they are
in error as to the extent of its legitimate coverage.'3 0 And at the time
of the hearing on the request for such an injunction, if the court determines that the officers should be enjoined, it may frame its decree as
narrowly or broadly as the new circumstances indicate is appropriate.
Having explored the history, nature, and function of injunctions
and declaratory judgments in our system, it remains to consider the history of those remedies in the federal courts prior to the Supreme
Court's decisions in 1971. In the discussion that follows, primary emphasis will be placed upon federal injunctions and declaratory judgments against state court proceedings, particularly criminal prosecutions.
I.

INJUNCTIONS AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN THE

FDERAL COURTS
The option given to Congress by article III of the Constitution to
create inferior federal courts is generally interpreted as giving it a broad
130. Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted
whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition

to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application be deemed
sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose

rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to show
cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.
UNIFoRm DECLARATORY JunGMmrs AcT § 8.
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power to regulate the jurisdiction of those courts it decides to create.1 81
This power to regulate jurisdiction, in turn, gives Congress "a wide
choice in the selection of remedies" that an inferior federal court may
afford."3 2 In the first judiciary act Congress conferred original jurisdiction upon the lower federal courts in
all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the
matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of
five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of
the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another
State.' 83
The same act also provided that "suits in equity shall not be sustained
in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain,
adequate and complete remedy may be had at law,"' 8 4 a limitation
which was only repealed in 1948.3 5 The forms of process, except as
to style, and forms and modes of proceedings in equity cases were to
accord with the "principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of
equity. . . as contradistinguished from courts of common law," subject,
however, to a rulemaking power in the Supreme Court. 8 0 This statutory prescription persisted until law and equity were merged by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.17 However, a major limitation upon the power of federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings
was enacted in 1793 and continues in effect today, in altered form, as
the so-called Anti-Injunction Act.1 8 In 1875, the jurisdiction of the
inferior federal courts was first permanently broadened to include cases
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.' 89 And,
finally, in 1934 the authority of the federal courts was first expanded
to permit them to grant the remedy of declaratory judgment. 40
Against this constitutional and statutory background, the important
questions for purposes of this article are: (i) what was the nature of
131. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 309-75.
132. See id. at 332-35.
133. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78.
134. Id. § 16, 1 Stat. 82.
135. See HART & WECHSLER, supranote 9, at 729.
136. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 276, amending Act of Sept. 29, 1789,
§ 2, 1 Stat. 93-94. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 664-65 (complete history
of federal equity).
137. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 664-65; FED. R. CIV. P. 1-2.
138. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334; 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
139. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. See C. Wiarrr, supra
note 9, at 54.
140. Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955.
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the principles evolved by the federal courts to govern the administration of injunctions against state court proceedings from 1789 to 1971;
(ii) to what extent has the federal Anti-Injunction Act been a factor
in preventing injunctive relief against state court proceedings; and (iii)
how has the new remedy of declaratory judgment affected the availability of federal anticipatory relief against state court proceedings?
A.

Federal Equitable Principles Governing Injunctions Against State
Proceedings

Early in its history, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the authority of an inferior federal court to enjoin state officials
from enforcing an unconstitutional state law. 141 With the expansion of
federal jurisdiction to include general cognizance of federal question
cases in 1875,142 it was perhaps inevitable that the frequency of such
injunctions would increase. 143 However, the equity power conferred
upon the federal courts by the statutory and constitutional scheme summarized above 44 was considered to be that of the High Court of
Chancery in England as of 1789.111 Consequently, since many such
injunctions were sought against the enforcement of penal provisions in
state criminal proceedings,' 146 the plaintiff in a federal suit had to overcome all the traditional obstacles to equitable interference with criminal
actions. Perhaps as a result, the federal courts did not begin extensively to enjoin state officers from instituting criminal proceedings
until after 1890.117 However, in 1894 the Supreme Court affirmed an
injunction against a state officer to preclude him from instituting suits
against a railroad to recover penalties for the violation of a rate statute. 48 The railroad's alternatives were either to submit to the unreasonable rates during the course of lengthy proceedings to determine
141. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737, 841-60
(1824); Lockwood, Maw & Rosenberry, The Use of the Federal Injunction in Constitutional Litigation, 43 HAv. L. Rnv. 426, 431 (1930).
142. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
143. For the history of federal injunctions against state courts prior to the jurisdictional expansion in 1875 see Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 -LARv.
L Rnv. 345 (1930).
144. See text accompanying notes 131-40 supra.
145. See, e.g., Lockwood, Maw &Rosenberry, supra note 141, at 431 n.21.
146. See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888); Taylor & Willis. The Power of
Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedingsin State Courts, 42 YALE LI. 1169, 1190 (1933).
See also Davis & Farrum. Mfg. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 199 (1903).
147. See Warren, supra note 143, at 373.
148. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894). See Warren, supra note 143, at 373-74.
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their validity, or to violate the rate provisions and risk enormous penalties for each separate violation. 14 9 Subsequently, the Court approved
similar injunctions against the commencement of criminal proceedings
to enforce rate laws, in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits and prosecutions, 150 and denied relief in cases where -the remedy at law was perceived to be adequate. 5 ' However, the high point of federal injunctions against state criminal proceedings came with the Court's now
famous decision in Ex parte Young. 5 2 Young is famous primarily for
the Court-created fiction that acts of state officers under an unconstitutional statute, even if undertaken in the name of the state, strip them
of their official authority, so that suits against the officers to enjoin their
activity do not violate the eleventh amendment. 58 However, the decision also contained a significant passage dealing with the principles that
were to govern a federal court in determining the propriety of injunctions against state criminal prosecutions.
The issue arose because a federal court had issued an injunction
against the attorney general of Minnesota to restrain him from enforcing a statute regulating railroad rates. The attorney general subsequently attempted to enforce the statute by mandamus proceedings
against the railroads and was held in contempt by the federal court.
He then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court to free
himself from custody under the contempt orders. In addition to his
eleventh amendment objection, he also raised the point that a federal
court of equity had "no jurisdiction to enjoin criminal proceedings by
indictment or otherwise, under the state law."'154 To this argument the
Court responded as follows:
This, as a general rule, is true. But there are exceptions.
When such indictment or proceeding is brought to enforce an alleged unconstitutional statute, which is the subject-matter of in149. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 394 (1894).
150. See Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
151. Compare Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207
(1903), with Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904). See also Fitts V.
McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899), in which suit was brought to enjoin the enforcement
of an Alabama statute fixing the tolls that could be charged for passage over a bridge
on the Tennessee River. The Court reversed an injunction against enforcement of the
statute, primarily on grounds that the suit was one against the state in contravention
of the eleventh amendment. However, it also held that the federal court was without
equity jurisdiction to enjoin the institution or prosecution of criminal proceedings. Id.
at 531. The remedy at law by way of defense of criminal prosecutions was considered
adequate by the Court. Id. at 532.
152. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
153. See C. WRiGHT, supra note 9, § 48.
154. 209 U.S. at 161.
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quiry in a suit already pending in a Federal court, the latter court
having first obtained jurisdiction over the subject-matter, has the
right, in both civil and criminal cases, to hold and maintain such
jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, until its duty is fully
performed....
. . . In Dobbins v. Los Angeles. . . it is remarked by Mr.
Justice Day, in delivering the opinion of the court, that "it is well
settled that where property rights will be destroyed, unlawful interference by criminal proceedings under a void law or ordinance may
be reached and controlled by a court of equity." 15
In addition, the argument was made that the remedy at law available
to the plaintiffs was adequate. The Court rejected this contention:
It has been suggested that the proper way to test the constitutionality of the act is to disobey it, at least once, after which the company
might obey the act pending subsequent proceedings to test its
validity. But in the event of a single violation the prosecutor might
not avail himself of the opportunity to make the test, as obedience
to the law was thereafter continued, and he might think it unnecessary to start an inquiry. If, however, he should do so while the
company was thereafter obeying the law, several years might elapse
before there was a final determination of the question, and if it
should be determined that the law was invalid the property of the
company would have been taken during that time without due
process of law, and there would be no possibility of its recovery. 156
The Court went on to discuss other deficiencies in the remedy available by way of defense of a criminal prosecution. These were (i) the
difficulty of finding an agent or employee who would be willing to disobey the law in the face of potentially large fines and lengthy imprisonment, and (ii) the difficulty of making out a defense that the rates were
too low, a difficulty which would arise because of the complicated nature of the facts which would have to be examined, rendering decision
by a jury "almost impossible."1 57 Indeed, the Court's ultimate conclusions about the inadequacy of a criminal defense were actually an argument in favor of the general utility of anticipatory adjudication of consti-

tutional issues:
To await proceedings against the company in a state court,
grounded upon a disobedience of the act, and then, if necessary,
obtain a review in this court by writ of error to the highest state
court, would place the company in peril of large loss and its agents
in great risk of fines and imprisonment if it should be finally de155. Id. at 161-62.
156. Id. at 163.
157. Id. at 164-65.
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termined that the act was valid. This risk the company ought not
be required to take ....
The courts having jurisdiction, Federal
or state, should at all times be open to them as well as to others,
for the purpose of protecting their property and their legal rights.
All the objections to a remedy at law as being plainly inadequate are obviated by a suit in equity, making all who are directly
interested parties to the suit, and enjoining the enforcement of the
act until the decision of the court upon the legal question.1 51

The last-quoted portion of the Court's opinion reveals that more
was at stake in Young than mere application of principles derived from

English Chancery practice. The Court was clearly, if implicitly, expressing two important policy judgments. One was the judgment that
some means ought to be available to parties in the position of the railroad to permit them to obtain a determination of their legal rights in
advance of a criminal violation. As indicated above, this is one of the
primary functions of the modern remedy of declaratory judgment.150
The second policy judgment was that there should be no preference
given to initial state court adjudication of constitutional issues in cases
such as Young. This is clear from the Court's statement that the
"courts having jurisdiction, Federal or state" should supply relief to protect litigants in the position of the railroad. 160
After Young the Court continued to determine the propriety of
injunctions against state criminal prosecutions by reference to the principles of English equity. 16 ' However, it seems clear that these principles
were as flexible as the Court's view of its constitutional role demanded. 162 Ex parte Young was decided in the heyday of substantive
due process, and its view of the constitutional balance between state

and nation was colored accordingly. When the Court moved into an
158. Id. at 165.
159. See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
160. 209 U.S. at 166-67. Not everyone was as confident as the Court of the restraint that would be exercised by federal judges or of the wisdom of injunctive interference with law enforcement. "It was greeted with harsh criticism by the country when
it was decided and for years thereafter." C. WiuGrrr, supra note 9, § 48, at 186. Congress responded by creating a court of ",special dignity" to hear applications for injunctions against state statutes on grounds of their unconstitutionality, with direct appeal to
the Supreme Court. Id. § 50; Note, The Three-Judge District Court: Scope and Procedure Under Section 2281, 77 HAiv. L. REv. 299 (1963). This burdensome procedure
remains with us, in modified form, today. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281, 2284 (1970).
161. See Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927); Fenner v. Boykin, 271
U.S. 240 (1926); Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924); Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197 (1923); Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453 (1919); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 (1915).
162. See generally Note, IrreparableInjury in Constitutional Cases, 46 YAL LJ.
255, 269-72 (1936).
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era of greater judicial restraint, characterized both by greater reluctance
to permit federal interference with the operation of state courts and by
a more liberal view of the constitutionality of state regulatory measures, 16 3 the Court did not discard the traditional equity principles as
a measure of the propriety of federal injunctive relief. On the contrary, it continued to decide cases by reference to those principles,
while making it clear that the occasion for the actual issuance of a federal injunction against state criminal proceedings would be rare indeed.16 4 However, the Court did intimate that a federal injunction
would issue in three separate categories of cases, even while operating
under stricter notions of restraint.
First, the Court indicated that an injunction would be appropriate
when the federal plaintiff was threatened with multiple prosecutions
under an unconstitutional statute. 65 This was small help to the litigant
faced with potential state criminal action, however, since the Court also
clearly indicated that a general statement by a prosecuting official that
he stood ready to perform his duty was not the quality of threat necessary to warrant intervention by a federal court of equity.' 6 And the
Court also made it easy for the prosecuting official to avoid a threat
of multiple prosecutions by permitting him to represent -that he intended to institute only a single test prosecution to determine -the va67
lidity of the law in question.
Secondly, the Court indicated that a federal injunction would be
appropriate when the state authorities invoked an unconstitutional law
for purposes of harassment. In Hague v. CIO6 8 the Court affirmed
the issuance of an injunction against municipal officers who had
adopted a deliberate policy of harassment toward plaintiffs, in an attempt to exclude them from a city and prevent them from communicating their views to other persons. Although the Court did not specif163. See DeVelopments in the Law, 78 Hnv. L. REv., supra note 26, at 1025-26.
164. See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Watson v. Buck,
313 U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Spielman Motor
Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935).
165. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 165 (1943); Watson v. Buck,
313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941); Spielman
Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 96 (1935); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S.
445 (1927); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). It should be noted, however, that
in none of the cited cases was an injunction actually granted.
166. See Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 399-400 (1941).
167. See Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 48-50 (1941); Spielman Motor
Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 96 (1935).
168. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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ically indicate that harassment was the ground for the injunction, in the
8
subsequent decision of Douglas v. City of Jeannette"'
Mr. Justice
Black interpreted the injunction in Hague as being justified on that
ground.

170

Finally, the Court in one decision stated that a federal injunction
would be justified if a state statute were found to be "flagrantly and
patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause,
sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it,"'171 although no such statute
was involved in the case before the Court and none was cited by way
of example. In substance, however, this standard may not be substantially different than the bad faith and harassment standard, since anyone who attempts to enforce a provision that is, as described by the
Court, so defective that no reasonable person could fairly believe it constitutional, might also be found guilty of bad faith.
In each of the instances cited as appropriate for federal equitable
intervention, the Court adhered to the traditional standards of "great
and immediate irreparable injury." However, it is again clear from the
decisions that more was involved than simply a continuing application
of -the same equity standards utilized in Ex parte Young. Rather, the
decisions now took pains to express concern both for a different priority
in the process of constitutional adjudication and for the interests of the
state courts in that process. Thus, for example, in Watson v. Buck17 2
the Court expressed a view, contrary to that expressed in Young,173 of

the desirability of federal court abstention in adjudicating the constitutionality of a state criminal statute before authoritative interpretation
by the state courts.' 7 4 In the same term, the Court in Beal v. Missouri
Pacific Railroad,' 5 reiterated a strong policy of deferring to state court
adjudication of criminal statutes.' 78
,169. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
170. Id. at 164.

171. Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941) (dictum).
172. 313 U.S. 387 (1941).
173. See text accompanying note 158 supra.
174. 313 U.S. at 401-02.
175. 31q U.S. 45 (1941).
176. The\federal courts are without jurisdiction to try alleged criminal violations of state statutes. The state courts are the final arbiters of their meaning
and appropriate application, subject only to review by this Court if such construction or application is appropriately challenged on constitutional grounds.
And in the exercise of sound discretion, which guides the determination
of courts of equity, scrupulous regard must be had for the rightful independence
of state governments ,'nda remedy infringing that independence which might
otherwise be given should be withheld if sought on slight or inconsequential
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The Court's attitude toward federal anticipatory relief and toward
the legitimate interest of the state court systems had thus altered irastically since Ex parte Young, primarily because the Court had narrowed
its view of its own role in the process of constitutional adjudication.
This restrictive review was not permanent, however; it was altered
when the Court perceived at a later time that state courts were not adequately protecting constitutional rights. Faced with the massive Southern resistance to desegregation following Brown v. Board of Education,177 the Court impliedly relaxed the requirements for federal injunctions against state criminal proceedings in civil rights cases. a This development was only one part of a broad slackening of judicial restraint,
which was characterized by the Warren Courts overall activist posture
17
in the areas, among others, of civil rights and freedom of expression.
It was in this period of "loose" restraint that the Court decided the now
famous case of Dombrowski v. Pfister.'8 0
Coming after the developments in the earlier, more rigorous
period of judicial restraint, described above, and the apparent relaxation of the standards for federal injunctions against criminal prosecutions in civil rights cases, Dombrowski superficially seemed to represent
only a slight extension of prior law. In the first place, plaintiffs were
officers of an organization "active in fostering civil rights for Negroes
in Louisiana and other States of the South."'" They alleged that the
defendants in the federal action were threatening to enforce certain
Louisiana statutes against them in order to "discourage them and their
supporters from asserting and attempting to vindicate the constitutional
rights of Negro citizens of Louisiana."' 82 Thus the case appeared to
contain the same elements that prompted the Court to relax the standgrounds.
Id. at 49-50. It should be noted that the basis of subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts was diversity of citizenship, though the Court spoke in terms ordinarily applied to constitutional cases and did not inquire whether the state courts would enjoin
the prosecution. For another statement of concern for the state systems see Douglas
v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1943).
177. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
178. See Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La.), affd
per curiam sub nom. Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S. 11 (1961); Browder v. Gayle,
142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), affd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). These cases
and others in the lower federal courts are discussed in Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief
Against State Court Proceedings. The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TExAs L. REV.
535, 548-52 (1970).
179. See generally A. BIcKEL, THE SuPREmE COURT AND Tim IDEA- OF PRoGRS
(1970); A. Cox, THE WAREN CoURT (1968).
180. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
181. Id.at482.
182. Id.
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ards governing injunctions against criminal prosecutions in civil rights
cases. Secondly, the Court adhered formally to the requirement that
plaintiffs demonstrate "irreparable injury" before an injunction would
issue.'8s It found that requirement satisfied by threats of multiple
prosecutions in bad faith under overbroad statutes regulating expression, which created a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of first amendment rights.1 4 Since it had appeared before Dombrowski that a showing of bad faith and harassment would suffice to establish irreparable
injury, the case merely seemed to confirm prior law on that point. The
innovative aspect of the case was its apparent extension of the irreparable injury standard to encompass the so-called "chilling effect" of a
vague or overbroad statute regulating freedom of expression. Together with subsequent decisions, Dombrowski seemed to mean that
a plaintiff might establish this chilling effect by showing either a threat
of prosecution in good faith under a facially unconstitutional statute, or
a threat of bad faith prosecution, even under a facially valid statute. 85
Despite Dombrowski's apparent consistency with prior law, a
closer comparison of the opinion with decisions handed down during
the earlier period of more rigorous judicial restraint described above
reveals that the case was in truth a broad authorization by the Warren
Court of federal intervention into state affairs-an authorization which
was motivated by the basic assumption that state courts would "not be
as prone as federal courts to vindicate constitutional rights promptly and
effectively.' t 86 In DombrowskN Mr. Justice Brennan expressed the
majority's view that defense of a state prosecution was inadequate fully
to protect first amendment rights when a chilling effect existed:
A criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression
usually involves imponderables and contingencies that themselves
may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment freedoms ...
When the statutes also have an overbroad sweep, as is here alleged,
the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious rights
may be critical. For in such cases, the statutes lend themselves
too readily to denial of those rights. . . . The assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights is unfounded in such cases..
.. The
chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may
183. Id. at 484-85.
184. Id. at 485-89.
185. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); C. Wiuorr, supra note 9, §
52, at 208; Maraist, supra note 178, at 578-79; Note, Bad Faith Prosecution of Civil
Rights Matters in State Courts-Future Developments of Injunctive Relief in Federal
Courts, 1 GA. L. REv. 656, 660-63 (1967).
186. 380 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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derive from the fact of the
prosecution, unaffected by the prospects
of its success or failure. 8 7
However, this view of the propriety of federal intervention conflicted
sharply with that expressed by the Court during the earlier period in
Douglas v. City of Jeannette. 8 ' In Douglas the Court was faced with
the question of whether it should enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance that it had declared unconstitutional the same day, partly on
grounds of overbreadth, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania.8 9 Even though
first amendment rights were involved in Douglas, the Court found no
inadequacy in the remedy available by defense of a state criminal prosecution. Although the decision may have been influenced by a belief
that the local authorities would observe its holding in Murdock, 90° the
clear import of the Douglas opinion for future cases was that federal
district courts should leave state prosecutions unfettered, even when
sensitive first amendment rights were threatened under overbroad statutes. Thus, fairly interpreted, the Court's approval of federal injunctive relief in Dombrowski when a "chilling effect" upon first amendment rights was present actually signified more than simply "an extension of well-established legal principles to a peculiar fact situation."'191
Rather, it represented one aspect of another fundamental shift in the
Court's attitude toward federal anticipatory relief for constitutional violations and the legitimacy of state court processes as a means of remedying those violations.
Read together, therefore, the Court's decisions on federal injunctive interference with state criminal proceedings from Ex parte Young
to Dombrowski reveal that although the Court has continuously applied
the labels of English Chancery practice in deciding cases, those labels
actually masked the important principles of decision during any given
period. The results in the decided cases can be explained more readily
as a function of the Court's attitude toward anticipatory adjudication of
constitutional issues, the legitimacy of the states' interest in initial decision of constitutional questions involving state law, and the efficacy of
state court processes to protect constitutional rights. So viewed, however, the Court's approach is subject to criticism. In the first place,
187. Id. at 486-87.
188. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
189. 319 U.S. 105, 116-17 (1943).
190. 319 U.S. at 165; Amsterdam, CriminalProsecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State
Court Trial, 113 U. PA.L.REv. 793, 904-05 n.496 (1965).
191. See Maraist, supra note 178, at 565.
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it is questionable whether there was ever a justification for applying
the English equity principles in the federal courts. Under the various
statutory schemes existing since 1789, single federal courts have always
been competent to issue both legal and equitable remedies. Though
confined for many years by the statutory requirement that there be no
"plain, adequate, and complete remedy" at law, that requirement was
designed to measure the adequacy of the remedies available on the law
"side" of the federal courts, not to determine the propriety of a federal
as opposed to a state forum.192 In any event, the requirement was
abolished in 1948, and there seems to be no substantial justification
for retaining any of the ancient equity requirements under the completely merged system of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure today.
Retention of the historical requirements for injunctive relief impedes
the development of rational, analytical standards for determining the
appropriateness of such relief in a modem procedural system. And nowhere is this more apparent than in the cases dealing with federal injunctions against state criminal proceedings.
The Supreme Court, by holding out the ancient equity standards
as principles of decision, has confused the functional inquiry that ought
to take place in determining -the propriety of federal anticipatory relief
against state action. A functional inquiry should take into account such
factors as the appropriate relationship between federal anticipatory relief and state anticipatory relief, the appropriate relationship between
federal anticipatory relief and defense of state civil or criminal proceedings, the legislative purposes behind the relevant statutory grants of authority to the federal courts, including jurisdictional grants, the Supreme
Court's proper role as arbiter of the relationships between the state and
federal courts, and perhaps others. Instead, the Court has used -the
rubric of "imminent irreparable injury" as a standard of shifting content
with which to reflect changes in the basic allocation of business between
the state and federal court systems. Coupled with that rubric's historical meaning, the end result has been the apparent application of a "no
adequate remedy at law plus" standard, with the content of the "plus"
being substantially in doubt. As the authors of one famous casebook
have expressed the operation of the standards governing injunctive relief against enforcement of state criminal laws, "notions of federal-state
comity intersect traditional equity requirements in connection with the
more inclusive requirement that the plaintiff in equity show irreparable
192. HAlT & WEcHSLER, supra note 9, at 1009.
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harm, and more particularly in connection with equity's traditional reluctance to interfere with criminal proceedings unless such harm would
result."' 93
The decision-making process which has been established is, therefore, one without intellectual or practical boundaries, which shifts according to the whims of a majority of the Court. As will be later discussed, this dysfunctional process can and should be replaced by an
analytical standard based upon sound procedural policies and upon all
the factors relevant to the appropriateness of federal anticipatory adjudication of state laws.
B.

The FederalAnti-Injunction Statute
As indicated above, a federal Anti-Injunction provision has been
in existence, in one form or another, since 1793.194 The history and
95
purposes of this statute have been examined in detail by others.'
Suffice it here to say that the legislative history of the provision is scanty
and its original purposes obscure. 196
Where it is applicable, the prohibitions of the statute are absolute.
That is, it prohibits injunctions against state court proceedings without
regard to the adequacy of the remedy in the state courts, the quality
of injury the federal plaintiff will suffer if an injunction is refused, or
the need for federal anticipatory intervention by way of injunction. 197
Consequently, it is important to determine when the statute applies to
understand the entire scope of discretion open to the federal courts to
enjoin state actions.
The most important exception to the operation of the statute is
that it only applies to state court proceedings already commenced when
the federal injunction is sought. The justification for this exception is
shaky, at best. If, as often stated, the statute performs the function
98
it
of preventing needless friction between state and federal courts,
193. Id. at 1009-10.
194. See note 138 and accompanying text supra.
195. See, e.g., C. WiGHT, supra note 9, § 47; Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunctions
Against Proceedings in State Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 MIcir. L. REV.
1145 (1932); Taylor & Willis, supra note 146; Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State
Court Proceedings, 74 H.Iv. L. Rxv. 726 (1961); Note, Federal Court Stays of State
Court Proceedings: A Re-examination of Original CongressionalIntent, 38 U. CM. L.
RPv. 612 (1971); Note, Anti-Suit Injunctions Between State and Federal Courts, 32 U.
Cm. L. Rnv. 471 (1965). See also Note, The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute and DeclaratoryJudgments in ConstitutionalLitigation, 83 HAnv. L. RPv. 1870 (1970).
196. See authorities cited note 195 supra.
197. See C. WmGHT, supra note 9, § 47, at 182.
198. See, e.g., id. § 47, at 178.
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would seem that the function is largely impaired by the exception. As
one commentator has stated:
There is thus presented the curiously illogical situation, that if a
state officer succeeds in initiating his criminal proceedings in a state
court to enforce an alleged unconstitutional state law, he cannot be
enjoined or interfered with by the federal court; but if he can be
caught on the immediate verge of initiating such action, he may
be so enjoined. -It is difficult to see why action of a state court
is not, in fact, as effectively restrained in the latter case, as it would
be by an injunction in the former case. It is also difficult to see
why the right of an individual to test the constitutionality of a state
law by a suit in the federal court-a right which he possesses only
by virtue of the provisions of the federal statutes should be deemed
to be more sacred than the right of a state to have the action of
its courts freed from restraint by a federal court injunction-a right
which it also possesses only by virtue of a federal statute. 109
Further reducing the effectiveness of the statute for many years
were numerous other court-made exceptions to it. 00 In 1941, in -the
case of Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.,201 the Supreme Court
rejected all but one of these nonstatutory exceptions to the statute.2 2
In response to Toucey, however, Congress sought in the 1948 revision
20
of the Judicial Code to restore the law as it existed prior to Toucey. 3
This present version of the statute reads, as follows: "A court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.", 4
It has been said with no little accuracy that this provision "isnot
a model of clear draftmanship,1 20 5 and since the revision, the Supreme
Court has vacillated in the strictness with which it has viewed the statute's prohibitions. 20 6 For the purposes of this article, -the most important difficulty with the language of the statute was what construction
should be given the exception for injunctions "expressly authorized by
Act of Congress." Specifically, the question was whether the Civil
Rights Act 20 7 constituted such an "expressly authorized" exception.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Warren, supranote 143, at 375.
See authorities cited note 195 supra.
314 U.S. 118 (1941).
See C. WRiuirr, supra note 9, § 47, at 178-79.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) (Reviser's Note).
Id. § 2283.
See C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 47, at 179.
Id. at 179-80.
42 U.S.C.§ 1983 (1970).
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For some time, the lower federal courts were divided over
whether to treat the Act as an "expressly authorized" exception to the
Anti-Injunction Statute,20 8 and, prior to 1972, the Supreme Court consistently refused to resolve the question. 209 Given the Court's willingness to manipulate -traditional equity principles in accord with its view
of the merits of judicial restraint, the ultimate direction in which it resolved the issue was of no little importance. Many suits brought to enjoin state criminal proceedings on constitutional grounds are based upon
alleged fourteenth amendment violations, which the Civil Rights Act
includes within its scope. Thus, if the Court ultimately held the Act
to be an "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute, the only important factors limiting injunctive relief against the bulk
of state court proceedings would be the shifting application of the -traditional rules of equity jurisprudence. Conversely, if the Court held that
the Anti-Injunction Statute barred injunctions under the Civil Rights
Act against state proceedings, state law enforcement officers would at
least be free of federal interference if they were able to win the race
to the courthouse. Of course, injunctions against "threatened" or "future" proceedings would remain unaffected by the Anti-Injunction Act.
As will be seen, the Court ultimately determined that the AntiInjunction Statute does not bar injunctive relief when suit is brought
under the Civil Rights Act. 210 This determination is part of the shift
in direction initiated by the Court's decisions in 1971 and will be discussed below. It should be noted here, however, that the result finally
reached was not generally expected by the commentators. 2 11 As Professor Currie inquired prior to the Court's resolution of the issue, "by
what stretch of the English language could it be argued that -the Civil
Rights Act 'expressly' authorizes injunctions against suits in state
courts?" As will be observed below, this and other questions which
208. Compare Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119, 124 n.11 (3d Cir. 1950), with
Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939
(1965); Wojcik v. Palmer, 318 F.2d 171 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930 (1963);
Coss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963); Moss v. Jones, 288 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 868 (1961); Smith v. Village of Lansing, 241 F.2d 856 (7th Cir.
1957); Sexton v. Barry, 233 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 838 (1956);
and Norwood v. Parenteau, 228 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 955
(1956). See also Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
209. See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 613-14 n.3 (1968); Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965). The issue has now been resolved in favor
of a construction that permits injunctive relief. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225
(1972), discussed in Part IV(D) infra.
210. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
211. See C. WG-rr, supranote 9, § 47, at 181-82.
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might be asked about the Court's approach in this area may be answered by reference to a desire to retain in itself a large degree of aiscretion to adjust the relationships between the state and federal courts
as its own composition shifts with variations in the political climate. As
with its approach to injunctions against threatened state court proceedings, this degree of discretion has the capacity of being dysfunctional.

In addition, as will be seen, it is a degree of discretion the Court is
not entitled to exercise.
C. DeclaratoryJudgments in the FederalCourts

As indicated above, the remedy of declaratory judgment was not
available in the federal courts until 1934.212

The legislative history of

this Act reveals clearly that the federal declaratory judgment was based
on the same premises, was intended to embody the same purposes, and

was designed to have -the same characteristics that underlie the remedy
generally-that is, the legislative history recognizes the validity of a
mechanism to adjudicate disputes before they ripen into violence and
disrupt the status quo, coupled with an assumption that in a civilized
society coercion is generally unnecessary to secure obedience to court

decrees. 18 Moreover, it is certain that the federal remedy was intended to be available to challenge criminal statutes 214 and that it was
to be a discretionary remedy. 15 In this last regard, it is also clear un212. In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse
party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970). See note 140 and accompanying text supra. See also
FED. R. Crv. P. 57.
213. See S. RP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6 (1934); H.R. REp. No. 1264,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); Hearingson H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 38-40 (1928) [hereinafter cited as
1928 Hearings]. Despite the provision for "further necessary or proper relief based on
a declaratory judgment" in section 2202, which is similar to the provision in section 8
of the Uniform Act, the above legislative history indicates a belief that coercive relief
would not ordinarily be necessary. Nevertheless, it was contemplated from the outset
that ancillary proceedings to enforce the judgment would, if required, be available
against a recalcitrant litigant, even though such proceedings would be the exception
rather than the rule. See id. at 21, 39.
214. See S. REP. No. 1005, supra note 213, at 3, 6; 1928 Hearingsat 18-19.
215. See H.R. RP. No. 1264, supra note 213, at 2; Borchard, The Federal Declara.
tory Judgments Act, 21 VA. L. REv. 35, 49 (1934).
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der the federal provision that the courts' discretion was not to be controlled by the traditional principles applied to govern injunctions, and

the Supreme Court has so held. 216 However, it is equally plain that
the federal courts should exercise their discretion under the statute in
accord with the proper role of the federal judiciary in our constitutional

plan and avoid unnecessary interference with state affairs. 217 Operating under this last principle the Supreme Court has refused to sanction

federal declaratory judgments which would needlessly interfere with
the execution of state policies. 218 And the Court has also made it clear
that in exercising its discretion under the Act a federal court should
determine whether a federal declaratory judgment would be useful in
the face of a pending state proceeding:
Where a district court is presented with a claim such as was
made here, it should ascertain whether the questions in controversy
between the parties to the federal suit, and which are not foreclosed
under the applicable substantive law, can better be settled in the
proceeding pending in the state court. This may entail inquiry into
the scope of the pending state court proceeding and the nature of
defenses open there. 219
The discretion afforded to the federal courts under the ordinary

standards applicable to declaratory judgment proceedings has not, however, been the only means those courts have devised to decline adjudi-

cation in such actions. Especially in cases involving public law issues,
the Supreme Court has applied the ripeness standard in a manner
which clearly indicates the Court is declining to adjudicate cases which

satisfy the constitutional prerequisites of a case or controversy. Although at one time it appeared that the Court would require a specific
threat of enforcement before it would consider an action "ripe" for adjudication,220 in recent years its decisions evidence the evolution of a
216. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937); Nashville, C. &
St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933).
217. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, 62 H.v. L. Rav., supra note 88, at 814,
867-72.
218. See Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 247 (1952); Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
219. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942). See also
Borchard, supra note 110, at 692-99; Developments in the Law, 62 HAv. L. Rnv., supra
note 88, at 814-15.
220. See Developments in the Law, 62 HAIv. L. REv., supra note 83, at 870-71;
Note, 50 YALE LJ., supra note 97. This view has apparently been espoused by the Supreme Court on a number of occasions. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961);
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 88 (1947); Ex parte La Prade, 289 U.S.
444, 458 (1933). However, it has been articulately criticized by Professor Borchard,
among others, see Borchard, supra note 97, at 464-67; Note, 50 YALE L.J., supra. That
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set of more rational standards to govern this "discretionary" ripeness
determination. It may be helpful to examine these standards in the
context of a suit for declaratory relief from a threatened criminal action.
This may be accomplished by examining two basic situations a person
endangered by a criminal law may confront and the difficulties he will
face in meeting the federal ripeness standard in these situations. They
are cases in which (i) the person is in jeopardy of criminal prosecution
for an ongoing course of conduct, either because the authorities have
threatened such a prosecution, or because an allegedly invalid statute
requires him to cease the conduct or risk incurring serious criminal penalties, and (ii) when the person is in danger of prosecution for contemplated future action, either because the authorities have threatened to
prosecute him if he takes the action, or because an allegedly invalid
statute proscribes the conduct in which he wishes to engage.
Initially, one may dispose of the situation in which the authorities
threaten to prosecute the plaintiff unless he ceases a particular, welldefined course of conduct. Here the plaintiff's ongoing activity eliminates all doubts about whether he will act and what he will do, factors
important in determining, for purposes of the ripeness inquiry, whether
he possesses definite rights that are being subjected to definite prejudicial interference. 2 ' The official threat, in turn, provides the necessary
degree of certainty that the authorities actually intend to prosecute him
for his conduct.2 22 Thus, in this situation there seems no doubt that
the case is ripe for determination under any reasonable standard.
When, instead, the plaintiff is engaging in ongoing activity, but
there has been no official threat of enforcement, ripeness depends
largely upon the character of the law in question. If the law is selfexecuting in nature, so that it clearly appears the plaintiff must either
cease or alter his activities, or risk incurring substantial criminal penalties, the case is ripe for adjudication.2 2 On the other hand, where
the law challenged requires some action by the authorities before it may
be enforced, adjudication may have to await the content of an actual
such a requirement is not an absolute prerequisite to a case or controversy has previously
been discussed. See text accompanying notes 97-103, 118-22 supra.
221. Compare Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), with United
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
222. Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947).
223. See Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 171 (1967); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152-53 (1967); cf. Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58 (1963). See also Dickson, Declaratory Remedies and Constitutional Change, 24
VAN. L. REv. 257, 268-75 (1971).
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application.224 In both instances the standard to be applied has a "twofold aspect, requiring [the court] to evaluate both the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration; 2 25 but in the latter case the presence of a cognizable danger of harm to the plaintiff depends upon the kind of enforcement activity undertaken by the authorities. 226 The problems encountered in enforcement, the kinds of safeguards employed to protect
the plaintiff's legitimate interests, and the need for various types of enforcement activity in order to attain permissible governmental goals, are
all likely to have an important bearing on the law's validity. 2 7 Thus
the need to know how the law will be enforced becomes urgent for
purposes of adjudicating its constitutionality; 2 8 and as long as the hardship of denying relief to the plaintiff is not severe enough to outweigh
this need for a specific application, the case will be considered "un9
ripe."
The most difficult case in which to establish justiciability arises
when the plaintiff is not engaging in an ongoing course of conduct, but
instead alleges that an invalid statute proscribes some action he wishes
to take in the future. 230 Here the difficulty lies in determining whether
the plaintiff will act, and, assuming that he will act, what precisely he
will do. In other words, it is difficult to tell whether he really needs
an adjudication of the statute's invalidity, or whether he is posing a
hypothetical situation for the court to resolve. 1 Under these circumstances, the existence or nonexistence of a specific threat to enforce
the questionable law may be critical to justiciability, not because the
threat itself is an absolute prerequisite to a ripe controversy, but because the plaintiff may be unable to point to any other factual element
which will establish the concreteness necessary for adjudication.283 A
22

224.
225.
226.
227.

See Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
See Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
Cf. id. at 163-64.

228. Id.

229. See id. at 165.
230. See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Dickson, supra note 223,
at 270-75.
231. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 (1947).
232. Id. at 88-90. After indicating that no sufficient threat of enforcement existed
to establish justiciability, the Court went on to state:
The power of courts, and ultimately of this Court to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress arises only when the interests of the litigants
require the use of this judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. A hypothetical threat is not enough. We can only speculate as
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threat of enforcement will generally establish sufficient concreteness
for justiciability, because it normally represents both a reasonable belief
by the authorities that the plaintiff will engage in proscribed future activity and a concomitant attempt to deter him from so acting. Ordinarily, it seems, the authorities will not make such a threat unless the plaintiff gives them reason to do so, as where he inquires whether his proposed actions will be prosecuted, publicizes his intention to perform the
activity, or has engaged in past conduct which has attracted the attention of the officials, but which they do not wish to prosecute as long
as plaintiff ceases his activity in the future. Thus it is often not the
threat alone that establishes a ripe controversy, but also the facts which
give rise thereto; and in this regard one should note that both factors
operating together must demonstrate that the authorities intend to take
definite action against specific conduct of the plaintiff. Otherwise, the
threat will constitute only a "general threat by officials to enforce those
laws.

. .

they are charged to administer.

,"2

which the Supreme

Court has held insufficient to establish a ripe controversy. 3 4 Finally,
even if a threat of prosecution for future conduct is "clear and imminent," other circumstances, such as long-continued nonenforcement of
the questionable law, may dispell the need for adjudication; 285 and even
when prior action by both the plaintiff and the enforcement authorities
indicates that a particular act will be prosecuted, changed circumstances
may make it so improbable that the plaintiff will commit the act as to
render the case unripe.2 6
Combined with the discretionary power of the federal courts to
dismiss declaratory actions, the Supreme Court's application of the ripeness requirement appeared to place substantial obstacles in the path
of one who sought a declaratory judgment against an unconstitutional
state criminal law. However, the Court's opinions subsequent to Dombrowski v. Pfister, but before its line of decisions beginning in 1971,
to the kinds of political activity the appellants desire to engage in or as to the
contents of their proposed public statements or the circumstancesof their publication. It would not accord with judicial responsibility to adjudge, in a matter involving constitutionality, between the freedom of the individual and the
requirements of public order except when definite rights appear upon the one
side and definite prejudicial interference upon the other.
Id. (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 88.

234. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947). See also Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941).
235. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). See also A. BICKEL, THn LBEsT
DANGEROUS BRANCH 143-56 (1962).
236. See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).

1975]

INTERFERENCE WITH STATE COURTS

left at least some doubt about the circumstances when declaratory relief would be available to challenge state criminal provisions.
From the Court's decision in Zwickler v. Koota2 37 it appeared
that the propriety of federal declaratory relief might be determined in
accord with the test of the Dombrowski case. In Zwickler the federal
plaintiff had been convicted of violating a New York statute prohibiting
the distribution of anonymous election literature. His conviction was
reversed on state law grounds by the New York courts, and thereafter
he sought declaratory and injunctive relief against future enforcement
of the statute against him from a federal district court in New York,
arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad in that it embraced anonymous literature both within and outside the protection of
the first amendment. A three-judge district court applied the federal
doctrine of abstention and dismissed the complaint, in order that the
plaintiff might obtain a construction of the statute from the New York
courts.2 8 On appeal to the Supreme Court, that Court reversed and
remanded the case.
As far as the decision to abstain was concerned, the Supreme
Court held that, under the circumstances of the case, the district court
had violated the duty of the federal judiciary to give proper respect to
a suitor's choice of a federal forum when it deferred to the New York
courts under the doctrine of abstention. The Court held that the special factors justifying abstention in favor of state courts were absent,
since the plaintiff was challenging the New York statute on grounds
of overbreadth, not vagueness, and therefore there existed no possibility of a state court construction of the statute which would avoid the
constitutional question.23 9 The Court also pointed out that the attack
on the statute was based on first amendment grounds, thereby creating
the danger that state court proceedings would "chill" the exercise of
those rights. 240 This was in accord with Dombrowski, which had held

abstention inappropriate when statutes were attacked as "overly broad
2 41
and vague regulations of expression."
The district court had treated the questions of abstention, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief as the same in Zwickler and had
237. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
238. See note 9 supra.
239. See 389 U.S. at 246-52. See also Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941).
240. See 389 U.S. at 252.
241. 380 U.S. at 489-90; see Maraist,supra note 178, at 578.
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denied all relief because the plaintiff had not made the showing necessary to entitle him to an injunction against a state criminal prosecution.242 The Court held that Dombrowski required a different test for
abstention and injunctive relief, and that a similar distinction existed
between declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Zwickler decision was widely interpreted as requiring district courts to issue declaratory judgments whenever a state statute was
challenged on its face as an overbroad regulation of expression.24 8 By
itself, however, Zwickler is entirely consistent with a standard of discretion which would require federal district courts to refuse declaratory
relief against state criminal laws when to do so would unnecessarily dilsrupt state affairs or would not serve a useful purpose, since the Court
merely directed that requests for federal declaratory relief be considered independently of requests for injunctions. It did not hold that
considerations of state-federal relations were to be disregarded once a
question of abstention had been resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Nevertheless, when Zwickler is read together with the holding in Dombrowski there is some support for the view that declaratory relief becomes mandatory once abstention is denied on grounds of a "chilling
effect." Dombrowski had clearly held that the irreparable injury necessary to justify injunctive relief would be established by the chilling
244
effect incident to an overbroad regulation of first amendment rights.
Since the same facts which established this chilling effect also made
abstention unwarranted, 245 and since a declaratory judgment is a
"milder" remedy than an injunction, both declaratory and injunctive relief seemed to follow automatically from a refusal to abstain after Dombrowski and Zwickler. In Zwickler, however, relief was later declared to be inappropriate on grounds of mootness and lack of ripeness.2

6

In summary, after Dombrowski and Zwickler, it appeared that
declaratory judgments against the enforcement of state criminal laws
would be available as a matter of course when such laws were
challenged as overbroad regulations of expression, but that the ripeness
standard would be applied with some stringency to preclude "premature" adjudication of constitutional issues. Thus the Court continued to
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

See 389 U.S. at 252-54.
See C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 207; Maraist, supranote 178, at 578.
380 U.S. at 490; see Maraist, supra note 178, at 578.
See 380 U.S. at 489-90.
See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 107 (1969).
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adhere to the traditional labels governing injunctive relief, ignoring the
possibility of treating federal declaratory judgments and injunctions
against state laws in a comprehensive fashion, as complementary remedies to be utilized in accord with their unique characteristics, as well
as with consistent, rational principles reflecting the Congressional purpose behind the Civil Rights Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act
and the necessities of our dual system of federal and state courts. The
Court's next attempt to deal with these remedies came in the context
of suits for federal injunctions and declaratory judgments against pending state criminal actions. As will be seen, its response in this context
also failed to establish rational, principled criteria for federal relief.
However, the Court's decision did indicate a retreat from its liberal attitude about federal anticipatory adjudication of state laws in Dombrowski to a narrower view of the situations in which federal intervention
would be permissible.
IV.

FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF AGAINST

STATE CRIMINAL LAWS: THE YOUNGER-SAMJELS
LINE OF DECISIONS

A.

Younger v. Harrisand FederalInjunctive Relief
2 47
In Younger v. Harris
the plaintiff, a member of the Progressive

Labor Party, was indicted for distributing leaflets alleged to be in violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. He then sought a federal injunction against the District Attorney of Los Angeles County to
stop the prosecution. As grounds for the injunction, he alleged that
the existence of the Act and the prosecution under it inhibited him in
the exercise of his first amendment rights. Subsequently, three other
persons intervened as plaintiffs, claiming that the prosecution inhibited
their teaching and political activities. A three-judge district court held
the Criminal Syndicalism Act void for vagueness and overbreadth and
enjoined the defendant from prosecuting Harris thereunder. On direct
48
appeal from this judgment the Supreme Court reversed.
247. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The commentary on Younger and its progeny has been
extensive. The best works seem to be Geltner, Some Thoughts on the Limiting of
Younger v. Harris, 32 OHIo ST. L.J. 744 (1971); Kennedy & Schoonover, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under the Burger Court, 26 Sw. L.J. 282 (1972); Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger, and
Beyond, 50 TExAs L REv. 1324 (1972); Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger:
The View from Without and Within, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1.
248. 401 U.S. at 40-41. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall concurred in the
result. Id. at 56-58. Justice Douglas dissented. Id. at 58-65.
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The Court per Mr. Justice Black first held that the intervening
plaintiffs had alleged no live controversy with the defendant. In the
Court's view the intervenor's allegations were wholly insufficient to
warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction since they were under no
danger of actual prosecution. Thus the Court adhered to its prior ripeness decisions by refusing to adjudicate the intervenor's case in the absence of any demonstration that the authorities would apply the statute
to them for the activities in which they were engaging.
After disposing of the intervening plaintiffs, -the Court turned its
attention to the original plaintiff, Harris. Conceding that a ripe controversy existed with respect to him because of the pending prosecution,
the Court nevertheless held that injunctive relief under the circumstances of the case would be a "violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings
except under special circumstances. -49 Justice Black cited three
sources evidencing this long-standing national policy.
First, he cited the long existence of the Anti-Injunction Statute as
evidence of a congressional policy "to permit state courts to try cases
free from interference by federal courts,"25 0 implying that this congressional policy was a source of strength from which the Court might draw
in restricting the availability of injunctive relief against state proceedings. This reliance upon the Anti-Injunction Act was curious for at
least two reasons. First, Justice Black made it clear later in his opinion
that the Court was not deciding whether the anti-injunction provision
barred a federal injunction against state proceedings of its own force,
or whether, instead, the Civil Rights Act would be considered an "expressly authorized" exception to that statute. 2 61 However, as earlier
observed, the Anti-Injunction Statute, when it applies, is an absolute
prohibition on a federal court's power to enjoin a pending state action.252 In a sound procedural system, similar questions concerning a
court's power to act over a particular controversy are disposed of at the
threshold of a lawsuit, while issues dealing with the manner in which
a court exercises its authority or discretion are dealt with later. Any
other sequence holds the potential for serious waste of the courts' time
and effort. 253 The Supreme Court's approach in Younger ignored this
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 41. The Court also denied a declaratory judgment. Id. at 41 n.2.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 54. See also id. at 55 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
See text following note 196 supra.
See Z. CHQ F, supra note 76, at 316-19.
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"Policy of First Things First '25 4 by reserving the Anti-Injunction Act
issue for later determination in order to decide the case on substantive
principles governing the availability of federal injunctive relief. Second, the Court's reliance on the Anti-Injunction Statute as a source of
strength for its ultimate decision seems entirely misplaced, in light of
its subsequent holding in 1972 that the Civil Rights Act constitutes an
expressly authorized congressional exception to that statute. 25 5 How
a policy against enjoining state proceedings can be derived from a statute which expressly allows such injunctions is confusing, to say the least.
A second source of the "national policy" against federal injunctions against state court proceedings was said to be the traditional equity
requirements of irreparable injury and lack of an adequate legal remedy.256 Mr. Justice Black's final source of evidence for the "national
254. Id. at 316.
255. See Part IV(D) infra.
256. IT]he basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence [is] that courts of equity
should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer
irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. The doctrine may originally have
grown out of circumstances peculiar to the English judicial system and not app!icable in this country, but its fundamental purpose of restraining equity jurisiction within narrow limits is equally important under our Constitution, in order to prevent erosion of the role of the jury and avoid a duplication of legal
proceedings and legal sanctions where a single suit would be adequate to protect the rights asserted.
401 U.S. at 43-44. Justice Black therefore recognized the origins of the "irreparable injury" doctrine as being in "circumstances peculiar to the English judicial system," but
suggested that there are independent reasons for retaining the doctrine in the federal
courts. However, it is difficult to see how the most important role of the jury is
"eroded" by a federal injunction against state criminal proceedings. The jury trial guarantees in our system are primarily designed to safeguard the rights of the accused. If
he wishes to forego those guarantees in favor of an anticipatory adjudication of his
rights, it is hard to see how the role of the jury will be significantly eroded by permitting him to do so. Moreover, the second of his reasons for retaining the "irreparable
injury" standard-to avoid duplication of legal proceedings where a single suit will be
adequate to protect constitutional rights-begs the question to be decided. The issue
was, or should have been, when federal anticipatory relief ought to be available to prevent the enforcement of state laws through criminal proceedings. This suggests a host
of factors that should be taken into account in the decision-making process in addition
to the adequacy or inadequacy of the remedy available by defending a state criminal
proceeding, including the goals Congress was attempting to achieve in conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts in civil rights cases without regard to jurisdictional amount,
the permissible range of discretion available to federal courts in light of those jurisdictional goals and the -policies Congress was seeking to achieve in the substantive portions
of the Civil Rights Act, the relative efficacy of federal anticipatory relief as opposed
to state anticipatory relief to achieve the same goals, the relative efficacy of anticipatory relief as opposed to defense of a criminal prosecution to achieve those goals, and
the relative roles of the federal and state courts in the process of constitutional adjudication. To suggest that all of these factors, as well as others which might be relevant,
are satisfactorily reflected in the ancient equity standard is disingenuous, at best.
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policy" forbidding federal injunctions against state court proceedings
was
the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state functions,
a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a
Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and
their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions
in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and
clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism".

.

..25T

This passage, along with the Court's later discussion of the Dombrowski
case, constituted the heart of its reasons for denying injunctive relief
in Younger. The Court had again switched from the concern it has
demonstrated in Ex Parte Young and Dombrowski for the plight of litigants -threatened by state criminal action to an orientation toward the
interests of the state. The Court indicated, however, that the change
was not absolute and protection of certain federal interests might possibly override state interests and result in a proper occasion for anticipatory relief.258 Nevertheless, it was clear that the pendulum had swung
in favor of the states. The only question was exactly how much room
was left for federal anticipatory relief after the swing.
Justice Black went on in Younger to discuss additional reasons for
the Court's renewed deference to state courts. These included the already mentioned greater reliance on traditional standards of equitable
relief than in Dombrowski, an attempt to show -thatthe "chilling effect"
analysis in Dombrowski was not necessary to the decision there, the
possibility that a federal injunction would not end the plaintiffs fear
of prosecution since the state would be able -to act after a state court
limited the reach of the statute, and a policy against invalidating a state
statute on its face without a concrete application.
In Boyle v. Landry,259 decided the same day, the Court held to
the same restrictive view of federal anticipatory relief it has expressed
in Younger. In both cases, the Court made it clear that its pre-Dombrowski precedents governing the propriety of injunctive relief had
been reinstated. Those precedents have been previously discussed;
they approved injunctions only against prosecutions brought in bad faith
or for purposes of harassment, 60 against prosecutions under flagrantly
257. 401 U.S. at 44.
258. Id.
259. 401 U.S. 77 (1971).

260. See Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) (per curiam), decided the same day
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unconstitutional statutes, against multiple prosecutions, and in other
"unusual," but undefined, situations.
By returning to the pre-Warren Court principles governing injunctive relief, the Court effectively emasculated Dombrowski, but left the
area of federal injunctions against state court proceedings in an unsatisfactory state. As previously observed, the retention of the old chancery
principles in a modern procedural system tends to divert the courts'
focus from the kinds of factors which would permit them to develop
rational criteria to govern this sensitive area. The Court did suggest
some possible factors it might take into account in determining the propriety of relief in future cases, however, and these have yet to be discussed. Before determining whether these factors combined with the
Court's traditional approach to injunctive relief will produce rational
standards, it will be helpful to examine the Court's holdings on federal
declaratory relief in the decisions under scrutiny.
B.

Samuels v. Mackell and FederalDeclaratoryRelief

In Samuels v. Mackel1 61 several persons who had been indicted
in New York for criminal anarchy brought suit in federal court to obtain
declaratory and injunctive relief from the state prosecutions. They alleged, inter alia, that the New York anarchy statute was void for vagueness in violation of due process and that it abridged their freedoms of
speech, press, and assembly in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments. As a consequence, they asserted, the trial of their indictments in state court would harass them and cause them to suffer irreparable injury. They requested that the state courts be enjoined
from proceeding and, in the alternative, that the New York law be declared unconstitutional. A three-judge district court held the criminal
anarchy statute constitutional and dismissed the complaint. On appeal
the Supreme Court affirmed.
In an opinion written by Justice Black, the Court first observed
as Younger. In Dyson the plaintiff was charged with two violations of the Texas obscenity statute. He brought suit in federal court for declaratory and injunctive relief
against arrest and seizure of his property by the Dallas police without a prior determination of obscenity. A three-judge district court refused such relief, but did hold the Texas
obscenity statute unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Younger and its companion decision, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66 (1971), so that the district court could, if appropriate, make findings of "irreparable
injury." On the facts of the case, it clearly appeared that bad faith and harassment existed. Dyson v. Stein, supra at 204-06 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Wheeler v.
Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971).
261. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
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that the plaintiffs had made no showing sufficient under Younger to
establish irreparable injury; therefore, no federal injunction was warranted.162 Then the Court held that the plaintiffs' alternative prayer
for a declaratory judgment was also insufficient, since under ordinary
circumstances the same considerations that require federal courts to
withhold injunctive relief against pending
state court proceedings also
2 6
make declaratory relief inappropriate. 1
The Court relied upon prior decisions in which it had denied declaratory judgments that would have prevented the collection of state
taxes and found no relevant difference between state tax collections
and state criminal prosecutions "with respect to the limited question
whether, in cases where the criminal proceeding was begun prior to
the federal civil suit, the propriety of declaratory and injunctive relief
should be judged by essentially the same standards. 26 4 The Court did
leave open the possibility that a declaratory judgment might issue in
certain circumstances where, although an otherwise sufficient showing
for injunctive relief exists, an injunction should be withheld because
"particularly intrusive or offensive. ' 265 But the Court made it plain
that the practical effects of the two forms of relief would usually be
the same and that federal courts should, in the proper exercise of their
discretion, deny declaratory judgments where this is so.26

Thus the

Court relied upon the line of decisions, previously described, which
held that federal declaratory relief should be administered in such a
27
way as to avoid unnecessary interference with state affairs.
The Court made it plain, in spite of its statement that a declaratory
judgment would sometimes be appropriate as a milder alternative to
injunctive relief, that it was not authorizing a true analytical approach
to the remedy. Rather, it was approving a rather mechanical process,
whereby declaratory relief would be denied whenever the traditional
chancery rules dictated that injunctive relief be refused:
We therefore hold that, in cases where the state criminal prosecution was begun prior to the federal suit, the same equitable princi262. Id. at 68-69.

263. Id. at 69.
264. Id. at 72.
265. Id. at 73.
266. Id.
267. See notes 217-18 and accompanying text supra. The Court might also have
relied upon the ordinary standard govining declaratory relief-i.e. whether a declaratory judgment will serve a useful purpose in resolving the dispute between the partiessince as observed earlier, a declaratory action will not normally be useful in resolving
a dispute that is already the subject of a prior pending action.
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ples relevant to the propriety of an injunction must be taken into
consideration by federal district courts in determining whether to
issue a declaratory judgment, and that where an injunction would
be impermissible under these principles, declaratory relief should
2 68

ordinarily be denied as well.

This approach flies squarely in the face of the intent of the draftsmen
of the Declaratory Judgment Act as well as the Court's prior decisions
holding that the declaratory remedy is not to be administered in accord
with traditional equity rules.169 Worse, it demonstrated once again an
insensitivity to the need for a coherent approach to the entire problem
of federal anticipatory relief, based on the unique features of the declaratory and injunctive remedies and the different functions that state
and federal courts perform in our dual court system which might bear
on the relative appropriateness of anticipatory relief in constitutional
cases being issued by one or the other system.
The Court in Younger and Samuels reserved for later decision certain questions the resolution of which might have a bearing on the coherence of the Court's overall approach to federal anticipatory relief.
Before passing final judgment upon the decisions, therefore, it will be
helpful to examine the nature of these questions and their subsequent
history in the Court.
C.

The Questions Reserved

The Court and its various members suggested a number of distinctions in the 1971 decisions which might provide a basis for less stringent
restrictions on federal injunctions and declaratory judgments against
state actions. These were (i) a possible distinction between the availability of federal relief against future state court proceedings, as opposed to pending proceedings; (ii) a possible distinction between declaratory and injunctive relief; and (iii) a possible distinction between
civil and criminal proceedings. Subsequent decisions of the Court have
resolved some of these questions; while other decisions have given
some indication how the declaratory and injunctive remedies should be
administered under the principles articulated in Younger and Samuels.
268. 401 U.S. at 73 (emphasis added). Clearly the Court did not mean by using
the word "ordinarily" to authorize a thoroughgoing analysis of the declaratory remedy's
utility in each case, for the quoted passage of its opinion was immediately followed by
a passage emphasizing that the remedy might be a useful alternative to an injunction
when the injunction was otherwise appropriate,but was, for some reason, particularly
intrusive. Id.
269. See note 216 and accompanying text supra.
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The Court has, as yet, not formally resolved the question of
whether federal injunctive relief against future state proceedings will
be administered by the same standards as injunctions against pending
proceedings, but there are a number of reasons for believing that the
same principles will be applied to both. First, as previously indicated,
the Court decided the case of Boyle v. Landry on the same day it decided Younger. Boyle involved a situation in which no state prosecution was pending at the time federal relief was sought, and the Court
disposed of the case under the irreparable injury standard of Younger.
However, Boyle does not finally dispose of the question, since on the
facts of the case, it strongly appeared that the plaintiffs were in the
same position as the intervenors in Younger who failed to establish a
ripe controversy. 270 Nevertheless, there are other indications that the
same standard will be applied to govern injunctions against pending and
future proceedings.
For one, the precedents cited by the Court in Younger to support
its application of the irreparable injury test to pending prosecutions
were all cases in which the plaintiffs sought to enjoin future prosecutions.2 7 1 For another, Mr. Justice Brennan, expressing the views of
three dissenting members of the Court in Younger's companion case
of Perez v. Ledesma~27 indicated that the same standard should be applied to govern injunctions against both pending and future proceedings.
In Perez the operators of a newsstand in the Parish of St. Bernard,
Louisiana, were arrested and charged in state court with selling obscene
magazines, books, and playing cards in violation of a state statute and
a local ordinance. Subsequently, they filed suit in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute and ordinance were unconstitutional and an injunction against pending and future prosecutions.
A three-judge district court held the state statute constitutional on its
face, but held that the arrests of the plaintiffs and the seizure of allegedly obscene materials were invalid for lack of a prior adversary
hearing. The court issued an order requiring suppression and return
of the materials seized, although it did not issue an injunction against
pending or future prosecutions. While recognizing that it had no authority to rule on the constitutionality of the local ordinance, the threejudge court nevertheless expressed its view that the ordinance was un270. See The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HM.v. L. REv.40, 305 n.26 (1971).
271. See authorities cited 401 U.S. at 45-47.
272. 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
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constitutional. The district judge who originally referred the case to
the three-judge court then adopted -that court's view of the ordinance's
validity and held it unconstitutional. The clerk of the district court
merged the orders of both the three-judge court and the district judge
into a single judgment. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the three-judge court insofar as it granted injunctive relief
and vacated and remanded the rest of the judgment, with directions
that the district court issue a fresh decree from which the parties might
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.2" 3
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, dissented. These Justices agreed with the majority that the decision of
the three-judge court was properly reviewable by the Supreme Court,
and that the three-judge court had improperly ordered the suppression
and return of the allegedly obscene materials.2 74 On the question of
whether the district court correctly issued declaratory relief, the dissenters first argued that a live controversy prerequisite to relief under
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act existed. 275 Even though, prior
to the federal hearing, the state authorities had entered a nolle prosequi
on the charges under the parish ordinance, 276 the "aggressive prosecution" of the plaintiffs gave rise to an inference that any further attempts
to sell the questioned materials would again be met with prosecutions
under both statute and ordinance.27 7 Having demonstrated a live controversy, Justice Brennan then argued that no pending prosecution existed under the parish ordinance to make federal intervention improper.2 78 Although charges were pending under the ordinance at the
time the federal suit was brought, the authorities had entered the nolle
prosequi prior to the time the three-judge court convened and heard
the case.2 79 In -the dissenters' view, the availability of federal relief
depended upon the situation at the time of the hearing, rather than at
the time the federal suit was initiated.28 0
The key predicate to answering the question whether a federal
court should stay its hand, is whether there is a pending state prosecution where the federal court plaintiff may have his constitutional
defenses heard and determined. Ordinarily, that question may be
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

88.
95, 96-98.
101.
94.
102.
103.

658

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

answered merely by examining the dates upon which the federal
and state actions were filed. If the state prosecution was first filed
and if it provides an adequate forum for the adjudication of constitutional rights, the federal court should not ordinarily intervene.
When, however, as here, at the time of the federal hearing there
is no state prosecution to which the federal court plaintiff may be
relegated for the assertion of his constitutional defenses, the primary reason for refusing intervention is absent. Here there was
no other forum for the adjudication of appellees' constitutional objections to the ordinance.
There is, of course, some intrusion into a state['s] administration of its criminal laws whenever a federal court renders a declaratory judgment upon the constitutionality of a state criminal enactment. The Court holds today in Samuels v. Mackell . . . that
considerations of federalism ordinarily make the intrusion impermissible if a state prosecution under that enactment is proceeding
But considerations of fedat the time the federal suit is filed . ..
eralism are not controlling when no state prosecution is pending
and the only question is whether declaratory relief is appropriate.
In such case, the congressional scheme that makes federal courts
the primary guardians of constitutional rights, and the express congressional authorization of declaratory relief, afforded because it is
than the injunction, become the
a less harsh and abrasive remedy
28
factors of primary significance. '
Mr. Justice Brennan then reviewed the history of federal suits to
enjoin the enforcement of state statutes,28 2 concluding that the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act was designed in part to allow litigants to test
the constitutionality of state and federal statutes under circumstances
where injunctions would not be appropriate and where, in fact, injunctive relief had been abused prior to that Act in order to give what
amounted to a declaratory judgment.28 8 On these grounds he argued
for rejection of the majority's "suggestion" that the irreparable injury test
applied to control the propriety of a declaratory judgment when no
prosecution is pending at the time federal relief is sought; 28 4 and he
made clear the view of the dissenters that the Dombrowski chilling effect should be sufficient to justify federal declaratory relief against future prosecutions, although he conceded that Younger's stricter criteria
of irreparable injury should control the propriety of injunctions under
28 5
the same circumstances.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

103-04.
104-10.
111-15.
115-16.
117-30.
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The dissenters therefore advocated retention of the traditional approach to injunctive relief, while drawing a distinction between the
availability of federal declaratory relief against pending and future
prosecutions. As previously observed, however, the Court has not yet
indicated whether it will adhere to their view of the standards by which
injunctive relief should be administered against future state court proceedings. During the remainder of its 1970 term, the Court summarily disposed of twenty-one cases on authority of the six February decisions, but none of the dispositions shed additional definitive light on
the main decisions.2 8 e Moreover, decisions of the Court since the 1970
term have consistently left the issue unresolved.2 8 7 And although a
few cases have indicated the direction the Court might take, the indicators are conflicting. For example, in Lake Carriers' Association v.
MacMullan,288 plaintiffs filed suit to have the Michigan Watercraft Pollution Control Act of 1970 declared unconstitutional and its enforcement enjoined. A three-judge court, finding an absence of a justiciable
controversy and grounds for abstention, dismissed the complaint. The
Supreme Court, although affirming the district court's determination to
abstain, disagreed with some of the grounds for that determination. In
rejecting certain of these grounds, the Court, per Mr. Justice Brennan,
had occasion to comment on the effect of Younger and Samuels upon
federal relief against future proceedings:
[T]he absence of an immediate threat of prosecution does not argue against reaching the merits of appellants' complaint. In
Younger v. Harris . . . and Samuels v. Mackell . . . this Court
held that, apart from "extraordinary circumstances," a federal court
may not enjoin a pending state prosecution or declare invalid the
statute under which the prosecution was brought. The decisions
there were premised on considerations of equity practice and
comity in our federal system that have little force in the absence
of a pending state proceeding. In that circumstance, exercise of
federal court jurisdiction ordinarily is appropriate if the conditions
for declaratory or injunctive relief are met. See generally Perez
289
v. Ledesma. .. (separate opinion).
286. The memorandum disposition of these cases is reported in 401 U.s. 984-90

(1971).

287. The Court's latest reservation of the question appears in Allee v. Medrano, 416
U.S. 802, 820 n.15 (1974). See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 473 (1974);
Note, Implications of the Younger Cases for the Availability of FederalEquitable Reliel
When No State Prosecution is Pending, 72 COLM. L. Rrv. 874 (1972); Note, Federal
Relief Against Threatened State Prosecutions: The Implications of Younger, Lake Carriersand Roe, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 965 (1973).
288. 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
289. Id. at 509-10.
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Although one reading of this passage is that the Court will apply a less
stringent standard to federal injunctive relief against future prosecutions, it seems dangerous to draw that conclusion given Mr. Justice
Brennan's citation to his separate opinion in Perez, which indicated the
contrary. Moreover, the Court has given subsequent indication that the
Younger rule may be applied to injunctions against future prosecutions.
In O'Shea v.Littleton,290 decided during the Court's 1973 term, the
plaintiffs brought a class action against certain city officials and judges
of Cairo, Illinois, alleging that the defendants had engaged in maladministration of the criminal justice system in Cairo which deprived
plaintiffs of their constitutional rights and requesting injunctive relief
against the alleged unconstitutional practices. The district court dismissed the case for "want of jurisdiction to issue the injunctive relief
prayed for" 91 and on the grounds that the judicial defendants were immune from suit with respect to acts done in the course of their judicial
duties. The court of appeals reversed, directing the district court to
fashion appropriate injunctive relief, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. Although
the Court first declared that the complaint failed to allege a live controversy, it also declared that the plaintiffs had failed to state grounds for
federal equitable relief. Citing Younger as well as earlier cases denying injunctive relief against future prosecutions, the Court stated that
the principles of those authorities precluded equitable intervention in
the case, even though no pending prosecutions were involved. In a
revealing passage, the Court continued:
Respondents do not seek to strike down a single state statute,
either on its face or as applied; nor do they seek to enjoin any criminal prosecutions that might be brought under a challenged criminal
law. .

.

. What they seek is an injunction aimed at controlling or

preventing the occurrence of specific events that might take place
in the course of future state criminal trials. .

.

. Apparently the

order would contemplate interruption of state proceedings to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance by petitioners. This seems to
us nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings which would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference
22
that Younger v. Harris. . .and related cases sought to prevent. 0

O'Shea seems to hold that federal injunctive interference against future
state prosecutions will be regulated by the same standards as injunctions
290. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
291. Id. at 492.
292. Id. at 500.
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against pending actions. Nevertheless, it would be unsafe to conclude
that it finally resolves the pending-future issue. For one thing, the injunction was sought against valid criminal laws, rather than allegedly
unconstitutional ones; and, in addition, it was clear that unlike the ordinary injunction against commencement of state criminal proceedings,
the form of the injunction requested by the plaintiffs in O'Shea would
permit the institution of criminal actions, but require highly intrusive
intervention and supervision by a federal court of the pending prosecutions thereafter. Coupled with the Court's subsequent assurances that
the pending-future issue is still open,293 these distinctions preclude a
confident prediction that the Younger standards will be applied to injunctions against future prosecutions, although the balance of the opinions is in that direction.294
Fortunately, the Court has at last resolved the question of whether
federal declaratory relief will be administered by a less stringent standard than the one articulated in Samuels when no state prosecution is
pending at the time the relief is sought. In its 1973 Term the Court
decided Stefel v. Thompson,2 95 which involved a threat of criminal
prosecution under circumstances where no bad faith or other element
sufficient to justify federal declaratory relief under Samuels was present. In Steffel the plaintiff and his companions were distributing handbills protesting the American involvement in Viet Nam on a sidewalk
of the North DeKalb Shopping Center in DeKalb County, Georgia.
Shopping center employees requested that they cease their handbilling and leave, but they refused to do so, whereupon the police were
summoned. The police informed the handbillers that they would be
arrested if they did not stop their activity, and plaintiff and his group
left to avoid that possibility. Two days later, however, the plaintiff and
a companion returned and again began handbilling. The manager of
293. See cases cited note 287 supra.
294. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 208-09 (1973), in which the Court affirmed the judgment of a three-judge district court refusing to enjoin a state from reimbursing nonpublic schools for educational services performed under a law subsequently
held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (declaratory and injunctive relief refused to a physician who sought that relief
only against future prosecutions for violation of an abortion statute, because there were
prosecutions pending against him in state court), with Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973) (physicians against whom there had been no prosecutions or threats of prosecutions permitted to challenge a state's abortion statute). In both Roe and Doe the Court
did not reach the question of whether injunctive relief against future enforcement of the
statutes was warranted, since it assumed the state authorities would abide by its declara-

tion of unconstitutionality.
295. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
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the shopping center called the police, who told plaintiff and his companion that they would be arrested if they did not cease handbilling.
Plaintiff again left to avoid arrest, but his companion remained and was
subsequently arrested on a charge of violating the Georgia criminal
trespass statute. Plaintiff filed a civil rights action in Georgia federal
court, requesting a declaratory judgment that the Georgia statute was
being applied in violation of his first amendment rights and an injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute against his activities. 2Do
The district court denied both declaratory and injunctive relief and
dismissed the action, on the grounds that plaintiff had not established
that the officers had acted or would act in bad faith and, consequently,
had not established "'the rudiments of an active controversy.' ,207
Plaintiff appealed only the denial of declaratory relief to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed, holding that the YoungerSamuels prerequisites for declaratory relief had to be established in
order to obtain that remedy against a threatened criminal prosecution. 29 s The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
The Court first held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient
to establish an actual controversy within the requirements of article HI
of the Constitution and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. The
threats of prosecution under the specific provisions of the state law
plaintiff was challenging were adequate to make out such a controversy,
without the necessity that he expose himself to arrest and prosecution
to attack the statute. However, the Court did observe that with the
United States' reduced national involvement in Vietnam it would be
necessary for the district court on remand to determine whether that
reduced involvement had so lessened plaintiff's inclination to distribute
299
handbills to moot the case.
The Court then held that the courts below had erred in determining that plaintiff's request for federal declaratory relief was to be judged
by the Younger-Samuels standards. First, the Court pointed out that
those decisions were based on principles of "equity, comity, and federalism," as well as the fact that normally the federal plaintiff would
296. Id. at 455-56.
297. Id. at 456.
298. Id. at 457. The Supreme Court observed that a three-judge district court
should have been convened initially, since the complaint requested an injunction against
a statute of statewide operation. However, since plaintiff only appealed from the denial
of declaratory relief, the Court held that the court of appeals had properly exercised jurisdiction on appeal. Id. at 457 n.7.
299. Id. at 459-60.
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have an adequate vehicle, in the form of the pending prosecution, with
which to vindicate his constitutional rights.30 0 As to the question of
whether declaratory relief would be administered by a less stringent
standard when no state proceeding was pending, the Court stated:
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the
federal complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in
duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be
interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to
enforce constitutional principles. In addition, while a pending
state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff with a concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal on the part
of the federal courts to intervene when no state proceeding is pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing [sic] what he
believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid
becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding. 30 '
The Court -then held that the court of appeals had erred in treating the
requests for declaratory and injunctive relief as the same. In so doing,
it reviewed the history of the civil rights jurisdiction in federal courts
and the history of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 302 observing
that the civil rights jurisdiction was designed after the Civil War to empower the lower federal courts to determine the constitutionality of
state action and that the Declaratory Judgment Act was a partial response of Congress to both the hostility of the states toward injunctive
relief after Ex parte Young and the dissatisfaction of federal plaintiffs
with the necessity of proving the traditional prerequisites of an injunction. 30 3 Thus in the Court's view the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act was designed to mollify the states by providing a less intrusive federal remedy against unconstitutional state action and to make a federal
anticipatory remedy easier to obtain against such state action by eliminating the traditional prerequisites for equitable relief. Then the Court
stated:
The only occasions where this Court has disregarded these
"different considerations" [applicable to the granting of declaratory
as opposed to injunctive relief] and found that a preclusion of injunctive relief inevitably led to a denial of declaratory relief have
been cases in which principles of federalism militated altogether
against federal intervention into a class of adjudications.. . . In
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id.
Id.
Id.
1d.

at
at
at
at

460-61.
462.
463-69.
463-66.
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the instant case, principles of federalism not only do not preclude
federal intervention, they compel it. Requiring the federal courts
totally to step aside when no state criminal prosecution is pending
against the federal plaintiff would turn federalism on its head. When
federal claims are premised on [the Civil Rights statutes]-as they
are here-we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or
administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role Congress
has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional
rights. ....But exhaustion of state remedies is precisely what
would be required if both federal injunctive and declaratory relief were unavailable in a case where no state prosecution has
304
been commenced.
Thus the Court at least strongly implied 'that it would be violating
a duty Congress had imposed upon it to protect constitutional rights
were it to reach any other result in Steffel. However, Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion in which the Chief Justice joined, cautioned
that the Court's opinion should not be interpreted as authorizing federal
dbclaratory relief whenever a plaintiff alleged merely that ,he felt
"chilled" in the exercise of his first amendment rights.3 °5
Moreover, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion with which the
Chief Justice also joined, expressed the view that the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was intended primarily to permit litigants to obtain
a determination of their rights prior to the time an injury had occurred,
rather than "to palliate any controversy arising from Ex parte Young."
In his view the Court's approval of the declaratory judgment procedure
in the context of this case was consistent with the congressional intent
behind the Act. He continued, however, to discuss several important
issues. First, he indicated that the declaratory judgment procedure was
designed to be an alternative to pursuit of potentially illegal activity.
Thus, in his opinion, a federal plaintiff who continues to "violate a state
statute after the filing of his federal complaint does so both at the risk
of state prosecution and at the risk of dismissal of his federal law suit.
For any arrest prior to resolution of the federal action would constitute
a pending prosecution and bar declaratory relief under the principles
of Samuels."30 6 Next, he expressed the opinion that it would be improper to interpret Stefel as sanctioning the automatic issuance of a
federal injunction to enforce a prior declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality.30 7
304. Id. at 472-73.
305. Id. at 476.
306. Id. at 480.

307. Id.
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Finally, Mr. Justice Rehnquist maintained that the Court's decision
in Stefel should not be read as supporting any circumvention of
Younger by authorizing a federal court -to treat disobedience of a de-

claratory judgment as bad faith and harassment of the kind that would
permit an injunction.

08

In his view, continued belief in the constitu-

tionality of a statute by state officials would not amount to the kind of
bad faith discussed in Younger, and therefore the officials would remain free to enforce the statute in accord with their view of its validity.

In short, in Mr. Justice Rehnquist's opinion any effect a federal declaratory judgment has should depend entirely upon the voluntary compli30 9
ance of the state officials.
In Younger, some members of the Court also indicated that a distinction might be drawn between the stringency with which federal in-

terference was prohibited against state civil proceedings, as opposed to
state criminal prosecutions. In his concurring opinion in Younger, Justice Stewart admonished that the Court was not dealing "with the considerations that should govern a federal court when it is asked to inter-

vene in state civil proceedings, where, for various reasons, the balance
might be struck differently." 310

He stated that "[t]he offense to state

interests is likely to be less in a civil proceeding. A state's decision
to classify conduct as criminal provides some indication of the importance it has ascribed to prompt and unencumbered enforcement of
its law. By contrast, the State might not even be a party under a civil
statute."3 11 Although there has been no- definitive resolution of this

question by the Court since Younger, some members of the Court have
indicated disenchantment with the distinction. 3 ral In Lynch v. House308. Id. at 483.
309. Id. at 484. It should be noted that Mr. Justice 'White filed a concurring opinion in Steffel expressly to refute any notion that Justice Rehnquist's views were sanctioned by the majority opinion. In his view, a federal declaratory judgment that certain
conduct is constitutionally immune should be accorded res judicata effect in any later
prosecution for that conduct. Moreover, he expressed the opinion that a federal plaintiff
need not rely on a plea of res judicata in the state proceeding, but might obtain an injunction to enforce the declaratory judgment against a recalcitrant prosecutor. Id. at
476-78.
310. 401 U.S. at 55.
311. Id. at 55 n.2.
311a. In a recent case, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 43 U.S.L.W. 4379 (U.S. Mar.
18, 1975), the Court strongly suggested that the Younger criteria would apply equally
to civil and criminal proceedings. Huffman itself involved only extension of the
Younger criteria to civil proceedings closely "akin to. . . criminal prosecution[s]." Id.
at 4383. However, the strong suggestion of the opinion was that the same criteria
would be applied to civil proceedings generally, and, indeed, the dissenters assumed that
this would be the Court's next step. See id. at 4385 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nowhere did the Court establish the sort of rational decision-making criteria to govern
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hold Finance Co.312 the Court decided in the context of a request for injunctive relief against a state civil proceeding that the jurisdiction of the
federal courts in civil rights actions is not limited only to cases in which
"personal," as opposed to "property" rights are involved. While agreeing with this aspect of the Court's decision, Mr. Justice White, joined
by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun, dissented on other
grounds.3 13 In the course of this dissent they expressed the view that
Younger and its companion cases applied equally to state civil proceedings. 314 Subsequently, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, who had not participated
in the decision in Lynch, indicated in an opinion in chambers that he
was in general agreement with that view of the distinction.3 15 Thus
four members of the Court have indicated their view that the civil-criminal distinction is without substance.3 1 6
That the civil-criminal question remains open for determination
1 7
seems clear from the Court's 1973 decision in Gibson v. Berryhill,
which also provides some additional indication how the YoungerSamuels restrictions should be applied by the district courts. In Gibson
the Alabama Optometric Association filed charges with the Alabama
Board of Optometrists against certain licensed optometrists who were
the salaried employees of Lee Optical Company, seeking to have the
optometrists' licenses revoked under Alabama law. The charges were
filed after certain amendments were made to the Alabama statutes governing the practice of optometry. The previous statutory scheme had
seemed to sanction the existence of commercial stores with optical departments, while the amendments cast the legitimacy of such enterprises in doubt. Two days after the charges were filed, the Alabama
Board of Optometrists filed a state court action seeking to enjoin Lee
Optical and thirteen of its employee-optometrists from the unlawful
practice of optometry. The Board held its own administrative proceeddeclaratory and injunctive relief that are suggested by this article, though the majority
opinion of Mr. Justice Rehnquist did suggest that federal relief might be available after

a federal plaintiff had exhausted his state judicial remedies and been denied Supreme
Court review of the state decision. See id. at 4383-84; but see id. at 4383 n.18. The
dissenters argued that the Court was imposing an impermissible requirement of exhaustion of state judicial remedies in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 43 U.S.L.W. at
4386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Schlesinger v. Councilman, 43 U.S.L.W.

4432 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1975) (Younger criteria applied to requests for injunctions against
court-martial proceedings).
312. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).

313.
314.
315.
316.
senting).
317.

Id. at 556.
Id. at 561.
Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201, 1206 (1972).
But cf. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 124 n.2 (1972) (Marshall, J., dis411 U.S. 564 (1973).

19751

INTERFERENCE WITH STATE COURTS

667

ings in abeyance pending the outcome of the state court suit. In that
suit the individual optometrists were dismissed as defendants, but Lee
Optical was enjoined from practicing optometry without a license and
from employing licensed optometrists. Lee Optical appealed, but
meanwhile the Board reactivated its proceedings against the individual
optometrists. Those optometrists then filed a suit in -federal district
court seeking an injunction against further Board proceedings against
them. The specific grounds were that the Alabama scheme permitting
the Board to hear charges against the individual defendants was invalid
because the Board was biased and could not give plaintiffs a hearing
that would accord with the requirements of due process. A three-judge
district court enjoined the Board from conducting a hearing on the
charges against plaintiffs and from revoking their licenses to practice
optometry. The district court found a substantial possibility of bias (i)
in the fact that the Board had previously brought suit against the plaintiffs in state court on nearly identical charges, so that the members of
the Board might have preconceived opinions on the cases, (ii) in the
fact that if Lee Optical were forced to suspend business in Alabama,
the individual members of the Board and other private practitioners of
optometry would benefit financially, and (iii) because membership on
the Board was limited to members of the Alabama Optometric Association, which in turn excluded from its membership optometrists who
were employed by other persons or entities, with the result that plaintiffs were denied participation in the governance of their own profession. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for reconsideration of the case in light of an intervening decision of the Alabama Supreme Court.
The Alabama decision held that nothing in that state's optometry
law prohibited a licensed optometrist from accepting employment from
a business corporation, and the Supreme Court felt that considerations
of "equity, comity, and federalism" justified it in remanding to the district court for consideration -of whether the state decision made the
federal injunction unnecessary 318 However, the Court agreed that
Younger and its companion decisions did not preclude federal relief.
It first considered the argument that the Younger principles should apply to restrict federal injunctions as stringently against state civil proceedings as against state criminal proceedings. The Court determined
that the district court's conclusions about the propriety of federal relief
318. Id. at 580-81.
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were correct in light of the latter court's finding of bias:
Unlike those situations where a federal court merely abstains
from decision on federal questions until the resolution of underlying or related state law issues

.

.. Younger. .. contemplates the

outright dismissal of the federal suit, and the presentation of all
claims, both state and federal, to the state courts. Such a course
naturally presupposes the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved.
Here the predicate for a Younger

. .

. dismissal was lacking, for

the appellees alleged, and the District Court concluded, that the
State Board of Optometry was incompetent by reason of bias to adjudicate the issues pending before it. If the District Court's conclusion was correct in this regard, it was also correct that it need not
defer to the Board. Nor, in these circumstances, would a different
result be required simply because judicial review, de novo or otherwise, would be forthcoming at the conclusion of the administrative
proceedings.3 19

Apparently, state judicial review would be irrelevant because of the district court's finding that "irreparable injury" would result to the federal
plaintiffs by the revocation by the Board of their licenses, together with
the attendant publicity that would be associated therewith.82 In addition, the Court went on to hold that the district court's finding of bias
was correct on grounds of the Board members' pecuniary interest in
the outcome of the proceeding.
Gibson is interesting primarily as an illustration of the operation
of Younger bad faith criterion for equitable relief. Although it was
clear that de novo state court review of the delicensing proceedings was
available,3 21 and although the adequacy and effectiveness of the state
court processes to eliminate any prejudice that had existed in the administrative proceedings was not questioned by the Court, it seems
clear that it was the additional burden of defending an initial proceeding before a biased tribunal that justified federal relief. The Board
was basically in the position of an enforcement official who institutes
proceedings against a defendant with no hope of success. Although
the defendants could hope to win an ultimate decision before the state
courts, the initial unwarranted proceeding was one that the ordinary
burdens of citizenship did not require them to bear. However, because
of the peculiar nature of the Alabama Board of Optometrists' composition, the case seems to have limited transfer value to other situations.
319. Id. at 577 (footnotes omitted).
320. Id. at 577 n.16.
321. Id.
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Only where plaintiffs are able to show that the members of an administrative or judicial tribunal possess a pecuniary interest in legal proceedings will the decision directly apply, although the Court did not foreclose the possibility that federal relief will also be proper when there
is an objective demonstration of a substantial danger that a state tribunal has prejudged the facts of a case. s2 2
A second decision of importance in illustrating the battles that continue to be fought over application of the Younger-Samuels criteria is
23
Allee v. Medrano,1
decided during the Court's 1973 Term. Allee
was a civil rights action commenced against members of the Texas
Rangers, members of the Starr County, Texas Sheriff's Department,
and a Justice of the Peace in Starr County. The suit arose out of a
labor dispute involving attempts by the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee to organize the predominately Mexican-American farmworkers of the lower Rio Grande Valley. A three-judge federal district
court declared five Texas statutes unconstitutional and enjoined their
enforcement against plaintiffs, and permanently enjoined the defendants from a number of other unlawful practices. On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decree granting injunctive relief against police misconduct, but directed that the decree be modified
to delete references to the five statutes held unconstitutional by the
lower court. As to those statutes, the Court vacated the district court's
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
With regard to the injunction against police misconduct, the Court
concluded that the district court had not misused its equitable
32
powers: 1We first note that this portion of the decree creates no interference with prosecutions pending in the state courts, so that the
special considerations relevant to cases like Younger v. Harris...
do not apply here. . . . Nonetheless there remains the necessity
of showing irreparable injury, "the
traditional prerequisite to ob325
taining an injunction" in any case.
It is clear from the Court's opinion that, as the majority viewed the case,
322. Id. at 578-79.
323. 416 U.S. 802 (1974).
324. Id. at 816.
325. Id. at 814. This passage from the Court's opinion, written by Mr. Justice
Douglas, suggests that a different standard might be utilized to measure irreparable injury when no state prosecution is pending. However, since the Court expressly reserved
this question for future decision later in its opinion, Allee cannot be interpreted as having resolved the question. See id. at 821 n.15.
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the plaintiffs had made a sufficient showing of bad faith and harassment
on the part of the authorities to satisfy Younger:
[A] showing [of irreparable injury] was clearly made here as the
unchallenged findings of the District Court show. The appellees
sought to do no more than organize a lawful union to better the
situation of one of the most economically oppressed classes of workers in the country. Because of the intimidation by state authorities,
their lawful effort was crushed. The workers, and their leaders
and organizers were placed in fear of exercising their constitutionally protected rights of free expression, assembly, and association.
Potential supporters of their cause were placed in fear of lending
their support. If they were to be able to regain those rights and
continue furthering their cause by constitutional means, they required protection from appellants' concerted conduct.
No remedy
at law would be adequate to provide such protection. 326
The Court remanded the questions concerning the five statutes for a
determination of the appropriate standard for granting relief.
More interesting than the majority's disposition of the case was a
lengthy opinion by Chief Justice Burger, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices White and Rehnquist joined. These
members of the Court concurred only in result of the remand to the
district court. They dissented from the Court's affirmance of the district court's injunction against the police misconduct and attempted in
their concurrence to deal with some of the issues left unresolved by
the majority. 27
On remand, the dissenters suggested that the Union would have
to show standing and meet the other Younger criteria to obtain relief.
With reference to the two unrepealed statutes, the concurring opinion
agreed that if no state prosecutions were pending, the Steffel standards
for declaratory relief would apply.3 28 The concurring opinion then
turned its attention to a definition of the Younger "burdens.1 329 In
this regard, the opinion concluded that federal courts should be sensitive to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to proceed to trial
with less than an open and shut case against defendants.380 Moreover,
it concluded that while the bad faith nature of a prosecution might
sometimes be inferred from concerted activity of prosecutors and po326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at 814-15.
See id. at 821-22, 833-60.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 833-46.
Id. at 836.
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lice, such an inference should not so readily be drawn on the basis of
police action alone:
When a policeman willfully engages in patently illegal conduct in
the course of an arrest there still should be clear and convincing
proof, before bad faith can be found, that this was part of a common plan or scheme, in concert with the prosecutorial authorities,
to deprive plaintiffs of -their constitutional rights. Willful, random
acts of brutality by police, although abhorrent in themselves, and
subject to civil remedies, will not form a basis for a finding of bad
faith. The police may, of course, embark on a campaign of harassment of an individual or a group of persons without the knowledge
or assistance of the prosecutorial authorities. The remedy in such
a case would not lie in enjoining state prosecutions, which would
provide no real relief, but in reaching down through the State's
criminal justice system to deal directly with the abuses at the primary law enforcement level. 33 '
Furthermore, the opinion then went on to observe that the injury to
a federal plaintiff must be "great [and] immediate" and constitute
"harassment," as well as being "irreparable," before a prosecution
might be enjoined. 3 2 To the concurring members of the Court, this
meant that when a statute is challenged on its face as invalid, the harm
to the plaintiff may be demonstrated by pending prosecutions or the
probability of future prosecutions, perhaps by proffering evidence of
multiple arrests and prosecutions of persons other -than the plaintiff. 3 '
However, where relief is sought against more than one statute on such
grounds, the plaintiff must demonstrate the requisite injury under each
statute challenged. When the challenge is to a statute as applied,
rather than on its face, the concurring opinion observed that the requisite injury would have to derive from a single prosecution, and that it
would be a rare case when a single prosecution alone would provide
the necessary quantum of harm. Nor could the Union aggregate the
injuries to all its members in order to demonstrate the required level
of harm, since this would permit easy circumvention of Younger. On
the basis of these views of the Younger standard the concurring Justices
then concluded that no sufficient showing of bad faith or the necessary
injury had been made before the district court, since with regard to
some of the statutes all that had been demonstrated were single arrests
334
of individuals, so that no danger of repeated arrests had been proved,
331.
332.
333.
334.

Id. at 837-38.
Id. at 838.
Id.
Id. at 842.
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while as to others the magnitude of the harm demonstrated was insufficient to satisfy Younger.3", Moreover, the opinion stated that no bad
faith had been demonstrated with regard to any of the prosecutions
which resulted from the arrests, since the evidence of police misconduct
did not illustrate an intensity of misbehavior which would "turn a series
of prosecutions, apparently instituted in good faith.
into a campaign
of terror against the Union which could only be remedied by recourse
to the federal courts,"33 6 and other evidence as to prosecutorial misbehavior was scanty.
The opinions rendered by various members of the Court from
Younger to Allee indicate that a wide difference in viewpoint exists
on the Court as to the stringency with which federal injunctions and
declaratory judgments should issue to restrain the enforcement of state
laws. It should be noted, however, that the Justices uniformly continue
to adhere to the traditional equity rubric of "great and immediate irreparable injury" even as they disagree in its application. Before examining which, if any, of the views expressed by the various members
of the Court are correct, it will be instructive to examine one additional
aspect of the Court's treatment of injunctions against state action. This
is the Court's decision in Mitchum v. Foster,337 holding that the Civil
Rights Act is an "expressly authorized" congressional exception to -the
Anti-Injunction Statute.
D. Mitchum v. Foster
In Mitchum the prosecuting attorney of Bay County, Florida,
brought a proceeding in state court to close a book store as a nuisance.
The state court issued a preliminary order closing the store. Plaintiff,
the owner of the bookstore, then brought suit in a Florida federal court,
requesting declaratory and injunctive relief against the state proceeding
under the Civil Rights Act, on the grounds that the state court was applying Florida law in an unconstitutional manner that would cause him
irreparable injury. A three-judge district court decided that injunctive
relief could not issue under the Civil Rights Act because it was barred
by the Anti-Injunction Statute. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court reiterated the view expressed in its prior decisions that
335. Id. at 843.
336. Id. at 844-45.
337. 407 U.s. 225 (1972).
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the Anti-Injunction Statute, when it applies, is an absolute prohibition
against federal injunctions. 338 Thus, as the Court framed the issue, unless the Civil Rights Act was an expressly authorized exception to the
statute, no federal injunctive relief could issue. 3 3 9 However, although
prior decisions of the Court had explicitly and carefully reserved this
question of statutory construction, the Court now interpreted Younger
v. Harris and its companion cases as having resolved the issue for all
practical purposes. Mr. Justice Stewart, for the Court, stated:
While the Court in Younger and its companion cases expressly
disavowed deciding the question now before us . . . it is evident
that our decisions in those cases cannot be disregarded in deciding
this question. In the first place, if [the Civil Rights Act] is not
within the statutory exception, then the anti-injunction statute
would have absolutely barred the injunction issued in Younger, as
the appellant in that case argued, and there would have been no
occasion whatever for the Court to decide that case upon the
"policy" ground of "Our Federalism." Secondly, if [the Civil
Rights Act] is not within the "expressly authorized" exception of
the anti-injunction statute, then we must overrule Younger and its
companion cases insofar as they recognized the permissibility of injunctive relief against pending criminal prosecutions in certain limited and exceptional circumstances.3 0
Thus the Court had in Younger used a statute, which it ultimately held
in Mitchum did not bar injunctions against state proceedings, as one
source of a policy that justified a denial of an injunction against a state
proceeding; while in Mitchum, it used Younger, a case in which -the
Court refused to decide whether the Civil Rights Act was an expressly
authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute, as an authority
which effectively decided that the Civil Rights Act was such an expressly authorized exception.
Fortunately, this extraordinary example of double bootstrapping
was not the only ground upon which the Court based its decision in
Mitchum. It next traced the history of the statute and its judicial construction through Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co. From this
history, it concluded the following:
It is clear that, in order to qualify as an "expressly authorized" exception to the anti-injunction statute, an Act of Congress must have
created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable
in a federal court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal
338. Id. at 228-29.
339. Id. at 229.
340. Id. at 231.
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court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding. This
is not to say that in order to come within the exception an Act of
Congress must, on its face and in every one of its provisions, be
totally incompatible with the prohibition of the anti-injunction statute. The test, rather, is whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of
equity, could be given
its intended scope only by the stay of a state
341
court proceeding.
The Court then proceeded to examine 'the history and purpose of
the Civil Rights Act, in order to determine whether it met the test described. From this history it was clear that Congress was attempting
to open the federal courts to persons whose constitutional rights were
threatened by state action because the state courts were either incapable or unwilling to protect such rights. 42 In short, the purpose of the
Civil Rights Act was to provide federal court protection where it was
essential to safeguard federal constitutional rights from state infringement.
Read with Younger and its progeny, Mitchum represents more
than a simple case of statutory construction. Rather, it represents an
essential step on the part of the Court in retaining for itself an almost
complete discretion .to regulate state-federal relationships in the area
of anticipatory relief for violation of constitutional rights. Younger and
its companion cases made clear that, for the time being at least, federal
courts would constrict their intrusions into pending state criminal prosecutions. But Mitchum insured that the trend represented by Younger
could be reversed at any time by a manipulation of the standards governing equitable relief. Along with the Court's reservation since
Younger of the questions whether federal injunctive relief against
threatened prosecutions or state civil proceedings would be administered according to a strict or liberal standard, its decision in Steffel
opening the way for declaratory relief against future prosecutions, and
the reservations upon the scope of declaratory and injunctive relief expressed by various members of the Court in concurring and dissenting
opinions, the decisions cast far more shadow than light upon the status
of federal anticipatory adjudication of constitutional rights. It remains
to be seen, however, whether the questions reserved by the Court and
the various positions taken by 'the Justices in concurrence and dissent
suggest, together or separately, any coherent principle by which federal
341. Id. at 236-38 (footnotes omitted).
342. Id. at 238-42.
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anticipatory remedies may be governed. It is to this inquiry that we
now turn.
V.

YOUNGER AND ITS PROGENY: A CRITQUE OF THE
CouRT's APPROACH

From the foregoing discussion, at least one criticism of the Supreme Court's approach in Younger, its companion cases, and subsequent decisions should be apparent. The Court has retained the ancient chancery principles of great and immediate irreparable injury as
a measure of the propriety of federal injunctive relief against pending
state prosecutions. Moreover, it will probably retain those principles
as a measure of federal injunctive relief against future state prosecutions as well, and it has already extended the principles to federal declaratory relief against ongoing state prosecutions in contravention of
the intention of the architects of the declaratory judgment procedure.
As observed earlier, the use of the traditional chancery doctrines in the
context of a modern procedural system tends to obfuscate, rather than
clarify, the analytical factors which should be taken into account in determining the propriety of both remedies. The only -remaining question is whether the distinctions suggested by the Court in Younger and
subsequent cases provide the basis for a rational system by which federal declaratory and injunctive relief may be administered.
With regard to the distinction suggested between injunctive relief against future, as opposed to pending, state prosecutions, it is difficult to believe that any such distinction provides a viable means of preventing the sort of harm to state interests that the Court was concerned
about in Younger. The distinction seems based upon the feeling expressed by Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Perez v. Ledesma
and repeated by him in Steffel v. Thompson that when no state proceeding is pending, considerations of "equity, comity, and federalism
have little vitality." However, it is difficult -to see why such considerations have "little vitality" in the absence of a pending proceeding. If
the concern for state interests is directed -to the disruption that a federal
injunction causes to good faith state law enforcement processes, there
is often very little difference between halting a pending or a future
prosecution. When the term "pending prosecution" is used, one too
readily envisions a packed courtroom in which a criminal trial is actively
underway, replete with empaneled jury, subpoenaed witnesses, and
other standard accoutrements. The disruption that would be created
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by a federal injunction against such an action is obvious, but it seems
unlikely that this will often be the situation confronting a federal court
requested to halt a pending prosecution. More often it seems that the
only occurrence that will distinguish a pending from a future prosecution is the filing of an indictment or an information. The disruption
caused by federal intervention at this stage of the proceeding is to police and prosecutorial resources which have been expended in preparing a case against the accused party, but which must suffer the delay
incident to a federal civil proceeding before they may come to fruition.
Yet these resources will often be expended to the same extent prior
to formal institution of a criminal action; and, therefore, in many cases
the disruption to state interests caused by preventing a future prosecution is just as great as if the prosecution is pending.
Perhaps, however, the distinction between pending and future
proceedings is based not primarily upon the actual disruption to state
activities that a federal injunction will cause, but upon a view that declining relief against future prosecutions will violate some duty or obligation imposed upon the federal courts by Congress. This view is represented by Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Steffel v.
Thompson. It will be recalled that there, in addition to expressing the
lack of vitality which the concerns of "equity, comity, and federalism"
possessed in the absence of a pending prosecution, Justice Brennan
stated that concerns of federalism compelled the federal courts to intervene in order to protect federal rights premised on the Civil Rights
Act.343 Of course, Justice Brennan was speaking in the context of a
request for federal declaratory relief, but if one concedes that the irreparable injury requirement is not a valid means of determining the propriety of federal injunctive relief, and if one accepts the Court's assumption, in Samuels v. Mackell, that a declaratory judgment wil often
have the same practical effect as an injunction, the statement seems
equally applicable to both remedies. In effect, it is a statement that
declining federal relief against future prosecutions when it is requested
under the Civil Rights Act would be tantamount to a refusal by the federal courts to exercise a jurisdiction which Congress has commanded
them to exercise. If true, of course, this would be a serious disregard
by -the federal courts of the paramount obligation to submit to that degree of control which the Constitution gives Congress the right to exercise over them. But is the statement, in fact, an accurate representa343. See text accompanying note 304 supra.
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tion of the obligations conferred by Congress upon those courts?
It is true that the Supreme Court has, in past decisions, suggested
that in actions brought under the Civil Rights Act the federal plaintiff
need not exhaust state judicial and administrative remedies before obtaining federal relief.344 And it is also true- that Justice Brennan relied
upon these authorities in determining in Steffel that federal declaratory
relief was compelled against future prosecutions under the circumstances of the case.345 However, it seems that this view does not adequately come to grips with the true nature of the obligations imposed
upon the federal courts in Civil Rights Act cases. To be sure, once
all the conditions of a Civil Rights Act claim have been properly met,
it would disregard the duty imposed by the Act if federal courts nevertheless sent a plaintiff to state court to litigate his claim. But the conditions of a civil rights action have always included the discretionary
standards applicable to a request for declaratory or injunctive relief, and
these standards have always reflected concern for the legitimate operation of the state systems. Thus the Court has required federal plaintiffs
to defend good faith state criminal actions in the absence of "extraordinary circumstances" justifying a conclusion that "great and immediate
irreparable injury" would result without federal action. As the discussion in previous sections has indicated, it has declined injunctive relief
under this standard against future prosecutions and, with Younger and
Samuels, has declined both declaratory and injunctive relief against
pending prosecutions under the standard. It is therefore clear from
past practice that the Court has never considered that it had an absolute
obligation to afford federal anticipatory relief against state action in civil
rights suits, without regard to the discretionary principles which it has
formulated from time to time to govern the administration of declaratory and injunctive relief. Nor is the burden imposed upon constitutional rights by this view a small one. It is well and good to say that
defense of a good-faith state criminal prosecution is merely an ordinary
burden of citizenship, but to the average citizen it is a substantial
burden nevertheless, and one he may well attempt to avoid even by
relinquishing his constitutional rights.
If the Court in Stefel was somehow attempting to draw a distinction between the adequacy of state courts to protect constitutional rights
in criminal, as opposed to state anticipatory actions, the rationale seems
344. See McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961). But see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
345. See text accompanying note 304 supra.
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equally wrong. It is true that the Court has in the past justified refusal
of federal anticipatory relief by reference to the efficacy of state judicial
processes to vindicate constitutional rights by way of defense in criminal
cases. But it is difficult 'to see why these processes are not equal to
the task of protecting constitutional rights in anticipatory actions as well.
The same judges who are expected to safeguard constitutional liberties
by upholding defenses in criminal prosecutions administer state declaratory and injunctive relief, and the same appeals are available for errors
of law in both kinds of cases. If the state processes are adequate in
the first case, it seems they should be considered adequate in the second. And there is, consequently, no apparent reason why the Supreme
Court should consider, as a factor relevant to the propriety of federal
anticipatory relief, the adequacy of the state courts in criminal cases
and not consider the adequacy of state anticipatory remedies against
future state action. Had the Court ever examined the availability and
adequacy of state anticipatory remedies, it would in many instances
have been hard pressed to find much of an objective nature wrong with
them. As long as declaratory and injunctive relief were found to be
available according to the same standards applicable in federal courts,
minus any concerns of federalism, then the Court could hardly have
denied the general efficacy of state anticipatory remedies to vindicate
constitutional rights. And if some subtle, undetectable, but feared defect exists in state court processes in cases where anticipatory relief is
sought, it is difficult to see why the same defect is not present in a criminal action.
The true obligation imposed upon the federal courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, in actions for declaratory and injunctive relief
is the intellectual obligation of developing rational, functional standards
to govern the administration of the discretionary remedies. In this, by
retention of the "irreparable injury" standard and the suggestion of irrational distinctions between pending and future proceedings, the Court
has failed. The development of a functional approach would ignore
neither the obligation to protect constitutional rights, nor the availability
of anticipatory relief in the state systems. Rather, it would take into
account these factors and all others which have a bearing upon the ability of the federal courts to provide anticipatory remedies for violations
of constitutional rights without unnecessarily interfering with legitimate
state interests. Certainly Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in
Ste fel did not adequately consider the sort of legitimate interests the
states might have in retaining initial constitutional adjudication in their
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own courts in actions for anticipatory relief. His opinion stated that
the Court had not in previous decisions measured federal declaratory
and injunctive relief by the same standards except in cases where "principles of federalism" required it, as in cases involving the enforcement
of state tax laws and cases involving pending state criminal prosecutions. However, his explanation why principles of federalism are
weaker in cases involving declaratory relief against future state criminal
proceedings seems unsatisfactory. He stated, for one thing, that federal declaratory relief would have a less intrusive effect on the administration of state criminal laws. This is true, for the reasons given above
concerning the relative freedom of action that a declaratory judgment,
which does not carry the contempt sanction, gives the law enforcement
officials. However, it is somewhat beside the point. The question is
whether a federal declaratory judgment is necessary, and proper evaluation of this issue requires an analysis which focuses upon the need
for federal anticipatory relief as opposed to state anticipatory relief.
Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion also stated that it would deny the congressional purpose to make declaratory judgments available where injunctions are inappropriate, if declaratory and injunctive relief against
future prosecutions were both measured by the irreparable injury
standard. This is also true, but again it does not address the central
issue, which is what standard is appropriate to measure the propriety
of federal declaratory and injunctive relief. In this regard, he argued
that only where principles of federalism had compelled it had both
forms of relief been refused according to the same standard. Apparently this did not violate Congress' intent. But it is difficult to understand why Congress would approve of the courts taking "principles of
federalism" into account in cases involving the collection of state taxes
and pending state criminal prosecutions, but not in all other cases. If
principles of federalism are relevant, they should be taken into account
wherever they appear. To be sure, they may be less compelling in
certain cases than in others, but Justice Brennan never adequately explained why they should be considered less compelling in cases where
declaratory relief against future state proceedings is requested, and the
reason is not apparent. On the contrary, if one considers the states'
possible interests in retaining cases involving requests for anticipatory
relief against constitutional violations in their own courts, he finds some
compelling factors. As observed in the introduction to this article, state
judges are bound to enforce the federal constitution in preference to
state laws when the two conflict. Moreover, state courts are the only
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institutions which can authoritatively construe state laws so that they will
meet the requirements of the federal Constitution. Therefore, the
states have a very substantial interest in seeing that initial constitutional
adjudication will take place in their own courts, rather than federal
courts, in order that state laws are construed whenever possible in a
manner which insures that they operate constitutionally. Nor does this
interest simply extend to state laws which are unclear and which may,
after narrowing construction, be clarified in a constitutional manner.
Even laws which are apparently clear may, in the absence of fair warning problems, be saved by the application of state rules of construction
which narrow or add to their operation to cure constitutional deficiencies. 346 In addition, there is also the consideration that state judges
cannot be expected enthusiastically to exercise their responsibility of
protecting federal constitutional rights when federal courts frequently
interpose themselves between state courts and the processes of constitutional adjudication. Under such circumstances the federal courts come
to be regarded as the paramount guardians of federal constitutional
rights, while state judges are often regarded as biased and perhaps even
venal. Yet it is clear that unless Congress extends federal jurisdiction
to include all cases in which a federal constitutional question arises during the course of state court proceedings, state judges must, of necessity, perform the function of safeguarding federal rights in a large variety of cases. It is impossible to believe that their ability or willingness
to perform such a function will be enhanced by a federal remedial
standard which does not take into account the adequacy of state anticipatory remedies to protect federal rights and thus cuts state judges off
from a significant portion of the responsibility to safeguard such rights.
The Court might have articulated a standard which takes into account the availability of state anticipatory relief and at the same time
meets obligations conferred upon it by Congress to protect civil rights
if it had, in the cases from Younger through Steifel, adhered closely
to the minimum standard of federal interference which that obligation
requires. This minimum standard was hinted at in Mitchum v. Foster,
when the Court considered the purposes of the Civil Rights Act to interpose the federal courts between state action and a citizen when it is
essential to protect constitutional rights.34 7 If the Court had viewed fed346. Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 443, 445 (1971).
347. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 43 U.S.L.W. 4379 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1975), in
which the Court strongly intimated that the civil-criminal distinction was invalid, though
not for the reasons given in the text. Huffman is briefly discussed in note 311a supra.
See also Schlesinger v. Councilman, 43 U.S.L.W. 4432 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1975) (Younger
criteria applied to requests for injunctions against court-martial proceedings).
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eral injunctions and declaratory judgments together as anticipatory
remedies, each with unique characteristics, the resulting standard would
have been more coherent and intellectually honest than the one employed. It would allow the two different remedies to be administered
according to rational, discretionary standards which take into account
the need to protect federal rights and the adequacy of the state courts
to provide both anticipatory relief for constitutional violations and relief
for such violations by way of defense in a state coercive action. In all
likelihood, the standard would have forbidden federal anticipatory relief except where it is the only effective means of preventing the denial
of a constitutional right. Under such a standard, the unique federal
characteristics of declaratory and injunctive relief would have been preserved, while insuring both protection of state interests and protection
of constitutional rights. Of course, under the principle stated, federal
relief would not be forthcoming more readily against a future than
against a pending proceeding, since the essential question would not
focus upon such a distinction. Furthermore, federal relief might well
be denied even in cases where it would be appropriate under Younger
and its progeny, since the availability of state anticipatory remedies for
constitutional violations would be a part of the total evaluation of the
propriety of federal remedies. When state courts are open to a federal
plaintiff and there is no demonstrable deficiency in the remedies provided by such courts, federal relief would be unavailable. Only where
state anticipatory relief is nonexistent, saddled with procedural obstacles, or otherwise ineffective to protect federal constitutional rights
would a federal court intervene.
Enough has been said thus far to demonstrate that the Court's suggested distinction between injunctive and declaratory relief also provides no rational standard by which those remedies can be administered. Insofar as the distinction envisions retention of the traditional
chancery principles to govern injunctive relief, it is deficient for reasons
already given. And insofar as it fails to encourage procedural analysis
of the remedies as functionally different forms of relief, one form carrying the contempt sanction for its violation and the other not, it is equally
deficient. Moreover, as suggested above, a coherent standard must
take into account the unique features of both remedies as federal remedies in order to comply with the obligations imposed by Congress on
the federal courts to protect constitutional rights, to avoid unnecessary
interference with the legitimate operations of the state courts, and to
provide intellectually honest principles to govern the administration of
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federal anticipatory relief. This, a distinction between declaratory and
injunctive relief based upon the irreparable injury standard does not
accomplish.
Likewise, the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings
does not provide the kind of standard necessary to a coherent, functional administration of the remedies. It will be recalled that in
Younger Mr. Justice Stewart suggested that classification of conduct as
criminal might indicate the seriousness with which a state views
"prompt and unencumbered enforcement of its law." However, it is
doubtful whether this is really so. It is clear that statutes concerning
commitment of the mentally ill, juvenile delinquency, and other matters
of legitimate state interest often provide for proceedings technically
classified as "civil" in nature. Yet in terms of their importance both
to the state and to the private citizens who are affected by them, proceedings under these statutes can hardly be deemed less important than
proceedings traditionally labelled criminal. Nor would a distinction be
appropriate between cases in which the state is a formal party and those
in which it is not. A state might well have antitrust laws, the enforcement of which it deems vital to the commercial well being of its citizens,
and yet determine that such laws can most effectively be enforced by
private civil suits. Other deeply rooted state policies might also be left
to vindication through private civil actions. Indeed, it would be folly
to permit the federal courts to adjudge the propriety of federal anticipatory relief depending upon their view of the relative "seriousness"
with which the state views the enforcement of certain of its laws. How
can a federal court determine which a state is "more serious" about, enforcement of traffic laws through conviction of violators in criminal proceedings, or enforcement of such laws through civil actions in tort?
Whichever is most important to the state, it seems certain that the federal courts are not the proper institutions to make a choice between
them.
None of the further opinions expressed by the various Justices
since Younger seem any more helpful in articulating a workable standard for federal anticipatory relief than those discussed above. Certainly Justice White was correct in his concurring opinion in Steflel,
when he rejected Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that federal declaratory relief have only a limited res judicata effect. Whatever standard
is developed to govern federal relief, it seems that when such relief
is appropriate its finality and efficacy should not be limited in any such
artificial manner. Nor was Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Allee v.
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Medrano more effective in establishing a coherent standard. Although
it was instructive in indicating how one wing of the Court felt the
Younger standards should be applied, it did not assist in providing a
functional, unifying principle by which federal anticipatory relief might
be administered in all future cases. The other opinions expressed from
time to time by various Justices are equally unhelpful, but no further
purpose would be served by a detailed critique of each one. Rather,
it will be more helpful to proceed to a discussion of a possible solution
to the problems of federal declaratory and injunctive relief, a solution
which, hopefully, will provide the kind of functional, analytical approach to those remedies which the Court has rejected in Younger and
its progeny.
VI.

CONCLUSION: A FUNCTIONAL STANDARD
FEDERAL ANTICIPATORY RELIEF

To GovERN

A functional standard for federal anticipatory relief against state
action involves two basic inquiries: (i) an inquiry whether anticipatory
relief is justified and, if so, whether that relief should be declaratory
or injunctive relief; and (ii) assuming that anticipatory relief of some
sort is justifiable against state action, should that relief issue from a federal court.
With regard to the first inquiry, the standard that should guide the
court's exercise of discretion is simply that traditionally used to determine the propriety of a declaratory judgment-i.e. whether anticipatory
relief will serve a useful purpose in resolving a dispute between the
litigants, in resolving some uncertainty or controversy surrounding the
plaintiffs rights, or in otherwise avoiding peril or insecurity which
threatens the plaintiff. The "useful purpose" standard would be employed initially to determine the general propriety of all anticipatory
relief, both declaratory and injunctive, since the traditional chancery
principles governing the injunction would be discarded. Only when
there is demonstrated the need for an order possessing the special functional characteristics of the injunction would a distinction be drawn between the two forms of relief.
In applying the "useful purpose" standard, it may be expected in
general that anticipatory relief will be found proper in the same sorts
of cases that are now appropriate for declaratory relief, and will be denied where a declaratory judgment would now be refused. Thus, for
example, if there is already another action pending involving the same
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controversy when relief is requested, anticipatory relief will generally
be inappropriate. This is so because the action for anticipatory relief
will usually not serve any function that could not be performed by the
prior filed action. If the prior action is criminal, the suit for anticipatory relief will not dispel the peril and insecurity it poses for the plaintiff, since resolution of the anticipatory action in favor of the plaintiff
would accomplish no more than could be done by way of defense in
the criminal proceeding, and a resolution against the plaintiff would
leave the criminal prosecution intact. Likewise, if the prior action is
a civil suit, no more can usually be accomplished by the anticipatory
proceeding than could be attained by defense of the first filed suit or
the filing of a counterclaim for anticipatory relief therein. Only where
anticipatory relief will perform some useful function that the prior action cannot perform will such relief be proper. Using the Younger
standards by way of example, this might occur when state authorities
undertake a criminal prosecution or civil proceeding in bad faith for
purposes of harassment. Since, by definition, the authorities have instituted the proceeding without hope of success, a successful defense will
not avoid the peril and insecurity posed by their actions. They may
continue to file other proceedings in bad faith in the future, and the
nature of their actions raises a reasonable possibility that they may
undertake activities in connection with the first proceeding that would
even thwart a successful defense, such as perjuring themselves at trial.
Similarly, if proceedings are brought under a statute which is "patently
and flagrantly" unconstitutional, the strong inference of bad faith and
the unusual nature of the burden imposed by the proceeding would justify anticipatory relief. And if multiple proceedings are brought, anticipatory relief may be necessary to insure that the plaintiff need only bear
the burden of defending a single one of them successfully. Of course,
when proceedings are merely threatened under the circumstances described above, it is apparent that anticipatory relief will serve a useful
purpose in resolving the threatened peril to plaintiff's rights. As indicated previously, however, an actual threat should not be an indispensable prerequisite to obtaining anticipatory relief, since such relief is
proper any time it will be useful in resolving a live dispute or controversy and such a dispute or controversy may be established short of the
necessity of proving a formal threat. Another situation in which anticipatory relief will be appropriate is represented by the facts in Gibson
v. Berryhill. When the plaintiff can demonstrate objective facts indicating that there is a danger of bias in the tribunal assigned to adjudi-
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cate the prior pending action, anticipatory relief is necessary to dispell
the peril posed by the action. A defense of the action before the biased tribunal will obviously not achieve the same effect, since the very
peril or insecurity complained of arises from the characteristics of the
tribunal itself.348
Once it has been established that anticipatory relief in some form
is justifiable, the next question becomes whether that relief should be
in the form of a declaratory judgment or an injunction. Ordinarily, a
declaratory judgment should be the preferred form of relief in such a
situation, since, as previously indicated, that form does not carry the
sanction of contempt for its violation. Consequently, it affords protection against a judicial decree of unintentionally broad scope and leaves
law enforcement officials some freedom, in extraordinary cases, to proceed against the plaintiff for activities apparently covered by the decree, but which they believe to be outside the legitimate scope of the
order. Moreover, in the case of a federal declaratory judgment against
state action, the initial preference for a noncoercive remedy demonstrates confidence in the good faith of state authorities and their willingness to comply with the court's decree, thereby reducing the abrasive
effect of such an order to state interests. In order to obtain an injunction, as opposed to a declaratory judgment, it should be the plaintiff's
burden to demonstrate the existence of facts which establish one of two
broad propositions: (i) that the sanction of contempt is necessary to
coerce obedience to the court's decree; or (ii) that an injunctive order
in the form of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
is necessary to protect the plaintiff from injury during the pendency of
litigation. The first proposition is again typified by the Younger bad
faith and harassment standard. When officials are alleged to be proceeding or threatening to proceed against the plaintiff in bad faith or
for purposes of harassment, a declaratory judgment that their acts are
unconstitutional will not adequately remove the peril and insecurity of
which the plaintiff complains. Officials who proceed in such a manner
cannot be trusted to obey the court's decree voluntarily. Therefore,
the contempt sanction is necessary in order to coerce them into obedience. Similarly, when they proceed, or threaten to proceed, under a
patently and flagrantly unconstitutional statute, their behavior will ordinarily indicate an absence of good faith law enforcement motives,
thereby justifying a coercive form of relief. When actual or threatened
348. Sec text accompanying notes 317-22 supra.
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multiple prosecutions under an unconstitutional law are the objection
raised by the plaintiff, an injunction may or may not be needed, depending upon the circumstances of the case. If the prosecutions are
threatened under circumstances where the plaintiff may obtain a declaration of his rights prior to the time it is necessary for him to act in
violation of the law, injunctive relief will probably not be necessary.
However, if he is engaging in ongoing conduct which he must cease
at great loss or suffer the burden of defending multiple proceedings,
an injunction may be necessary to prevent the institution of proceedings
against him pending the final resolution of his constitutional claim.
The need for the contempt sanction in these circumstances may well
depend upon the willingness of the prosecuting officials to institute a
single test suit to determine the validity of the law. The benefit sought
is not insulation of the plaintiff's continuing conduct from punishment
if his claim is ultimately held to be without merit, but merely the assurance that the dispute may be resolved in an orderly fashion, without
an unnecessary and burdensome multiplicity of suits all dealing with
the same issue simultaneously. If multiple proceedings are actually
pending against the plaintiff at the time he seeks relief, and it is apparent that the multiple actions will have the effect of preventing plaintiff from engaging in constitutionally protected conduct, an injunctive
order is also necessary, albeit one of a narrower scope. The aim is,
again, to insure orderly resolution of the dispute, without imposing the
burdens of simultaneous multiple litigation upon the plaintiff. Thus
the injunction should simply require the suspension of all but one of
the suits and prohibit the institution of others, until such time as the
plaintiff's defense can be tested in a single action. Thereafter, of
course, if the plaintiff loses the single action, he is subject to prosecution for all the acts he has committed in violation of the law. If bias
in a tribunal charged with the responsibility of adjudicating the
plaintiff's claim is the objection, as in Gibson v. Berryhill, an injunction
is also necessary to force the discontinuance of proceedings in the
prejudiced forum. However, if the plaintiff is only threatened with the
commencement of such proceedings, a declaration either that the law
he is threatened under is invalid, or that the tribunal which will hear
the claim against him is unfit, may suffice to discourage resort to the
tainted forum.
In addition to the situations described in the preceding paragraph,
there are other circumstances where the plaintiff may need anticipatory
relief in the form of a temporary restraining order or preliminary in-
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junction to preserve his rights pending litigation. Since the declaratory
judgment is purely a final, rather than an interlocutory, remedy and
since the necessity for interim relief is usually present only when action
is being taken or is threatened which will injure the plaintiff unless it
is immediately and forcefully stopped, anticipatory relief in the form
of an injunctive order will often be necessary in such circumstances.
The defendants will be protected by requiring that plaintiff demonstrate a need for the injunction to preserve the status quo or otherwise
protect him from injury pending final resolution of his claim, that he
demonstrate a probability of success on his claim in the main litigation,
and that he post a bond sufficient to reimburse costs and damages to
any defendant who is later found to be wrongfully enjoined.
Once the court has determined that anticipatory relief should issue
and the form which it should take, the next inquiry is whether the anticipatory relief should be federal or state. In this determination, the federal courts should be guided by the principle that federal anticipatory
relief should not issue against state action unless that relief is the only
effective remedy for the denial of a constitutional right. Adherence
to this principle will meet the obligations of those courts to protect constitutional rights in suits brought under the civil rights laws by insuring
that federal remedies will be available when others are not effective.
It will also insure that there is a minimum of federal interference with
the operation of the state judiciaries in our unique dual system of
courts. This last assurance will be given by refusing federal anticipatory relief whenever state anticipatory relief of the proper form and
scope is available to protect the plaintiffs constitutional rights. Procedurally, by determining first, in the manner suggested above,
whether anticipatory relief is justifiable in a particular case and, if it
is, what form it must take to afford adequate protection to the plaintiff,
the federal court will be prepared to examine the availability and efficacy of existing state anticipatory remedies in the case, in order to
determine whether it should intervene or leave the matter entirely to
the state courts for resolution. In this process of examining the availability of state anticipatory remedies, there are two broad categories of
situations in which the state remedies will be ineffective to protect constitutional rights. First, state anticipatory relief will not be effective to
guard civil rights when it is either nonexistent or saddled with procedural obstacles which unduly narrow its availability. Second, even if
it is not burdened with formal procedural obstacles, if state relief is
demonstrably not available in practice, it is ineffective to protect civil
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rights and federal anticipatory relief of the proper scope should issue.
In the first category, the obstacle most likely to render state anticipatory relief ineffective is the retention by the state of outmoded
rules to govern the availability of anticipatory relief. For example, in
an actual controversy where declaratory relief would serve a useful purpose in dispelling the peril or insecurity posed to the plaintiff by a criminal law, but where a state requires a formal threat of prosecution before it will issue such relief, the state declaratory remedy is ineffective
to protect civil rights where no such threat has been made, and a federal
declaratory judgment should issue. This conclusion follows from the
facts (i) that the federal court, before examining the efficacy of the state
remedy, has already concluded that declaratory relief would serve a
useful purpose in dispelling the peril and insecurity posed to the plaintiff by the law, and (ii) that state declaratory relief is unavailable because of the state procedural rule. Therefore, in order effectively to
protect civil rights and comply with the congressional purpose behind
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the federal court must issue declaratory relief. Of course, federal relief should not be available
merely on the grounds that state declaratory relief has or probably will
be denied. As long as the state adheres to remedial principles which
do not obstruct useful anticipatory relief for constitutional violations, it
should be free to decline relief without federal interference. Thus, if
a state would ordinarily deny declaratory relief against a prior pending
action on the grounds that such relief would serve no useful purpose,
federal relief will not generally be warranted, since anticipatory relief
of any sort is usually inappropriate under these circumstances. Only
if a state denies, or would probably deny, relief against a prior pending
action when such relief would serve a useful purpose must the federal
court issue a remedy.
If the form of anticipatory relief needed is injunctive, rather than
declaratory, the state procedural obstacles most likely to bar federal relief will be the traditional chancery principles. Thus when a state retains
a distinction between the propriety of injunctions against infringement of personal and property rights, a federal court should issue
injunctive relief to protect those rights excluded from protection under
state law if an injunction is the form of anticipatory relief needed. Similarly, if the "imminent irreparable injury" standard would probably be
employed by a state court to deny useful injunctive relief from constitutional violations, the federal courts should step in to provide injunctive protection. However, federal injunctive relief should not be
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granted in cases, where, although a state would place the traditional
chancery principles between a plaintiff and injunctive relief, declaratory
relief will suffice to protect the plaintiff's rights, and that form of relief
is available under state law. If, after the granting of state declaratory
relief, it subsequently appears that the contempt sanction is in fact necessary to coerce obedience to the court's decree and an injunction is
still unavailable under state law, the federal court should step in with
injunctive relief if necessary to protect constitutional rights.
An injunction may also be necessary to provide protection to a
plaintiff, pending the final determination of his legal claims, in the form
of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. If the state
will provide him the requisite form of injunctive order to preserve the
status quo pending the final disposition of litigation he has commenced,
then no federal relief is necessary. If, however, the state places unnecessary obstacles in the way of such interlocutory relief, or denies
the relief under circumstances where it is apparent that constitutional
rights will be destroyed before the normal processes of trial and appeal
can be pursued, a federal injunction should issue to prevent the injury.
For example, if state authorities are disrupting or threatening to disrupt
a plaintiffs legitimate exercise, of his first amendment rights, and upon
application by him to a state court a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to prevent the disruption pending full litigation is
refused, a federal court should step in to issue the appropriate relief.
Although a final state injunction against the authorities may ultimately
be granted, the plaintiff requires immediate injunctive intervention to
prevent the loss of first amendment rights pending the litigation. The
state court has, by its refusal to issue such relief, placed the plaintiff
in the position of having to give up his constitutional rights in order
to litigate them. Consequently, assuming that no relief is available
from the state's appellate courts, or that there is no time to pursue
otherwise available avenues of appeal, injunctive relief from a federal
district court is the only effective means of preventing the denial of a
constitutional right. If, on the other hand, relief is available from the
state appellate system under circumstances where the plaintiff has time
to obtain it before losing his rights, a federal court should stay its hand.
Moreover, first amendment rights, like other rights, need not always
be exercised immediately in order to be preserved. Only where the
facts indicate that there is some need for their immediate exercise
should a federal court intervene upon a state's refusal to issue temporary relief. Thus, one may distinguish between the need for immediate
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exercise of first amendment rights in the midst of an election campaign,
or upon some date of particular symbolic significance to the speech in
question, and the need in situations like those existing in Steflel v.
Thompson, where no urgency to distribute handbills at the particular
time or place is apparent from the facts. Of course, if it is demonstrated that the authorities are acting or threatening to act against plaintiff's activities whenever, wherever, and however they are engaged in,
so as effeotively to preclude all exercise of first amendment rights during the litigation or so narrowly constrict them that they will be valueless, then federal injunctive relief would be proper. Finally, it should
be noted that the propriety or impropriety of a state court denial of interim relief may also depend upon the clarity with which first amendment rights are being infringed or, conversely the extent to which a
state may permissibly regulate the time, place, and manner of such activities. Refusal of temporary relief under circumstances where the
state has the authority to regulate the activity in question, for example,
parading in the streets, may demonstrate only that the plaintiff's
claimed right to exercise his rights in a particular manner or at a particular place and time, ought not succeed. Temporary relief issued
from a federal court under such circumstances would virtually destroy
the state's reasonable right to regulate the use of its streets. Thus,
while a federal court should make an independent judgment on the
facts to determine whether the state is exercising a reasonable regulatory power or attempting to nullify the legitimate exercise of first
amendment activity, it should be wary lest it intervene where the plaintiff's activity is merely being subjected to reasonable conditions.
Beyond a demonstration that state anticipatory relief of the proper
form and scope is flatly unavailable or burdened with dysfunctional procedural obstacles when anticipatory relief in some form would be essential to preserve constitutional rights, it should always be open to a federal plaintiff to demonstrate that state remedies which are available in
theory are not available in practice. Ordinarily, such a demonstration
will be exceedingly difficult to make, and the most fruitful challenges
to deficiencies in state anticipatory remedies will be based upon the
unavailability of such remedies under state law or the existence of restrictive state rules governing their issuance. However, there may arise
circumstances in which state law enforcement, prosecutorial, and judicial authorities combine in efforts to deprive a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs of federal constitutional rights, under circumstances where state anticipatory remedies appear to be open under governing principles of
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state law, but where the actions of the authorities will pervert the
normal operation of the governing principles. Such behavior is, of
course, tantamount to bad faith and harassment on the part of the state
officials, but with the twist that judicial authorities, whose duty it would
ordinarily be to provide relief from official harassment, are also involved. There may be no objective facts indicating that the state tribunal is composed of biased personnel, as there was in Gibson v. Berryhill, but the concerted effort on the part of the entire law enforcement
apparatus to deprive a plaintiff of his rights may be demonstrable by
circumstantial evidence. For example, it may be demonstrated that
state law enforcement and/or prosecutorial officials have been making
arrests without probable cause and seeking convictions without hope of
ultimate success and that the state judiciary, -through inaction, such as
actual refusals of anticipatory relief in clear cases where it is justified
to halt the harassment, is effectively, if not consciously, participating
in the lawless action. If such a demonstration can be made, a federal
court should intervene to halt the lawless action in order to provide essential relief for constitutional violations where state processes, through
design or negligence, have broken down. Other situations may also
exist where state judicial processes may be deemed ineffective to protect constitutional rights, but it should be emphasized that no presumption of ineffectiveness on the part of the state judiciaries should be engaged in. Federal relief should only be available when the plaintiff
is able to demonstrate the inefficacy of state courts in a manner similar
to that described above.
It should be noted, however, that the model described above is
not the only possible system that might be constructed to govern the
administration of federal anticipatory relief. On the contrary, it would
be possible to create an internally consistent remedial scheme in which
federal relief would be available against state action on a far broader
basis than outlined above. The core of such a scheme would be a presumption against the efficacy of the state courts to protect constitutional
rights, with the result that the federal courts would administer anticipatory relief without regard to the availability or efficiency of state courts
to perform the same function. The presumption would be founded
upon a fear that state bias against federal civil rights would be manifested in the form of state court prejudice against litigants who seek
to vindicate those rights, with the consequent denial of the civil rights
in subtle and undetectable ways. In short, this alternative model would
hold it essential that federal courts administer anticipatory relief for
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constitutional violations in all cases where their aid is sought, in order
to prevent pervasive, but imperceptible, denial of federal rights.
Although this alternative model would constitute a rational, coherent method of determining the appropriateness of federal relief, always
assuming, of course, that its empirical foundations are sound, the implications of the model for the total working of our dual judicial system
are unacceptable. In the first place, if it is indeed true that state judges
are prejudiced against federal constitutional rights in ways that will produce damage to those rights in state proceedings for anticipatory relief,
then it is equally true that such prejudice exists in the context of state
criminal prosecutions. Therefore, in order to eliminate the detrimental
effects of the prejudice, federal courts would have to assume the total
responsibility for adjudicating constitutional issues, even to the extent
of halting state criminal trials whenever some constitutional issue which
would normally be raised by way of defense is presented instead to a
federal district court for adjudication in the context of -an anticipatory
proceeding. In short, the "useful purpose" test which now governs declaratory relief would have to be modified in its application, because
of the assumption of state court prejudice, to permit federal relief any
time it is requested against state action under the Civil Rights Act. Before the role of the state courts, in protecting constitutional rights and
enforcing their own criminal laws is thus nullified, it should be clear
that such rights cannot be protected in any other way.
In fact, when one focuses upon the kinds of prejudice against federal rights that might exist in a state proceeding, it becomes difficult
to believe that the scope of federal anticipatory adjudication of constitutional rights envisioned by the alternative model would afford significantly more protection than a system which permits more latitude to
the state courts. If prejudice on issues of law is what is feared, then
it seems clear that such prejudice can be remedied through -the ordinary
processes of appellate review. And it seems clear that, in most instances, issues of law, as opposed to issues of fact, will be the primary
points of dispute in state or federal proceedings for anticipatory relief.
Consequently, constitutional rights can be as effectively vindicated
through a process of anticipatory adjudication in the state courts, with
ultimate appeal of any errors of law to the United States Supreme
Court. Where facts are at issue, they are likely to be at issue in a state
criminal proceeding before a jury. However, jury bias against a criminal defendant cannot be eliminated by federal anticipatory adjudica-
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tion of constitutional issues which could be asserted by way of defense
in the criminal proceeding. If the federal court sustains a criminal defendant's constitutional arguments, he has received no more than he
would ultimately have obtained through assertion of the defense in the
state court, with appeal of any errors of law to the Supreme Court if
necessary. And if the federal court rejects his constitutional arguments, or in any way narrows his defense to anything less than an absolute right to be free of all prosecution, the possibility of jury bias remains when the criminal proceeding is ultimately tried. Only in the
rare situation where disputes of fact exist in the context of a state anticipatory proceeding is there even a theoretical possibility of eliminating
bias by resort to a federal court. However, as previously indicated,
where factual disputes exist, it will most often be the case that an analysis of the need for anticipatory relief will reveal that such relief will
serve no useful purpose 4" Furthermore, even the theoretical possibility of help from a federal court depends upon the assumptions that the
state judge will prejudge the facts against the plaintiff and that a federal
judge would be immune from any similar bias. Moreover, the rarity
of the circumstances in which this sort of "correctable" state court bias
exists, coupled with the likelihood that such bias will be accompanied
by other, more objective indicia of prejudice, such as the creation of
unwarranted procedural hurdles for the plaintiff, which would justify
federal relief in any event, or arbitrary application of state law to a situation it was not designed to cover under circumstances where a state
appellate court might well reverse the trial court for errors of law, make
this possibility a slender reed upon which to rest a federal remedial
scheme which eliminates virtually all significant state court participation
in the processes of federal constitutional adjudication. The first model
proposed, on the other hand, has the virtue of providing federal anticipatory relief only when such relief will serve a useful purpose and it
349. Since a judgment of nonapplicability would be res judicata only as to the
precise factual situation upon which the issue was litigated, a subsequent prosecution would not be dismissed if a different course of conduct or change in
circumstances were proved. The same argument is not applicable where the
facts are disputed, since in that situation a declaration may be virtually without
utility. A determination of these factual issues in favor of the plaintiff might
be available as a defense to a subsequent prosecution; but an adverse determination, being based on a preponderance of the evidence, would probably not
be binding in a criminal prosecution where proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is required for conviction. There may, however, be circumstances where the
plaintiff's rights are in such jeopardy and in need of clarification that the presence of controverted factual issues should not be controlling.
Developments in the Law, 62 HAv. L. REv., supra note 88, at 871-72 (footnotes

omitted).
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can be objectively demonstrated that the state systems are somehow deficient in protecting constitutional rights.
In Younger v. Harrisand its companion cases, the Supreme Court
of the United States attempted to establish a trend away from extensive
federal anticipatory intervention into legitimate state affairs. Although
this trend is itself salutary, the doctrine evolved by the Court is unacceptable in its retention of outmoded chancery principles to govern the
administration of federal injunctive and declaratory relief from pending
state prosecutions and in its failure to articulate a rational standard for
federal anticipatory remedies against state action in all cases. To meet
the obligations imposed upon the federal courts by Congress in the Civil
Rights Act and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act in a rational and
intellectually honest way, and to meet the Supreme Court's institutional
obligation to insure the smooth working of our dual system of state and
federal courts, the Court must begin to move away from the approach
it has taken to federal anticipatory remedies since Younger. This article has proposed one means whereby it may do so. Whether the proposals made here are sound must be determined by time and the criticism of others. That the approach taken by the Court is unsound is,
however, clear. Further evolution by the Court of discretionary principles by which federal courts administer anticipatory remedies should
be undertaken with this in mind.

